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Preface

T

he challenge to belief represented by the competing claims of
the world religions has fascinated me for almost as long as I can
recall. Indeed, it seems to me a challenge second only to the
problem of theodicy for believers in God. Over twenty-five years
ago, I concluded a book on Paul Tillich with an examination of how
Tillich’s thought might be developed into a “world theology,” or
what would today be called a “pluralist theology.” I have taken the
opportunity in this present book to consider the many different
ways in which believers today approach the challenge of the
potentially disconfirming Other, the member of a religious tradition
different from one’s own. It is not my intent here to propose my
own solution to the challenge of religious pluralism, but rather to
examine in depth the diverse strategies already on the scene, from
outright denial of the problem to creative pluralist theological
strategies to New Age agendas that essentially encourage seekers to
abandon their traditional religious homes.
As with any book project, I owe much to many. Thanks to
Debbie Alexander for her inspiration and for introducing me to
various New Age practitioners and gatherings. Those introductions
allowed for an empirical component in my examination of the New
Age and its role in American religious pluralism.
My thanks, secondly, to regular conversation partners who
never fail to provide the intellectual stimulation that I find is
required to keep me going on any research project, even if our
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conversations are not always directly focused upon the project in
question: Marla Ackerley, Christopher Sharrett, Walter Brooks, and
Sidney Gottlieb.
Sidney Gottlieb must be singled out for a special word of thanks,
for not only is Sid a model of scholarship, an expert on figures as
diverse as George Herbert and Alfred Hitchcock, but he has served
as the editor for this book, as for other Sacred Heart University Press
volumes, and he carries out that task with extraordinary competence
and artistry.
Thanks, too, to the referees who read the manuscript for the
Sacred Heart University Press. I gleaned a great deal from their
suggestions. It is obligatory to say – but in this case it also happens
to be entirely true – that any weaknesses in the book are most likely
the result of points at which I unwisely decided to disregard those
readers’ advice.
Finally, thanks to Dr. Seamus Carey, Dean of the College of
Arts and Sciences at Sacred Heart University, who had an important
role in seeing this project through to its completion.

Introduction

A

merica has been the land of religious pluralism at least since the
seventeenth century, when European nations began founding
colonies in North America. There is no doubt that much light could
be shed upon American history, as well as upon our contemporary
situation in the United States, by contemplating how this religious
pluralism has affected the whole sweep of our national experience.
But what is at issue for us in the pages that follow is more narrowly
philosophical and theological. In earlier eras, Americans were unlikely
to encounter persons who embraced religions other than Christianity
or Judaism. But today, we live in the proverbial global village. The
explosion of new forms of electronic media makes it almost
impossible for the reasonably curious American to avoid confronting
religions other than his or her own. More concretely, the person
occupying the office cubicle next to me may very well be a Hindu or
a Muslim or a Buddhist. On an even more personal level, religiously
mixed marriages provide a potent example of religious pluralism.
How does the diversity of other religions that the individual
American believer must confront nearly every day undermine,
whether explicitly or implicitly, the claims of his or her own
spirituality? Philosopher Charles Taylor perceptively observes that
this concrete confrontation of different belief systems results in their
“mutual fragilization” and forces the individual believer to reckon
with “the undermining sense that others think differently.” The
other believer threatens to become the disconfirming Other.1
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Initially, America’s spiritual and religious pluralism, far from
appearing to be a threat to belief, seems wholly positive. First, this
pluralism is a result of a robust spiritual culture: it is reasonable to
suppose that we would not have so many spiritual options to choose
from in America if there were not a large number of persons who
wished to engage in the spiritual search. Pluralism is, in other
words, a reflection of the fact that a significant number of
Americans not only wish to be religious, but that their desire to be
religious has led religious entrepreneurs to offer a host of religious
options from which religious seekers can choose. Second, this
pluralism is not only a result of spiritual robustness but actually has
a causal role in reinforcing spirituality – more exactly, it reinforces
the general phenomenon of the spiritual quest – because the very
existence of so many endorsements of the spiritual quest lends that
quest an enhanced plausibility.2
On the other hand, however, spiritual and religious pluralism
confront the believer with a theoretical challenge. The specific
options arrayed before me, as opposed to the general phenomenon
of the spiritual quest, present competing spiritual worldviews that
frequently contradict one another: Lutheran Christianity
champions a God who graciously becomes a man in Jesus Christ in
order to die on the cross to atone for human sin, while Sunni Islam
holds that the very notion of God appearing in human form is
tantamount to idolatry and that there is no need for a divine act of
atonement. What is more, the all-important grounds upon which I
assume that the claims of my own religious or spiritual worldview
rest – divine revelation, for example, or supernatural intuition – are
typically the very same grounds adduced by those pieties that
contradict my own. Hence, I have no way to reassure myself, let
alone the advocates of competing views, that my own claims are
valid and that those that contradict them are invalid. Among a host
of contradictory perspectives in which no one perspective is
consistent with any of the others, one perspective, at most, can be
sound. And because none of the perspectives possesses evidence by
means of which to falsify the others, they effectively cancel one
another out. Indeed, given that I hold to one spiritual worldview
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out of a whole menagerie of contradictory ones, the simple
mathematical odds are that my own perspective is false. This is the
potent challenge represented by Taylor’s disconfirming Other.
We confront the paradox, then, that while the pluralism at issue
here seems allied, by some measures, with spiritual fecundity in
American society, it also possesses the potential powerfully to
undermine belief. Thus it is that, although various commentators
have opined for decades that a hitherto vigorous American piety
might eventually succumb to the relentless onslaught of the scientific
worldview or to some other force, we need to consider the
possibility that the very success of so many spiritualities in America
may actually prove to be a significant threat at least to the most
parochial, unmodified forms of American spiritual belief. Where
Christianity is concerned, which shall be our focus in this
exploration, these traditional forms of belief are represented by
“mainline” traditions, churches such as the Roman Catholic, United
Methodist, Presbyterian, Lutheran, United Church of Christ, and
Episcopalian.3
While terms such as “religion,” “spirituality,” and “pluralism”
are hardly esoteric, the quest for precision dictates that we not take
it for granted that their meaning is clear. I shall make an initial
attempt to be precise here in the Introduction by offering an
interpretation of the history of spiritual pluralism in America. This
interpretation involves a decidedly brief rehearsal of that history,
divided up into a consideration of the Colonial period, the roles of
revivalism and fundamentalism, and the constant presence of what
Catherine Albanese has called metaphysical religion.4
Religious pluralism was at the very heart of the Colonial
experience in America. The Puritans, those English religious
dissenters whose thinking was informed in large part by the
theology of John Calvin and who established settlements such as the
Plymouth Colony in Massachusetts, seem ordinarily to amass a
disproportionate amount of attention in popular accounts of
Colonial religion. They include, after all, the “Pilgrims” of gradeschool lore, zealous god-fearers who made the famous journey on
the Mayflower. But, of course, the Colonial experience was one of
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diverse colonies in no small measure because of the different
religious groups that came to these shores: for example, significant
numbers of Roman Catholics (among others) found their way to
Maryland, Quakers to Pennsylvania, and Anglicans to colonies such
as Virginia that were a function of entrepreneurship more than of
escape from religious persecution. New York, which began as the
Dutch colony of New Netherlands, illustrates all by itself the
pluralism of the Colonial scene. As Winthrop Hudson and John
Corrigan explain,
When the English took over control of New Netherlands in
1664, the new colony was the most religiously
heterogeneous area in America. The Dutch Reformed
church quite understandably was the largest single religious
group, and throughout the seventeenth century it was to
continue to have more adherents than all other groups
combined. But as Governor Dongan (a Roman Catholic)
reported in 1687, there were also French Calvinists,
German Lutherans, Congregationalists from New England,
several varieties of Quakers, Mennonites, Baptists, some
Roman Catholics, and a few Jews. “In short,” he explained,
“of all sorts of opinions there are some, and of the most part
none at all.”5
That is, the Governor is pointing out that, while many religious
groups were represented in New York, the majority of his
constituents had no strong opinions about religion.
Rhode Island, too, has a special place among the Colonies as a
symbol of pluralism, insofar as Roger Williams was able to bring his
convictions about religious freedom to fruition there, so that a host
of different religious groups flourished. A small Jewish community
could be found in Newport, Rhode Island, as early as the 1650s,
and a synagogue constructed in 1763 can be found there still today.6
We are already in a position to catch a glimpse of the initial
trajectory, at least, of American spiritual pluralism and to begin to
make some terminological distinctions. We can take as our point of
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departure a statement that has become a mantra for a good many
Americans today but that would have meant little or nothing to
their Colonial forebears: “I’m spiritual but not religious.”
Ordinarily, one who makes this assertion means to suggest that he
or she is interested in a life of participation in something beyond the
contours of the visible world, a form of participation affording the
experience of self-transcendence, but that such a life is not to be
found within the confines of “institutional religion.” That is, while
“spirituality” is concerned with a quest for participation in a reality
beyond the everyday and the resultant experience of selftranscendence, “religion” is here defined as a subset of that quest,
one characterized by being part of a group with clearly defined rules
of organization and requirements for belonging.7
Given this use of terms, what the brief survey above suggests is
that Colonial spiritual pluralism was, on the surface at least, mostly
of the “religious” variety: it was the result of institutionally welldefined groups, usually having an origin in Britain or on the
Continent, rubbing shoulders in Colonial America. Even the
Puritans, after all, though they were religious dissenters from the
Church of England, were intent on establishing precise rules of
membership and organization. And, despite their dissenting status,
they owed the vast majority of what they believed to institutional
forms of European Christianity that predated them. Similarly, while
there was plenty of movement within early American Christianity,
so that Congregational churches could end up being Unitarian or
Universalist, for example, even Unitarianism and Universalism had
European roots, and both took on recognizably institutional forms
in this country. If “spirituality” is the broader term, then, embracing
all forms of participation and self-transcendence in a reality
perceived to be beyond the everyday, including the institutional
subdivision called “religion,” we can say that America has been
spiritually pluralistic from the Colonial period on, but that in that
period itself the pluralism was largely of the religious variety.
That it was not entirely religious in character, however, can be
determined from two considerations, in particular. First, it is
important to keep in mind that, despite the desire of some present-
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day commentators to present glowing accounts of a thoroughly
pious early America, the Colonies had a significant number of
inhabitants for whom God, religion, and spirituality were of little
concern. While the fact that Colonial Americans were less pious
than some would have us believe is not an example of religious
pluralism, it nonetheless suggests more diversity than some would
have us believe existed in early America. Recall the brief quotation
from the Governor of the New York Colony cited above: while a
whole host of religious opinions was represented in his colony, most
inhabitants actually held to “none at all.” Indeed, the available data
indicates that church-going was at its lowest point in the whole of
American history in the period from roughly 1750-1790, when
only approximately seventeen percent of the population attended
church.8 Perhaps it is simply terminologically inaccurate to see the
phenomenon of unbelief in Colonial America as part of its spiritual
pluralism. Unbelief is not a form of religion or spirituality, after all,
but rather its negation. But the element of unbelief does further
variegate the spiritual scene in early America.
Second, and perhaps more important, many colonists were able
to combine their adherence to a well-defined, institutionalized
religious tradition with folk beliefs and practices that flourished
outside institutional walls. Contemporary historians have gone to
great lengths to show that the American colonists lived in a world full
of heavenly portents and bizarre events in nature, of fearful acts of fate
and uncanny evil forces. Colonists consulted fortunetellers and
astrological charts and saw ghosts and monsters in the forests.9 Thus,
if it can rightly be said, as Shirley Jackson Case would have it, that the
“sky hung low in the Ancient world,” something very similar can be
said for the atmosphere of early America.10 As a result, we must
conclude that early American pluralism was not only of the
institutional religious variety – one might also dub this the
“denominational” variety – but that it had wider spiritual dimensions.
Revivalism and fundamentalism added something distinctive
to the American equation, and further enhanced spiritual pluralism
on these shores. While revivalism as it developed in America had its
roots in movements on the Continent and in Britain, such as
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Pietism and Methodism, it took on a life of its own once
transplanted here and insinuated itself into the fabric of American
piety. One thinks, for instance, of the two Great Awakenings, of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries respectively, and of their
impact upon the American religious landscape. It is no accident that
arguably the most paradigmatic of American composers, Charles
Ives, drew much of the inspiration for his Third Symphony from the
phenomenon of the camp meeting so much a part of American
revivalism, nor that, on the other end of the musical spectrum, a
seminal twentieth-century rock band, Creedence Clearwater
Revival, took its name from the same phenomenon. Revivalism has
had a lasting impact upon American culture.
One of the most significant features of early revivalism was its
emphasis on individual religious experience. The believer expected to
have what Søren Kierkegaard would call, however foreign the
expression to the American believer’s own ears, an “absolute relation
to the Absolute.”11 Revivalism’s emphasis on the individual and his or
her proximity to the divine was paralleled in other varieties of
American piety. New England Transcendentalism, for instance, whose
preeminent representative was Ralph Waldo Emerson, had roots in
the thought-world of intellectual luminaries such as F.H. Jacobi,
G.W.F. Hegel, and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. But Transcendentalism’s
emphasis on the immediate presence of the divine to the human
person ran parallel to the revivalist conviction that the believer
ought to experience God directly, even though the latter had a less
impressive philosophical foundation.
Fundamentalism is, at least in part, an offspring of revivalist
Christianity. For while I have chosen to emphasize revivalism’s
emphasis upon the phenomenon of individual religious experience,
such experience was, in revivalism, inextricably tied to a brand of
preaching that was informed by a literalist reading of the Christian
Bible. It was in the early part of the twentieth century that some
Christians took the name “fundamentalist,” holding firm to what
they took to be “fundamentals” of Christian belief under siege in the
modern world. These fundamentals included, above all else, a belief
in the word-for-word inspiration of the Bible by God and the
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consequent commitment to read it literally on everything from the
creation stories in Genesis to the account of the virginal conception
of Jesus in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke. Andrew Greeley and
Michael Hout describe American fundamentalism’s origins this way:
The movement which came to be called fundamentalism was
born of the instinct that there could be no compromise with
Darwinian evolution without the loss of Christian faith.
Between 1915 and 1920 a group of conservative scholars
published twelve short volumes called The Fundamentals,
which laid down the nonnegotiable requirements of
Christianity. In 1919 the conservatives founded the World’s
Christian Fundamentals Association (in opposition to the
[mainline Protestant] Federal Council of Churches). . . .
They charged that their adversaries were no longer Christians
but founders of an entirely new religion.12
In more recent years, the term “fundamentalist” has probably
more often been used as a term of critique and derision than of selfidentification. Hence, while Christians who have accepted the
historical-critical approach to biblical interpretation initiated in
nineteenth-century Europe, can refer to their biblically literalist
counterparts as “fundamentalists,” and while the press in the United
States frequently dubs militant Islamic groups as “Islamic
fundamentalists,” today’s Christian literalists are more apt to define
themselves with terms such as “evangelical” or “born-again.”
Whatever the history of the term “fundamentalism,” however, the
defensive theological posture to which it points is still an
extraordinarily important part of the pluralistic religious environment
in America. As a result, American spiritual pluralism is characterized
not simply by a cacophony of competing positive proposals for what
ought to be believed, but also by voices at least equally concerned
with the negative task of defeating, or at least holding out against,
forces seen as corrosive of genuine piety.
In addition to the large number of institutionalized forms of
belief – the religious denominations – that have powered American
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religious pluralism and the dynamics that folk piety, revivalism, and
fundamentalism have added to it, we must also consider the
longstanding role played by what Catherine Albanese has dubbed
“metaphysical” spirituality. In her magisterial history, A Republic of
Mind, Albanese defines that all-important current of American
piety by focusing on four characteristics. First, it is characterized by
“a preoccupation with mind and its powers,” where mind is an
expansive concept ranging from cognition all the way to
clairvoyance.13 Second, metaphysical spirituality posits a
correspondence between a divine macrocosm and the human
microcosm (here the characteristic American emphasis on the
proximity of the divine and the human, the emphasis on divine
immanence, is in full flower) (p. 13). Third, metaphysical
spirituality espouses an understanding of reality that emphasizes
movement and energy (p. 13). And fourth, this characteristically
American movement expresses “a yearning for salvation understood
as solace, comfort, therapy, and healing” (p. 15). This metaphysical
form of the spiritual quest includes everything from Theosophy to
Christian Science, and it leads in our own time to so-called New
Age spirituality and to discrete new religions such as Scientology. Of
special importance for our purposes is the fact that this
metaphysical piety contributes to American spiritual pluralism not
just insofar as it is one more tendency to be added to the mix, but
because, in Albanese’s words, “the metaphysical world provides
abundant materials that emphasize, especially clearly, its pluralism
and, more, its fractiousness” (p. 7). That is, metaphysical spirituality
is internally pluralistic; internal diversity is one of its most salient
features, an especially relevant note that should be added, for our
purposes, to the four defining characteristics of metaphysical piety
listed above.
The dynamics of the forms of spirituality briefly considered here –
Colonial piety, revivalism, fundamentalism, and metaphysical
spirituality – continue to wield an influence in our own day. If Colonial
pluralism was fueled first and foremost simply by the many different
versions of institutional Christianity, along with a dash of Judaism,
brought to America by settlers, the ongoing immigration so
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characteristic of the United States has continually added to our
pluralism of religious institutions. Waves of immigration that
brought increasing numbers of Jews, Catholics, Lutherans, Eastern
Orthodox Christians, and other European groups to the United
States have been followed by immigration from other lands that has
added different world religions to the mix, including Hinduism,
Buddhism, and Islam. As for revivalism, the emphasis on divinehuman intimacy, far from being relegated to the period of the
Great Awakenings, is today as American as cherry pie. For example,
a significant number of contemporary Americans claim a “personal
relationship” with Jesus Christ. And forms of Christian belief
derived from fundamentalism often appear to be among the
liveliest religious groups in America today. As already indicated,
Albanese’s metaphysical religion has a multitude of contemporary
incarnations, most notably in the exceptionally variegated New
Age movement.
But this extraordinary spiritual pluralism returns us to the most
salient issue for our investigation: How does the individual
practitioner’s daily confrontation with the many potentially
disconfirming others arrayed about her challenge her own spirituality?
And how does the practitioner respond to that challenge?
Any consideration of the major challenges to belief in the
modern and contemporary worlds necessarily entails mention of the
much-debated phenomenon of secularization. Let us define
secularization as it has most often been used by scholars, namely, as
the process, beginning in Europe in the seventeenth century, in
which the Christian religion gradually lost influence in Western
society. While in the heyday of Christendom – that period during
the Middle Ages in which the church had a potent influence over all
dimensions of society – Christianity was simply inextricable from
the larger culture, the modern period in the West has seen the
church’s authority, at least in many countries, retreating farther and
farther into the individual or private sphere. With secularization,
religion is no longer the primary authority in arenas in which it
previously held sway. For instance, it no longer provides us with our
primary descriptions of how the physical world functions – that task
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has been taken over by science – and it can no longer dictate how
the economic component of society will be ordered. Religion, so the
proponents of the notion of secularization aver, has been relegated
to the private sphere. And even in the private sphere, religion and
spirituality seem in some cases to be losing their power. Britain,
Europe, and Scandinavia have all seen precipitous declines in both
church membership and private expressions of piety.14
But what, exactly, lies behind the phenomenon of
secularization? While it is naive to suppose that any mono-causal
explanation could be adequate, one of the most frequently discussed
potential causes is the rise of capitalism in the seventeenth and
subsequent centuries, for capitalism’s rationalizing dynamic
empowered the economic sphere, allowing it to organize much of
the rest of society around it. Religion, which had previously
occupied that organizing center, was now pushed to the periphery.
However, secularization theory, as described above in terms of
the rise to prominence of economic forces and the resultant
privatization of religion, has become particularly controversial in
recent years. That theory, in nearly all of its forms, assumes that
institutional religion, and probably even what we have labeled
spirituality, will continually weaken around the world as societies
continue down the road whose starting point is modernity, and
many proponents of the notion of secularization go on to assert that
religion will eventually fade away completely. Yet, in sharp contrast
to what the secularization hypothesis predicted, we seem to be
witnessing the so-called “return of religion.” From resurgent forms
of Islam around the world to phenomena such as Hindu
nationalism in India and the flourishing Pentecostal Protestantism
in South America, religion and spirituality seem to be gaining
strength rather than losing it.
But even if one interprets this present return of religion as just
a temporary detour in the inevitable trajectory of secularization, one
attributable perhaps to an unusual concatenation of socio-political
forces that will not long endure, the spiritual situation in the United
States has, for a much longer time, represented its own unique
challenge to secularization theory. While it is true that the
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constitutional separation of church and state in this country is
compatible with the privatization of religion often associated with
secularization, it is impossible to miss the ongoing salience of
religion in the lives of countless Americans. Nor should we overlook
the fact that the principle of separation of church and state is
constantly tested. Hence the challenge to secularization theory: If
the process of secularization is an inevitable byproduct of capitalist
rationalization, why is America so apparently non-secular? One
might opine that, while capitalism is, according to the regnant
theory, supposed to play a crucial role in religion’s demise, capitalists
may be ambivalent about religion, in that it can be a powerful tool
for social and economic control. Certainly Karl Marx did not
completely miss the mark in his analysis of how religion can
function in a society.
But where the peculiar vitality of American religion is at issue,
sociologists have frequently responded with a different explanation,
one that draws on capitalist economics to suggest how America has
avoided the capitalist economy’s marginalization of religion and
spirituality, but that does not focus on religion as a tool of control.
Religion’s startling vigor in the United States is, they aver, a matter
of market forces and of competition in America. In Europe and
Scandinavia, there has traditionally been an established church, such
as the Anglican Church in England or the Lutheran church in
Denmark. But insofar as an established church is protected from
vigorous competition, propped up by taxes and tradition, it is likely
to become fat and lazy, to atrophy for want of any vigorous
commitment on the part of its constituents. But in the United States,
with its constitutionally prescribed separation of church and state,
there is no one protected religious species. And because no one
spiritual group has an automatic leg up on the others, each group
must compete with the others to stay alive. Each must aggressively
market itself. Hence the long tradition of proselytizing in American
Christianity, as well as among many new religious movements in this
country. While the Jewish community, given its longstanding
suspicion of attempting to make converts, remains a holdout in this
regard – at least this is true of the mainstream American bodies of
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Judaism, namely, Orthodox, Reform, and Conservative – such
apparently unlikely candidates as the Unitarian Universalist Society
have now enthusiastically entered the religious marketplace. One can
actually find bumper stickers triumphantly declaring Unitarian
Universalism the “Uncommon Denomination.” In short, spiritual
groups in America market themselves as aggressively as Ford markets
Mustangs or General Mills markets Wheaties breakfast cereal.
If this analysis is sound, an analysis according to which
American spiritual pluralism results in a marketing effort that
keeps U.S. spirituality vigorous, then we must add it to the list of
positive correlations between pluralism and piety, to be balanced
off against our focus upon the potentially deleterious effects upon
the most traditional forms of piety of confronting those who
believe differently than oneself. It should be noted, however, that
not all commentators accept the marketplace analysis as an
explanation of America’s apparently unique ability to withstand the
forces of secularization. According to Gregory Paul, for instance,
this explanation:
owes much of its early acceptance to one of the greatest
mathematical faux pas in the history of sociology. The statistical
studies by Rodney Starke and Roger Finke that initially
established the free-market competition theory of American
religious vitality contained an egregious coding error: a key
formula contained a -1 rather than the correct +1.15
He goes on to explain that
Even before that extraordinary error was uncovered, Mark
Chavez . . . and Philip S. Gorski had published a devastating
2001 meta-analysis of more than two dozen studies alleged
to support the free-market hypothesis, concluding that “the
claim that religious pluralism and religious participation are
generally and positively associated . . . is not supported, and
attempts to discredit countervailing evidence on
methodological grounds must be rejected.”16
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We cannot say, for sure, then, whether it is in fact the freemarket competition among religions in American society that has
held off the full force of secularization on these shores. But whatever
the role of market competition in particular in the perennial vigor
of American piety, commentators will no doubt continue to cite
that apparent vigor, whatever its cause, as evidence against the
applicability of the secularization hypothesis to the American scene.
We should, however, bring a critical eye to bear on any credo
according to which religion and spirituality have an absolutely
secure place in American culture. After all, at the very center of our
interest in this study is the notion that American spiritual pluralism
may, in the long run, seriously undermine piety, or at least radically
change it. The specter of the disconfirming Other is ever present.
Hence, it may turn out that while American devotion has not
succumbed to secularization – where secularization is understood in
terms of the economy taking religion’s place as the unifying center
of the social order or, alternatively, as a weakening of religion due to
other modern forces, such as natural science – that devotion will in
fact eventually succumb to something else, namely, the individual’s
being forced concretely to confront a veritable chaos of spiritual
perspectives other than his or her own, so that fatal seeds of doubt
will be sown.
Now it will also be central to our thesis that the believer has a
number of different options, some more intellectually honest than
others, for responding to the challenge of the disconfirming Other.
For instance, the believer can make strategic modifications to belief
that may enable him or her to continue boldly to believe,
modifications that defuse the Other’s disconfirming power. We shall
analyze this possibility in detail in Chapters Three and Four.
Still, it is certainly possible to find subtle signs of weakening in
the structure of traditional American piety. That American piety
might not be quite as secure as it initially appears, and that spiritual
pluralism might be one factor undermining that piety, is plausible
given a brief glance at recent empirical data. We must make it clear
at the outset, however, that this empirical data provides scant
evidence, if any, that it is pluralism in particular that is weakening
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American spirituality. Rather, a glance at this data simply sets the
stage for our discussion by showing that, whatever the causes,
American spirituality is not without signs of being undermined.
The “U.S. Religious Landscape Survey 2008” undertaken by the
Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life looks to be the gold
standard of religious surveys for some time to come.17 While the
study is voluminous, a few brief observations stand out, given our
focus. First, the researchers found that
More than one-quarter of American adults (28%) have left
the faith in which they were raised in favor of another
religion – or no religion at all. If change in affiliation from
one type of Protestantism to another is included, roughly
44% of adults have either switched religious affiliation,
moved from being unaffiliated with any religion to being
affiliated with a particular faith, or dropped any connection
to a specific religious tradition altogether.18
While all such changes in affiliation bespeak the pluralism of
the American spiritual scene, the large number of unaffiliated
Americans amidst this pluralism is consistent with, though by no
means necessarily indicative of, the claim to be explored below,
namely, that pluralism can tempt the erstwhile believer into spiritual
indifference. Among those 18-29 years of age, one-in-four claim to
be unaffiliated with any particular spiritual or religious group. The
survey found that 16.1% of all Americans are unaffiliated. And
while 5.8% of Americans consider themselves unaffiliated but still
in some sense “religious,” the remaining unaffiliated persons dub
themselves wholly secular. Of particular interest is the fact that
“those Americans who are unaffiliated with any particular religion
have seen the greatest growth in numbers as a result of changes in
affiliation.”19 Andrew Greeley and Michael Hout draw on other
research to come to similar conclusions about the growing numbers
of the religiously unaffiliated. They report that the number of adults
who claim to have no religion doubled from seven to fourteen
percent in approximately the last thirty years.20
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A second indication that American spirituality might not be
quite as healthy as it first appears is provided by the statistics on
Roman Catholicism. While the number of Roman Catholics in
America has stayed roughly steady over the past few decades, that
turns out to be largely a function of foreign Catholics moving into
the U.S. population. In fact, to return to the Pew study,
“approximately one-third of the survey respondents who say they
were raised Catholic [in America] no longer describe themselves as
Catholic.”21 Pluralism might well be one salient factor here:
immigrant Catholics tend to come from less pluralistic
backgrounds, and first-generation immigrants tend to be shielded to
some degree from the full force of American spiritual pluralism
because they use their religious tradition as a tool for maintaining
their identity, which is threatened by the sense of being strangers in
a strange land. But a full third of American-born Catholics, those
who do in fact grow up in direct confrontation with the
disconfirming other, end up abandoning their Catholicism.
The Gallup organization’s international polling only adds to
the impression that, when compared to the spirituality of other
lands, Muslim countries in particular, American piety is not as
widely and enthusiastically embraced as an essential part of life as
some might suppose:
The importance of religion [in Muslim countries] is
reinforced by what Muslims say about their traditions
and customs, which also continue to play a central role in
their lives. When asked, “Are there traditions and
customs that are important to you, or not?” majorities in
many predominantly Muslim countries say “yes”: Jordan
(96%), Saudi Arabia (95%), Turkey (90%), and Egypt
(87%). This contrasts sharply with percentages of those
[from a cross-section of persons from many religious
traditions] answering “yes” to the same question in the
United States (54%) and especially in European
countries such as the United Kingdom (36%), France
(20%), and Beligium (23%).22
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Jon Meacham, writing in Newsweek and drawing upon the 2009
American Religious Identification Survey among other polls and
surveys, offers some further sobering data in his provocatively titled
article, “The Decline and Fall of Christian America.”23 He reports that
“the percentage of self-identified Christians has fallen 10 percentage
points since 1990, from 86 to 76 percent” (p. 34). In a Newsweek poll,
68% of the respondents said that religion is “losing influence in
American society” (p. 36) What is more, “the percentage of
Americans who think religion ‘can answer all or most of today’s
problems’ is now at a historic low of 48 percent” (p. 36). Perhaps most
surprising, “the number of people willing to describe themselves as
atheist or agnostic has increased about fourfold from 1990 to 2009,
from 1 million to about 3.6 million. (That is about double the
number of, say, Episcopalians in the United States)” (p. 34).
In his article “Is God Coming Or Going?” David Ramsay
Steele, drawing in part upon the work of Pippa Norris and Ronald
Inglehart on the relationship between religion and economic
development, provides further evidence to bolster the claim that
secularization is proceeding apace, not just in Europe but in the
United States as well. Steele points out, for example, that responses
to the Gallup organization’s frequent polls on U.S. church
attendance “exaggerate [how often the respondents actually attend
church] by up to one hundred percent. We now know that U.S.
church attendance has actually been falling steadily, and averages
around twenty percent – higher in the South and Midwest, but
lower in the rest of the country. U.S. church attendance is about
four times that of the UK, yet still, church-going is distinctly a
minority activity in today’s America.”24
There is another place to look for a subtle weakening of
American spirituality in recent decades, despite appearances of its
health. Popular culture in America has, in a span of roughly fifty
years, gone from seeing “religion” as something essentially too
sacred to treat with even a hint of irreverence (with undeniably
important exceptions, such as the witticisms directed at religion by
figures such as Mark Twain and H.L. Mencken) to a target ripe for
ridicule. Think of Kurt Vonngegut’s 1963 novel, Cat’s Cradle, that
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makes fun of religion as essentially a clever scam designed to make
our lives tolerable, all the way up to recent comic treatments of
religion such as George Carlin’s book When Will Jesus Bring the Pork
Chops?, Lewis Black’s Me of Little Faith, the antics of Jesus and his
fellow world redeemers on television’s South Park, and comic and
social commentator Bill Maher’s 2008 quasi-documentary
Religulous. Black captures the mood of many of those tempted to
skewer American piety: “I think [religion is] taken too seriously, and
anything that takes itself too seriously is open to ridicule.”25 The
kind of light-hearted approach to a topic that would, in an earlier
era, have more often been treated with the utmost gravity, is
illustrated by the following passage from Black’s book:
I feel [education is] more important than religion and, as it
teaches the art of critical thinking, it can, under certain
circumstances, even lead to religion. Religion, on the other
hand, might lead you to education, but that usually only
happens if you’ve been jailed and find Jesus and then Jesus
says, “Hey stupid, get your GED, I can’t understand you
when you pray to me.”26
What is more, there is no escaping the fact that religious
pluralism is a crucial component of the religious dynamics that
Black feels need to be skewered: “While it is true that many . . .
religions think they are the only true religion, the one true way to
God and eternal salvation, this is all . . . absolute bullshit.”27 While
these quotations from Black are taken from one of his books, he
mounts the same kind of offensive against institutional religion in
America in his stand-up routines, some of them aired on such
bastions of contemporary American television as HBO. While
Lenny Bruce’s criticisms of religion might have been as sharp as
Black’s, consider the utter implausibility of Bruce or any other
comic back in the 1960s similarly skewering religion on the Ed
Sullivan Show or the Tonight Show.
Film too tells us something about our now relatively relaxed
attitude toward piety. The 1970s brought us Oh God, with George
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Burns’s genial and thoroughly innocuous deity, hardly the
tremendum, the overpowering force traditionally associated with the
God of Western theism. In the 1979, Americans happily imbibed a
highly irreverent British import, Monty Python’s Life of Brian,
about a hapless and unwilling candidate for messiahship born next
door to Jesus of Nazareth, a film that went so far as to find humor
in crucifixion. Things became even more wildly impious in the
1999 film Dogma. While the Swedes can look back to classic Ingmar
Bergman films such as The Seventh Seal (1957) and Winter Light
(1962) for deadly-serious cinematic remonstrations of institutional
religion, American (and British) filmmakers have become adept at
comic treatments of a topic that would have been essentially offlimits before the 1960s.
In summary, then, an analysis of the state of religion and
spirituality in the contemporary United States results in a mixed
message. On the one hand, the number of different spiritual
enterprises in America today seems well-nigh unlimited; spiritual
pluralism could not be more in evidence. The multiplicity of
pieties that surround us surely indicates that spirituality in
America is far from moribund. But, on the other hand, both
contemporary polling data and the irreverent attitude toward
belief flouted in popular culture suggest that American religion
and spirituality are also showing significant signs of strain, or that,
though widely embraced, they are not taken nearly as seriously as
they once were. In the chapters that follow, we shall interpret this
mixed message as consistent with (but by no means exclusively
caused by) spiritual pluralism’s tendency to sow the seeds of its
own undoing. Spiritual practitioners, sensing this threat, even if
only subliminally, attempt to hold on to their beliefs through a
number of different maneuvers, some of them merely defensive (we
shall dub these “avoidance tactics”) and some of them entailing
creative changes in traditional belief systems (we shall call these
“modification strategies”). It is these avoidance tactics and
modification strategies that will take us to the heart of the matter.
For while the juxtaposition that we have just undertaken of spiritual
pluralism with empirical indicators of the weakening of traditional
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religious and spiritual allegiances is, at best, suggestive, the
investigation of the avoidance tactics and modification strategies
will provide a window into the internal logic of belief and pluralistic
disconfirmation that our brief consideration of empirical data
cannot accomplish. That is, the polling data adduced above, as well
as the examples of treating religion less than seriously, by no means
substantiate by themselves the thesis that pluralism can fragilize
belief systems. There is little indication within that data that
pluralism is the prime culprit in the weakening of belief. The point
of our adducing empirical data, then, is simply to show that
spirituality and religion and American do have chinks in their armor
that must have been inflicted by various causes, of which pluralism
might be one. Hence we must venture interpretive judgments that
go beyond what the data we have adduced thus far has provided.
Yet logical argument will not be our only concern. For while
our investigation is stimulated by a logical dilemma – “How can I
assume that my beliefs are sound when I have no better grounds to
embrace them than others have for their very different beliefs?” –
our interest is in a whole host of ways that Americans respond to
that dilemma. As a result, we will, in addition to more strictly
logical matters, necessarily venture into the psychology of belief,
especially when considering avoidance tactics.

CHAPTER ONE

Traditional Religion and the
Disconfirming Other

O

ur investigation shall consider what responses are open to a
traditional believer when met with the challenge of the
disconfirming Other. But just who counts as a “traditional
believer?” As with our stipulative definitions of religion and
spirituality, we shall focus upon one particular type of believer in
our investigation. He or she is the believer who does genuinely
believe, that is, who does not underestimate the element of belief in
religion and the truth claims that necessarily accompany what we
call belief. This is obviously not to suppose that the cognitive
dimension of spirituality is the only one that matters. It does not
negate the importance of features such as ritual and ethical
behavior; it does not treat these other components as mere
epiphenomena.
Our “traditional believer,” then, is a person who takes seriously
the intellectual tenets of one of the great world religions and
understands those tenets in a relatively orthodox manner. If we take
a Christian as our example – since Christianity is by far the largest
religion in America, it is Christians who will most often confront
the problem of disconfirmation – this Christian is a someone who,
at least before he or she is challenged by spiritual pluralism, is
comfortable reciting the Apostle’s Creed, for instance. Another way
to express the matter is to say that our “ideal type” here is
represented by the believer who has seriously entered into Anselm’s
laudable enterprise of “faith seeking understanding.” Hence, our
exemplary believer will be particularly alert to the problem of
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cognitive dissonance, that is, to points at which his or her religious
beliefs seem to be contradicted by other plausible truth claims.
Surely there are such believers. Indeed, if the intellectually astute
believer described here does not in fact connect with any actual
practitioners, then Christianity in particular, given its theological
and doctrinal emphases, is in serious trouble. Of course, even these
believers do not approach Christianity with a disinterested
collection of philosophical abstractions about God. Although they
are focused upon the cognitive dimensions of Christian beliefs, they
connect the beliefs at issue here with their ultimate concern, and
they are convinced that the deity whom they believe exists is to be
unconditionally trusted, a way of relating to God that can
appropriately be designated “faith.”
But perhaps the whole project that I intend to undertake here –
the examination of the different sorts of responses religious persons
make to the realization that their beliefs are contradicted by the
beliefs found in other religions – is fatally flawed because it places
so much emphasis on having sufficient proof for one’s beliefs.
Aren’t there many things that we believe that we cannot prove? As
a matter of fact, we usually do not believe things unless we at least
know how we could go about proving them, even if we do not
have proof in hand at the moment. Suppose I tell you that I have
loaned my good friend Frank a large sum of money, even though
he would not tell me what he needed the money for. Do I have
proof that Frank is trustworthy? Most likely, I do not possess
indisputable proof, proof beyond any possibility of doubt. But I
have the record of trustworthiness that Frank has displayed in all
of his dealings with me up to this point. And if I really wanted to
prove his trustworthiness, I could have him tracked by a private
detective and find out what he intends to do with the money that
I have lent him.
But this challenge, namely, that we ought not to expect the
religious person to have proof for his or her beliefs, falters not only
because we most often do in fact have something approaching proof
for our beliefs – I might well take Frank’s long record of
trustworthiness as proof beyond a reasonable doubt – and because
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we know exactly how proof could be attained. It falters too because
it trades on a false comparison. It compares beliefs we have for
which we may not possess immediate ironclad proof with beliefs we
hold that are confronted with strong evidence against them. The
challenge of the disconfirming Other is about being faced with
apparent disproof, and that is a significantly different situation from
simply believing without incontrovertible proof.
However, the astute reader may offer another objection to the
whole project that is at issue here. He or she may say that I am
trading on just one notion of truth, a fairly narrowly scientific
notion of truth. But aren’t there many forms of truth? For example,
doesn’t an artful production of Macbeth communicate truth, at least
to the most receptive members of its audience, and isn’t that truth
something other than the sort of truth associated with the natural
sciences? We must answer both of these questions in the affirmative.
But it is also important to note that religious belief, while it
certainly appeals to various notions of truth, does have a large
investment in something closely akin to scientific truth. For
instance, belief that there is a supernatural consciousness that freely
created the universe is a proposition, and it is closer in form to the
claim that the Earth orbits the sun than it is to T.S. Eliot’s poetic
expression of the claim that modernity is a spiritual wasteland.
Having noted this kinship of religious truth claims with
scientific ones, however, it is also important to note that we shall
have occasion in our investigation to take other, non-scientific kinds
of truth very seriously indeed. The modification strategies discussed
in detail in Chapters Three and Four will certainly take us beyond
any one, narrow definition of truth. For example, we shall take
seriously Vietnamese Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hahn’s claim that
the Christian notion of the Kingdom of God can in some sense be
made consonant with the goal of the Buddhist spiritual quest, and
this will require stretching the notion of truth beyond its narrowly
scientific sense.
It is well to admit at the outset that the intellectually oriented,
probing Christian lay person upon whom we are focusing is in the
minority in most Christian churches. This is probably more the
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result of the larger culture in which American Christianity finds
itself, a culture that has, not without reason, often been dubbed
“anti-intellectual,” than it is the result of any purely intra-Christian
dynamic. The fact remains, however, that the problems that will be
at the center of our investigation throughout this book may be
consciously a problem for only a minority of believers. But to be
simply unaware of the problem does not mean that the problem is
of no consequence to the tradition in which one participates.
When the traditional believer is confronted with the
disconfirming Other, modified versions of piety may emerge that
serve to remove the apparent contradictions between his or her own
convictions and those of the others encountered in America’s
heterogeneous spiritual landscape. Our exploration of such creative
modifications and the strategies that produce them will be reserved,
however, for Chapters Three and Four. At issue in this first chapter
is what results from the confrontation with the disconfirming Other
when one is not willing to go the distance required to produce a
modified belief system that can remove the contradictions that
pluralism brings to the fore. One opts instead for avoidance tactics.
In Chapter Two, we shall analyze what might be deemed a half-way
house between avoidance tactics and strategic modifications of
belief, namely, fundamentalist belief.
In order to understand the relevance of modification strategies
and avoidance tactics alike, we must first investigate just what can
result from the believer’s confrontation with the disconfirming
Other. It turns out that there are at least three important results of
this confrontation. First, it becomes apparent that the extraordinarily
important concept of divine revelation cannot do the job that it is
asked to do because, when confronted with the disconfirming Other,
my conviction that something from my tradition is an instance of
divine revelation is itself called into question. Second, the believer is
forced into fideism. That is, he or she is forced to make a blind leap
of faith and essentially to abandon the project of faith seeking
understanding. And, third, the believer is left with a narrative about
the relationship of the sacred and the profane that is characterized by
a distinctive sort of bifurcation or fracture: whereas the profane is
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ordinarily parasitic on the sacred with which it is contrasted, now the
profane seems to lose even this negative connection with the sacred.
Having considered these three results of the collision of one’s
beliefs with the very different beliefs of others, we will be in a
position to move on to consider three avoidance reactions to the
disconfirmation dilemma. These avoidance tactics should not be
confused with the aforementioned strategic modifications to one’s
belief system: the latter attempt to alter one’s beliefs so as to avoid
disconfirmation, while the former are essentially attempts to evade
the issue. The three avoidance tactics are the compartmentalization
of one’s worldview, the decision to see matters of religious belief as
essentially immune to logic, and self-deception about the
disconfirming implications of pluralism.
We begin, then, with the manner in which a robust pluralism
renders the concept of divine revelation impotent, at least when the
concept of revelation stands in its traditional, unmodified form.
The great Abrahamic religions are all thoroughly tied up with the
notion of revelation. Because God transcends the finite sphere in
which we exist and to which our minds are proportioned, we can
know very little about God, so the thinking goes, if we are left to
our own devices. God is in heaven, and we are on earth. Any
significant knowledge of God – whether of his ways or of the more
specific details of what he expects of human beings – depends on
God deigning to come down to humanity in order to show himself.
The paradigmatic instance of this in the Jewish tradition is God’s
revelation of the Torah, his divine “teaching,” to Moses on Mount
Sinai. While the tablets of the Law provide the most tangible
example of God’s revelation, the Torah continues to unfold in the
form of the oral law, the tradition of commentary upon which is
enshrined in the texts known as the Mishnah and the Talmud.
Christianity inherits the Jewish concept of God revealing
himself, and it takes up the idea of revelation in at least a threefold
fashion. The ultimate revelation for Christians is the person of Jesus
the Christ, God become man. But the Christ event is testified to in
the New Testament which, along with the Hebrew Bible/Old
Testament, thus becomes a source of divine revelation in its own
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right. And in Roman Catholic Christianity, the ongoing teaching
tradition communicated through the leadership of the Church, the
Magisterium (from the Latin for “teacher”), is a third source of
divine revelation.
Islam, the third of the three Abrahamic traditions, offers what
is perhaps the most straightforward theology of divine revelation:
Allah has revealed himself via word-for-word dictation to the
prophet Muhammad, a revelation mediated through an angel,
recited by Muhammad upon its reception, and recorded in the
Muslim scripture, the Quran.
But it is not only the Abrahamic traditions that depend upon
the notion of divine revelation. The classic Hindu sacred text the
Baghavad Gita (the “Song of God”) contains revelatory insights
provided by the god Krishna. The more philosophically dense
collection known as the Upanishads does not in fact rest its claim to
authority upon divine revelation, but, as we shall see below, the
tradition that it was supernaturally intuited by special “seers” ends
up raising some of the same difficulties in a spiritually plural world
as do more straightforward claims to revelation.
As is so often the case, Buddhism seems to be the oddtradition-out among the major religions. Because the Buddha has
no apparent interest in the concept of a God, divine revelation is not
on the Buddhist agenda. However, there are elements of the
Mahayana branch of Buddhism in particular, such as stories of the
Buddha wordlessly communicating a truth beyond ordinary
concepts to a particularly adept disciple, that, as with the
Upanishads, will end up confronting the Buddhist with some of the
same difficulties that arise in other traditions when one faces the
disconfirming Other.
Even if the implications of pluralism for the concept of divine
revelation are seldom discussed in the theological literature, the
concept of revelation is faced with a significant challenge, a
challenge that might well be dubbed the Lockean paradox. The
great eighteenth-century British philosopher John Locke recognized
that, if it were unambiguously the case that I had access to divine
revelation on some particular matter, I could rest assured that I
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possessed the greatest certainty imaginable on that topic. But here is
the problem: “Our assurance can be no greater than our knowledge
is, that it is a revelation from God.”1 The paradox, in other words,
is that while divine revelation would always provide knowledge far
superior and more secure than that available to finite, unaided
human reason, human reason turns out to have the last word, for we
must always make the human judgment that a particular claimant
to revelatory status is in fact a revelation. Mere human reason always
outruns claims to divine revelation; our own faculties necessarily
stand in judgment over any and all alleged revelations.
Christian theologians, in particular, have been aware of this
dilemma. That is why they have frequently maintained that the act
of Christian faith, through which one accepts certain claims as
revelatory, is not, in fact, simply a human achievement. Rather,
Christian theology has often maintained that faith, and hence the
acceptance of an alleged revelation as a revelation, is a gift
empowered by God’s grace. In the words of Dei filius, issued by the
First Vatican Council in 1870, faith is “a supernatural virtue by
which, with the inspiration and help of God’s grace, we believe that
what he has revealed is true.”2
But this all comes to naught when the mainline Christian, for
instance, confronts the many different spiritual options in his or her
society. If I am such a Christian, why do I believe that Jesus of
Nazareth is the incarnation of the second person of the divine
Trinity? Because of revelation, of course. And I will add that my
assurance that this is indeed a matter of divine revelation is provided
not simply by my ability to produce reasonable arguments for its
being so but through the illumination, the inner certainty,
vouchsafed me by God’s Holy Spirit. But here is the rub: When I
confront my Muslim neighbor, I learn that she believes something
very different about God and God’s interaction with humanity. God
is not triune, and God never did, and never could, become
incarnate in a human being. The problem, of course, is that my
Muslim acquaintance will claim to know this precisely on the basis
of divine revelation, specifically, the revelation contained in the
Holy Quran. It will do me little good to say, “But I know that my
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belief is the one based on genuine revelation, since I possess the
certainty gifted to me by the Holy Spirit,” for the Muslim will
respond that her conviction that the Quran is divine revelation is
equally certain, given that her conviction is not the products of her
own reflection but, rather, is the work of Allah, all things being in
His hands.
Claims to special faculties of knowledge, such as the examples
provided above of the origin of the Upanishads or of wordless
transmission of wisdom from the Buddha to a disciple, are in a
precisely parallel situation to claims of divine revelation: persons
from traditions different from my own will also claim to have
special routes to knowledge, and the blatant contradictions between
and among our competing claims will render the notion of special
faculties of knowledge useless. When confronted with pluralism’s
disconfirming Other, claims to special spiritual ways of knowing are
shown to have no more weight than claims to divine revelation.
In short, claims to divine revelation and its analogues, whatever
their plausibility when set forth solely within the boundaries of
single communities of belief, become impotent when confronted by
other revelatory claims coming from other spiritual communities.
There are simply no independent criteria, external to both
Christianity and Islam, for example, that allow us to adjudicate
between the competing Christian and Muslim claims. And if we
add Hindus and Jews to the conversation, we will end up with a yet
more cacophonous, and ultimately pointless, shouting match.
There is an extraordinary reversal of fortune here, for, in one fell
swoop, what initially appeared to be the paradigm of objective
knowledge, namely, divine revelation, suddenly seems to be a
function of mere subjectivity. It turns out that claims of divine
revelation, so apparently essential to the content of theists’ spiritual
convictions, end up falling far short of their promise.
This fashion in which spiritual pluralism challenges the power
of revelatory claims leads to the second result of the pluralistic
confrontation mentioned above, namely, that the believer is reduced
to fideism. The term “fideism,” from the Latin for faith, is a kind of
“faith-ism.” It is the famous “blind leap of faith,” an apparently
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willful decision to believe something when there is no rational
evidence for the belief, but only the bare act of faith itself. There
have been times in the history of Christianity, in particular, when
fideism has been celebrated rather than condemned. But, ordinarily,
these have been in settings in which the confrontation with other
spiritual traditions was not in the offing; it was in these cases an
intra-Christian dynamic at issue. In the nineteenth century, Søren
Kierkegaard talked provocatively about faith as a “movement by
virtue of the absurd.”3 He juxtaposed the absurdity of faith with the
uncontroversial deliverances of reason in an attempt to call forth
authentic Christian faith out of a Christianity that had become no
more than a taken-for-granted cultural inheritance. Kierkegaard did
not, in other words, retreat to a blind leap into absurdity as a
response to the challenge of what Muslims or Hindus believed, but,
rather, in response to a moribund culture-Christianity. Even Karl
Barth, the great Swiss Calvinist theologian, despite the fact that he
was a twentieth-century figure and thus already lived in a world
aware of religious pluralism, set forth his fideistic theology within a
decidedly parochial context. Barth was, once again, pitting his
version of fideism against a form of Christianity, one that he
believed put far too much confidence in the ability of our human
faculties to grasp the divine.
It may well be the case that within the sort of intra-Christian
conflicts fought by Kierkegaard and Barth, fideism can be shown to
have certain advantages as a spiritual practice. But fideism surely
proves useless when we step outside the confines of the Christian
community and attempt to use it as a theoretical tool to defend our
beliefs when they are challenged by the disconfirming Other. In the
latter instance, as could have been anticipated from our discussion
of the Lockean revelation paradox, the retreat to fideism can issue in
little more than a shouting match among devotees of different
spiritual perspectives.
The third result of the confrontation of unmodified mainline
belief with the disconfirming Other is a special sort of bifurcation
of the sacred and the profane. Students of religion have often noted
how various cultures through time have divided the world into the
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sacred and the profane realms. The sacred, of course, is that
dimension of reality infused with meaning derived from beyond the
merely finite. It is the focus of the spiritual quest for participation
and self-transcendence. The concept of the “profane” – the word
comes from the Latin expression for “outside the doors of the
temple” – helps to delimit the sacred; it is its counterpoint. But as
with all binary concepts, it would be a misunderstanding to suppose
that the sacred and the profane are somehow completely separate
from one another, for they necessarily derive their meanings from
one another. They are parasitic upon each other.
Although Plato’s Republic is not ordinarily taken as a religious or
spiritual document in the narrow senses of the term, this parasitism
can be illustrated by his famous allegory of the cave. Plato contrasts
the transcendent realm of the Forms, the ultimate source of what is,
with the world of mere appearances in which we find ourselves here
below. While he typically thinks in the abstractions of the
philosopher rather than in the more emotionally-charged categories
of the preacher, Plato’s story provides a particularly clear metaphor
for how the sacred or Real is related to the merely profane. The
allegory of the cave depicts prisoners chained in a cave, facing its
back wall. They are not allowed to see the figures that move back and
forth in the outside world in front of the cave, but only the shadows
that those figures cast on the wall. Our immediate experience of the
world is analogous to the prisoners seeing mere shadows, for that
immediate experience does not acquaint us with the Real, the Forms,
but only with deficient imitations of those Forms. Hence, the
Platonic allegory presents us with a division between the Real,
knowledge of which requires something beyond our ordinary habits
of perception, and the everyday world that we mistakenly suppose to
be the Real. It is legitimate to equate this distinction with that of the
sacred and the profane, not only in that that the Forms are
transcendent, but also insofar as knowledge of the Forms and
liberation from bondage to the merely apparent is necessary for our
existential fulfillment or “salvation” as human beings.
What is particularly helpful for our purposes about Plato’s
allegory, as already suggested, is that it so clearly illustrates the
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manner in which the binary concepts of the sacred and the profane
are not simple opposites but are parasitic upon one another. The
images cast on the cave wall are indeed mere images, not the Real,
but they are nonetheless images of what is in fact the Real. If the
figures walking past the cave entrance were different, the shadows
cast on the wall would be different too. One’s particular notion of
the sacred should dictate one’s experience of the profane.
We can get a second view of this interdependence of sacred and
profane by turning to what Mircea Eliade, probably the most
famous expositor of the sacred-profane distinction, dubbed the axis
mundi.4 The axis mundi is literally the pole at the center of the
world. Eliade’s claim is that a vast number of spiritual traditions
employ versions of axis mundi symbolism: they have images of a
vertical structure that provides a passageway between the earth and
the heavens, between the profane and the sacred. The Hebrew Bible
story of Jacob’s ladder, a ladder on which angels can move back and
forth between heaven and earth, is one example. The Christian cross
is an axis mundi symbol too, in that it is a pole – ancient Christian
devotional language refers to it as the “tree,” echoing the Tree of Life
found in the Garden of Eden – on which Christ was crucified. The
crucifixion purchases salvation, that is, access to heaven. That there
are such passageways between the realms of the sacred and the
profane illustrates once more that the sacred and profane are not
traditionally conceived as simple opposites of one another such that
never the twain shall meet. The profane is dependent upon the
sacred, and what it means to live within the profane realm is
determined by the nature of the sacred which stands over against it.
It turns out, then, that while the concept of the profane might
initially suggest the mere absence of the sacred, the profane has
ordinarily been a function of the sacred. And this means that
different notions of the sacred should produce different notions of
the profane. Note how dissimilar a pious American Methodist’s
perception of the profane normally is from the perception of an
advocate of Iranian theocracy. The former will most likely perceive
the distinction between sacred and profane as more pronounced
than the latter. The Iranian theocrat does not deny that one can
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distinguish between the sort of relationship with Allah attained in
the midst of prayer, on the one hand, and the implications of that
relationship in a court of law, on the other hand. But to the extent
that he or she maintains that the laws of the land should be a
function of Shariah, that is, Muslim legal prescriptions derived
directly from the Quran and Muslim tradition, the divide between
sacred and profane will be seen as a smooth transition rather than
an easily discernable break. The Muslim theocrat’s expectation that
the profane will reflect the sacred in a relatively direct fashion will
be similar to the expectation of a citizen of Christendom in Europe’s
Middle Ages, where the Church could authoritatively pronounce
even on economic matters, for instance, by prohibiting the charging
of interest on loans.
But the seemingly logical expectation that the profane realm
will possess distinctive characteristics based upon the distinctive
perception of the sacred with which it is juxtaposed is confounded
in pluralistic America. American pluralism resulted in the
constitutional separation of church and state, which produced an
unprecedentedly wide divide between sacred and profane. The
width of that divide is only expanded by the highly rationalized
structure of the American capitalist economy and its accompanying
political and legal systems. This structure dictates how we shall
behave in the profane realm, regardless of our individual perceptions
of the sacred. Furthermore, the wide gap between the sacred and the
profane created by the constitutional separation of church and state
and its exacerbation by these additional structural features of our
society is further increased as American pluralism is enhanced. If I
am a twenty-first century American evangelical Christian, I must
live in a society alongside Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, and New
Agers, as well as with other Christians of a non-evangelical, liberal
persuasion. The demands of practical interaction among all these
different believers in the profane sphere, an interaction that
demands that we all follow essentially the same rules of behavior,
homogenizes the profane.
While different groups may still evaluate the profane differently –
one sort of believer may attempt to be “in the world but not of it,”
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while another sort will be perfectly comfortable in the profane
world – the actual structure of the profane world will be largely the
same for all. Of course, we ought not to underestimate the
importance of these different evaluative judgments of the profane.
This is, after all, in large measure, what the notorious “culture
wars” of recent years have been all about. Evangelical Christians
want the Ten Commandments posted in American courthouses,
while members of more liberal religious or spiritual groups
frequently do not. But the fact that such culture wars have taken
on particular saliency in recent decades only testifies to the way in
which the increasingly pluralistic character of American society
pushes us closer to a homogenization of the profane, a
homogenization that representatives of the “religious right” are
convinced leaves out some essential beliefs and values. In the
nineteenth century, hardly anyone interpreted the constitutional
separation of church and state as dictating that it would be
inappropriate to place a nativity scene, a Christian symbol, on the
town green at Christmastime. Now that Muslims, Hindus,
Buddhists, and Jews have a say in things that they did not have
previously (not to mention the increasing significance of skeptical,
non-religious voices), that nativity scene is regarded as
unconstitutional. As pluralism continues apace, the profane’s
ability to reflect a particular brand of sacrality diminishes.
Let us return to the traditional notion of the sacred and the
profane. As binary concepts, the sacred and the profane will
always suggest a bifurcation: the profane is that dimension outside
of the sacred, as the sacred is that which transcends, is of more
value than, or is more real than the profane. But the bifurcation in
the narrative of the sacred and the profane found in traditional
societies, such as those discussed by Eliade, is a highly qualified
bifurcation or fracture: the profane is indeed what the sacred is
not, but it is nonetheless the particular sort of profane space that
it is as a function of the particular sort of sacred that stands
beyond it. What we have found in twenty-first century America,
with its robust spiritual pluralism, is a different sort of bifurcation,
a peculiar sort of fracture that separates the sacred and the
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profane. For now the profane is merely the non-sacred in an
entirely general sense, rather than that which stands over against a
specific image of sacrality.
A concrete example of this peculiar bifurcation is provided by
the common morality we find in the profane sphere today. As the
new breed of scientist-critics of religion, such as Richard Dawkins
and Sam Harris, has pointed out, the moral standards actually
practiced in American society (as well as in a sister society such as
Britain), even by self-professed “Bible-believing Christians,” does
not really derive from the Christian Bible, at least not in any direct
fashion.5 Rather, even the fundamentalist Christian draws upon the
common secular morality, what we can call here the morality of the
largely homogeneous profane sphere.
Consider, as but one example, America’s near-obsession with
“family values” as the desideratum of our moral demeanor.6
While it is true that one of the Ten Commandments orders us to
“Honor thy father and thy mother,” the larger set of family
values so dear to evangelical Christians, values that are given lip
service by the vast majority of Americans of all spiritual stripes,
are not to be found in what is for Christians the most
authoritative content of the Scriptures, namely, the teachings of
Jesus. In one Gospel story, Jesus calls a man to be his disciple.
Out of proper respect for his father, who has just died, the man
asks to be allowed to bury his father first, before he travels away
with Jesus. But Jesus will have none of it. “Let the dead bury
their own dead” is his harsh reply (Matthew 8:22 and Luke
9:60). When Jesus is in a crowded room teaching and he is told
that his mother and brothers are outside and wish to see him,
Jesus dismissively replies that his real mother and brothers are
those that follow him; blood takes a back seat to ideology
(Matthew 19:46-50; Mark 3:31-35; Luke 8:19-21). Perhaps
most dramatically of all, Jesus actually goes so far as to say that
his followers ought to “hate” their mothers and fathers in
comparison to their love for him (Luke 14:26). Try putting that
version of family values on the Family Channel and getting a
positive response from its targeted demographic!
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There are innumerable spiritual communities available for us to
join, but when it comes to our everyday behavior, our interactions
with others in the profane sphere, our actions are less often a
reflection of the vision of the sacred set forth in the spiritual
community with which we identify, and more often part of a wellnigh common American value system, even if, as with all value
systems, not all members of the society end up actually practicing
what they acknowledge as the common ideal. The source of our
moral values in contemporary American society is, in other words,
one example of the way in which the profane sphere, the everyday
world which persons of different spiritual persuasions occupy in
common, is not a shadow cast by our idiosyncratic visions of the
sacred. Instead the profane sphere is almost impervious to particular
notions of the sacred.
We have considered three important results of the
confrontation of mainline religion with the disconfirming Other,
namely, the effective dissolution of the power of revelatory claims to
back beliefs, the retreat into fideism, and an exaggerated bifurcation
of the relationship of the sacred and the profane. This prepares us to
move on to an exploration of three avoidance tactics employed by
practitioners of traditional religion, responses that evade the
challenge to modify one’s beliefs so as to ward of pluralistic
disconfirmation.
Of course, before we begin our investigation of these avoidance
reactions, it must be acknowledged that some believers will not get
even this far: not only will they refuse the opportunity to modify
their beliefs in the face of the pluralistic challenge, they will not even
engage in avoidance tactics. Instead, they will simply not confront
the pluralistic challenge at all, perhaps because they have never
thought through the implications of the fact that others’ faiths have
the same degree of evidential support as their own. The observation
that there are undoubtedly some religious persons who are blissfully
unaware of the challenge of the disconfirming Other, coupled with
the fact that such persons are irrelevant to our whole investigation,
forces us to recall the stipulation made above that we are dealing not
with all believers, but with those who take the project of faith
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seeking understanding seriously. But, once again, those particular
believers are not only a very real portion of the total population of
believers, they are also the sorts of believers that religious traditions
would most like to have.
Putting aside those traditional believers, then, who somehow
avoid thinking about their neighbors’ spiritual beliefs at all, we
come upon three avoidance tactics employed in the face of the
disconfirming Other. It is essential to be clear about what it is
possible to claim about such tactics and what is beyond the reach of
our investigation. It should be obvious that a philosophical analysis
such as the one we are undertaking here, which does indeed draw
upon the psychology of religion in addition to the philosophy of
religion and theology, nonetheless cannot claim perfect access to the
psyches of individual believers.
What is at issue for us, in any case, is a more theoretical
undertaking: we begin with the uncontroversial fact that there are
persons who hold what we are calling traditional beliefs, there being
a host of traditional communities, from forms of Roman
Catholicism and Lutheranism, for example, to equally traditional
forms of Islam. We subsequently note that, if particular mainline
beliefs go largely unmodified, they sometimes stand in stark
contradiction to the beliefs held fast by members of other spiritual
persuasions. For instance, Roman Catholic Christians hold that
Jesus of Nazareth is the incarnation of the second person of the
divine Trinity, while Sunni Muslims hold that the very notion of the
Trinity is sacrilege, in that it compromises monotheism, and that
the incarnation of the divine is equally unthinkable, in that it
idolatrously reduces God or Allah to finite dimensions. We note,
furthermore, that some Roman Catholics are quite aware of the
contradiction between their own convictions and those of their
Muslim fellow-citizens, and that they are equally aware of their
inability to show that their beliefs rest on grounds that are more
secure than the grounds upon which Muslim faith rests. We then
take the straightforward step of looking for known, relatively
uncontroversial psychological devices that can plausibly account for
even an intellectually astute person’s ability to live with such
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contradiction. The first avoidance tactic that we shall consider is
compartmentalization, since it is in many ways the simplest of the
three. Next we shall explore the self-conscious dismissal of logic in
matters of spiritual belief. Finally, we shall investigate the tactic of
self-deception, which can reasonably be regarded as the most
psychologically complex of the three.
It is a truism, a chestnut of folk psychology, that human beings
are able to compartmentalize what they believe. That is, they have
the ability to hold both conviction “a” and conviction “b,” even
when “a” and “b” contradict one another, and they accomplish this
feat by seeing to it that the contradictory convictions are never
brought face to face. It is, in other words, as if there were separate
compartments within the human psyche that, like the watertight
compartments of a ship, can be safely sealed off from one another.
Thus, I may firmly believe that Jesus of Nazareth is the incarnation
of God but also recognize not only that Muslims handily reject this
claim but also that I have absolutely no reason to suppose that my
convictions are more securely founded than the Muslim counterconvictions. But I will compartmentalize the belief from the
recognition, so that the two never confront one another.
As it turns out, we have a bit more to support the notion that
human beings engage in compartmentalization than mere folk
psychology. Contemporary neuroscience provides evidence that
compartmentalization is indeed a common phenomenon. Rita
Carter, who has written widely on contemporary brain research,
shows in her book Multiplicity how the human brain switches back
and forth between different ways of seeing and thinking when it
encounters two contradictory possibilities so that it can embrace
both of them. A concrete example is provided by certain visual
“illusions.” Take, for example, the line drawing, so often reproduced
in psychology textbooks, that can be seen either as symmetrical
facial profiles lined up nose to nose or as a vase. Most of us are also
familiar with the figure that can be seen as either a duck or a rabbit.
The salient point here is that our brains will allow us to interpret the
figure in question in contradictory ways, but that it cannot embrace
those contrary ways of seeing at one and the same moment: “your brain
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will allow you to see only one at a time . . . it just can’t ‘do’ both
patterns simultaneously.”7
Carter goes on to explain that “this inability to see things in
two ways simultaneously [but to see things in contradictory ways in
sequence] occurs throughout the brain, including areas concerned
with thoughts and emotions.”8 This suggests, of course, that the
brain can and will hold contradictory ideas (not just contradictory
visual interpretations) and that it will accomplish this feat by
temporally compartmentalizing, that is, by focusing its attention on
one idea at one time and on an opposing idea at another, without
allowing the two ideas to come face to face in the same moment.9
Spiritual pluralism can reasonably be read as one possible driver of
this phenomenon. As Carter points out, “For most of us the options
presented to us [in contemporary society] are increasing [including
spiritual options] – life is getting more, not less, complicated.
Hence, we switch from one way of seeing things to another, one way
of being to another.”10
That this temporal compartmentalization is indeed an avoidance
tactic employed to deal with the disconfirming Other becomes all the
more plausible when we factor in the role of emotion in some kinds
of temporal compartmentalizing. Spiritual beliefs often entail a large
emotional investment, given that they are about matters of ultimate
importance to us: they deal with the meaning of life, the implications
of death, and the moral principles by which we believe that we ought
to live. One is understandably loath to give up beliefs that are of such
extraordinary existential significance. Hence, if compartmentalization
can prevent these beliefs from being undermined by a confrontation
with the disconfirming Other, it is reasonable to suppose that
compartmentalization will be an attractive option indeed. Consider
an actual example. There are numerous Christians who disavow
Darwinian evolution because they believe that it contradicts the Book
of Genesis. Yet those same Christians take it as a given that
pharmaceutical companies need continually to develop new
antibiotics as bacteria become resistant to older antibiotics. Penicillin
cannot cure all of the ills that it once could. Yet this phenomenon is
nothing other than Darwinian natural selection.
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The second avoidance tactic on our agenda is the selfconscious abandonment of logic in matters spiritual and religious.
Let us return once more to our hypothetical mainline Christian,
an intellectually responsible practitioner who has grown up
reciting the Apostle’s Creed on Sunday morning. At some point,
however, the increasingly pluralistic character of American
spirituality and the ever-more effective communication of that
pluralism via new forms of media lead our believer to confront the
challenge of the disconfirming Other: Hindus and Muslims and
Buddhists, not to mention Jews and even some other Christians,
do not believe what I believe, and I cannot produce any better
evidence for my convictions than they have for theirs. My beliefs
are crucial to who I am. They constitute, in Paul Tillich’s familiar
phrase, my ultimate concern.11 Yet the chances of my beliefs being
the one set of correct beliefs among the sea of competitors are
mathematically slim.
The believer who is put in this apparently untenable position
may well decide to take a page, as it were, from Job. While Job is
concerned about theodicy rather than pluralism – though Job’s socalled friends, with their conflicting views, might be said to
represent pluralism – the answer that he receives from God may
appear to be equally applicable to a contemporary person of faith
facing the disconfirming Other. God famously makes the point to
Job that divine matters are simply beyond human comprehension.
Where were humans when God laid the foundations of the world?
Faith too is, in the end, a divine matter, consisting as it does of a
claim to be in relationship with God and to know certain things
about God. Thus, perhaps I, taking the part of our hypothetical
traditional and intellectually astute believer, will acknowledge that,
on the one hand, I am certain about my faith convictions, while, on
the other hand, I cannot intellectually solve the challenge
represented by the other believer. But I may go on to conclude that
this is where I simply ought to abandon logic, thereby releasing
myself from the responsibility of explaining why my own
convictions ought to be taken as more secure than those of other
believers. After all, divine matters are beyond the grasp of human
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reason, and thus even the law of non-contradiction must sometimes
be suspended when issues of faith are at stake.
It is worth noting that this willingness to abandon even the
most basic canons of logical reasoning when it comes to matters
spiritual is not without an impressive pedigree. The church father
Tertullian is well known for glorying in believing in what appears to
human reason as impossible. And centuries later, Martin Luther,
never at a loss for the pithy phrase, referred to reason as the whore
of the devil. If we desire a more contemporary example of the
notion that, in matters of faith, logic does not always apply, we can
look once more to the theology of Karl Barth.
This tactic of willfully transgressing the principles of logic may
recall our earlier discussion of fideism, along with the incapacitation
of revelation and the unprecedented disconnect between sacred and
profane. But these were meant to be understood not as conscious
tactics employed by a believer facing the disconfirming Other – that
is what is at issue in the present case – but rather, as unavoidable
logical implications of the dilemma of the disconfirming Other, the
implications of which the believer might not even be conscious.
One can take a blind leap of faith, after all, without ever reflecting
upon the fact that it is blind. Hence, what separates our present
discussion of the willful transgression of logic from our earlier
discussion of fideism is that, despite the potential overlap between
the two topics, we are thinking of the former as a self-conscious
choice on the part of the believer.
The third avoidance strategy to be considered is self-deception.
Georges Roy boldly claims that “Despite appearances, many
Western adults who’ve been exposed to standard science and
sincerely claim to believe in God are self-deceived; at some level they
believe the claim is false.”12 Indeed, according to Roy, there are
“reasons to suppose that anyone subjected to a standard AngloEuropean high school education knows at some level that standard
theistic claims are false.”13 If human beings can and do deceive
themselves about the contradiction that Roy alleges between
traditional theism and science – many would of course argue that
no such contradiction exists – then it is to be presumed that they
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can also deceive themselves about the disconfirming implications of
the Other’s religious and spiritual convictions.
The notion of self-deception, however, is certainly one of the
most puzzling concepts in all of psychology. How can one possibly
deceive oneself? The concept implies that I know something to be
true but, at the same time, succeed in convincing myself that it is
not true. But that is a contradiction in terms. Yet, few would deny
that most of us are, from time to time, subject to something that we
would be willing to call self-deception. Scientist Michael Gazzaniga
puts it in straightforward terms:
We not only lie to each other, we lie to ourselves. From 100
percent of high school students who rank themselves as
having a higher-than-average ability to get along with
others (a mathematical impossibility) to 93 percent of
college professors who rank themselves above average at
their work, self-deception is at play.14
How can we make sense of the notion of self-deception, then? I
suggest that in self-deception it is not the case that one is aware of the
fact that what one believes (what one “knows” is true) is in fact false;
that scenario is simply impossible to make sense of. Rather, in the case
of self-deception, one recognizes that there is overwhelming evidence
against what one believes. But given that belief is a matter of decision – I am
not forced to believe in God, for instance, but decide to do so – there is no
actual contradiction in my believing something even when I recognize
that the evidence against that belief is overwhelming. The evidence
that Frank is guilty of murder may be overwhelming, but the evidence
may be misleading: Frank may in fact be innocent. The problem,
however, is that if the only information to which I am privy is the
overwhelming evidence of Frank’s guilt and I have no good reason to
believe that the evidence is misleading, my belief that Frank is
innocent is an irrational belief. What is more, I know that the belief is
irrational. This is, I think, what we mean by self-deception.
Human beings frequently engage in self-deception, understood
in this fashion, in matters of health. There are numerous stories
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about persons who convince themselves that the rapidly growing
mass that they are aware of in some part of their body is perfectly
harmless, even when that mass grows to the size of a grapefruit.
They convince themselves that the mass is harmless even though
they are quite aware of the fact that, in the vast majority of cases, a
mass of that size is not in fact harmless and should be surgically
removed as soon as possible. They choose to believe something
contrary to the evidence. There is no actual logical contradiction in
doing so, but this is precisely what we mean by self-deception. I
believe what I want to believe, knowing full well that the belief flies
in the face of the available evidence.
My analysis of what is involved in the phenomenon of selfdeception bears some resemblance, on two counts, to aspects of
Freudian theory, though it by no means necessitates adopting the
entirety of the Freudian notion of the psyche. First of all, selfdeception as I have described it sounds, on some counts, like
Freud’s notion of wish fulfillment as laid out in his famous attack
upon religion in The Future of an Illusion.15 I convince myself that
the mass growing in my abdomen is thoroughly benign simply
because I so badly want it to be benign. Freud claims that this is
what happens with belief in God: the believer has no evidence that
God exists but so badly desires to tap the advantages that accrue
to belief in a cosmic father figure that he or she convinces himself
or herself that that cosmic figure actually exists. My description of
self-deception is a bit different, however, in that it requires not
that I believe in the face of the lack of evidence but, rather, that I
believe against the extraordinary preponderance of evidence that I do
know exists.
Second, the self-deceiver’s ability to believe the opposite of
what the evidence supports suggests a potent ability to avoid
thinking about the evidence and its implications, and this ability
might be seen as akin to the notion of Freudian repression into the
unconscious (though it has no necessary connection to the whole
Freudian philosophy of instinctual drives and traumatic memories
that are supposedly forced into the unconscious, most often via
strong social prohibitions).
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Can this sort of self-deception be described as “lying to
oneself,” as Gazzaniga describes self-deception above? One might
initially suppose that it cannot, given my rejection of the claim that
self-deception is belief in something that one knows to be false. But
Australian psychologist Dorothy Rowe echoes Gazzaniga’s language
while adding an account of the existential issues at stake that brings
her understanding of self-deception into proximity to my discussion
of that phenomenon, with its emphasis on what we wish to believe:
We first experience the terror of being invalidated when we
are small children, but by the time we are three or four we
have learned a way of avoiding it: we have learned how to
lie. From then on, whenever we glimpse the faintest
possibility that our “selves” might be threatened with
annihilation, we lie.
First of all, we lie to ourselves. Why? Because we fear that
we do not have the strength and courage to face the truth
of our situation. We even lie about lying, preferring to call
our lies anything but a lie. We say: “He’s in denial.”16
In any case, if self-deception as it has been described here is not
only possible but common, then it is fair to assume that many
persons go on believing what they have always believed in matters
of religion even though they are aware of the evidence – in this case
the simple fact – that the array of competing, equally-well
supported, positions taken by their neighbors renders the truth of
their own religious convictions mathematically unlikely.

CHAPTER TWO

I Believe Because They Don’t:
Fundamentalist Christianity

I

n the Introduction, we had occasion briefly to mention what is
now ordinarily called “evangelical” or “born-again” Christianity,
and we noted that the term “fundamentalist” is no longer the term
that most conservative Protestant Christians use to designate
themselves. However, I will use the term “fundamentalist” in this
chapter to denote a defensive form of Christian belief, of which
contemporary evangelicalism or born-again Christianity is one
example. The term is useful, because it suggests the adherence to
what are deemed fundamentals of belief that are under siege within
the larger culture. The siege mentality is crucial for what I am
calling fundamentalism here: Christian fundamentalism – and it is
Christian fundamentalism rather than fundamentalisms of other
varieties that I shall explore – can be designated an oppositional
spiritual stance, one that is defined by the commitment to protect
certain beliefs, deemed essential to Christian faith, from forces in
the larger culture that are perceived as undermining those beliefs.
In the third edition of his classic study of American evangelicalism,
Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory, Randall Balmer effectively underlines
the oppositional character of fundamentalist spirituality:
Ever since the 1925 Scopes Trial convinced fundamentalists
that the broader American culture had turned hostile to
their interests, fundamentalists have busied themselves
devising various institutions to insulate themselves and
their children from the depredations of the world. (In fact,
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the terms worldly and worldliness are probably the closest
most evangelicals come to epithets; these words are often
spoken sneeringly, in a tone at the same time
condescending and cautionary).1
As a result of this oppositional stance, we encounter a “network
of institutions – churches, denominations, Bible camps, colleges,
seminaries, publishing houses, mission societies – that evangelicals
built in earnest after 1925. The subculture made possible a
wholesale retreat from the larger culture.”2
Our particular interest in fundamentalism as an oppositional
spirituality has to do with its relation to pluralism and the
phenomenon of the disconfirming Other. Now the opposition
that Christian fundamentalism has most vigorously mounted
since its early-twentieth-century inception has been against such
modern phenomena as the dictates of evolutionary biology and
historical criticism of the Bible. But its oppositional stance has
also included other religions. Most often, the other religions at
issue have not been Asian traditions such as Hinduism and
Buddhism (although its unrelenting foreign missionary activities
are tantamount to opposition to these traditions) but, rather, the
triumvirate of mainline or liberal Protestantism, Roman
Catholicism, and Judaism. Mainline Protestants are seen as having
abandoned crucial tenets of the faith. Roman Catholics have often
been regarded by Protestant fundamentalists as hardly Christian at
all, but as devotees of the merely human institution that is the
Roman Catholic Church, which has usurped the role properly
belonging to Jesus Christ, a Christ known not through the
pronouncements of the Church but only in the Bible. As for the
Jews, nothing could be much clearer than the pronouncement of
a recent President of the Southern Baptist Convention (the single
largest Protestant body in the United States and one of decidedly
fundamentalist pedigree) that “God Almighty does not hear the
prayer of a Jew.”3 Fundamentalist Christian organizations such as
Jews for Jesus leave no doubt about the fact that, for
fundamentalists, Judaism is deficient.
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Nor should we overlook the fact that, even when we say that
evolutionary biology and historical criticism of the Bible have been
the leading incitements to fundamentalist defensiveness, we are still
dealing with spiritual pluralism and its disconfirming Other: the
larger American culture that has embraced science and historical
criticism is not composed principally of atheists and avowed
secularists, but, rather, of non-fundamentalist Christians and Jews
who choose to integrate these modern ideas and methods into their
own worldviews. Hence the aforementioned antipathy to liberal
Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Jews.
When Andrew Greeley and Michael Hout lay out what they
take to be the defining characteristics of “Conservative Christianity”
in the United States, a concrete iteration of what I am calling
Christian fundamentalism, they focus on three things: a literal
reading of the Bible, an emphasis on the experience of being bornagain, and a commitment to converting others to their version of
faith in Jesus Christ.4 The first of these, namely, biblical literalism,
is at the heart of what I am calling fundamentalism, for one of the
fundamentals that is perceived as being under attack in the modern
and contemporary worlds is precisely the idea that God dictated the
Bible word-for-word to its writers and that he intended it to be read
literally. At first blush, the attack upon biblical literalism appears to
come from the two quarters indicated above: the historical-critical
approach to studying the Bible and the dictates of natural science,
evolutionary biology in particular. The historical-critical method is
largely a product of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in
Europe. To turn that method upon the Bible is to read it, not as
dictation from God, but as the product of human beings living in
particular times and affected by particular concerns and
circumstances. As a result, the Bible is understood as a document
motivated by forces parallel to those that motivated many other
literary works from various locales in the ancient world. Natural
science is seen by fundamentalists as undermining the literal
inerrancy of the Bible insofar as disciplines such as geology, biology,
and physics appear to contradict biblical stories about the creation
of the world and humanity as well as biblical accounts of miracles.
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But the sense of siege that fuels biblical literalism is tied to an
additional phenomenon.
Though it is not as salient as historical criticism and natural
science, we should not overlook the role of the pluralistic challenge
in generating a tenacious, defensive biblical literalism among
fundamentalists, for extra-Christian pluralism – the fact that there
are many different religions – confronts the Christian with
alternative scriptures, each claiming the sort of authority that
Christians have usually supposed belongs to their Bible alone. Nonfundamentalist Christians might respond by embracing an
interpretive freedom as the proper approach to the Bible (seeing
much of it as metaphorical or symbolic, for example), which would
theoretically allow them to avoid the conclusion that other
scriptures contradict, and perhaps actually disconfirm, the Bible. In
sharp contrast, the fundamentalist takes the oppositional tack of
saying that the Bible must be taken wholly literally and thus should
be regarded as falsifying any texts that contradict it.
Greeley and Hout’s second defining characteristic, namely, the
emphasis upon the experience of being born again, connects with
our discussion in the Introduction of the importance in American
spirituality generally of an experience of direct connection with the
divine. The phrase “born again” itself comes from the third chapter
of the Gospel of John in the Christian New Testament, where Jesus
explains that, in order to enter the Kingdom of God, one must be
born anew (John 3:3-8). That is, one must radically reorient one’s
priorities, away from selfish concerns and toward God and his
Kingdom. There is a parallel message in another statement
attributed to Jesus, namely, that one must lose the old self in order
to find the new, regenerate self (Matthew 10:39). Christians of
nearly all stripes would probably agree with this sentiment if taken
broadly – indeed even spiritual traditions outside Christianity speak
of the need for a radical reorientation of one’s life, as in the Buddha’s
teaching about extinguishing the illusion of selfhood – but
American Christian fundamentalists have given the expression
“born again” a specific meaning. For the fundamentalist believer, to
be born again is to have a powerful experience of the dissolution of
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one’s old way of being and of having one’s life reordered by being
directly connected, via the act of faith, to Jesus Christ. The
experience is sufficiently dramatic that fundamentalists often
suppose that one should be able to name the precise date upon
which the experience of Christian rebirth occurred.
The third factor that Greeley and Hout associate with what
they call Conservative Christianity is particularly germane to our
topic of pluralism: it is a hallmark of American Christian
fundamentalism that its practitioners expend extraordinary effort to
convert others to their viewpoint, to bring others to the born-again
experience. The very phenomenon of proselytizing or evangelization
is, of course, a function of pluralism. If one lived in a wholly
homogeneous religious or spiritual environment, then there would
be no need to convert others to one’s own perspective, for there
would be no other perspectives. But fundamentalists not only live
among a host of other perspectives, they are characterized by a zeal
for converting those who believe differently.
We shall return to this zeal to convert others as a response to
spiritual pluralism. But first we must examine an even more basic
move on the part of fundamentalism, one directed to all of the
threats that fundamentalists perceive as arrayed before them,
including pluralism and its threat of the disconfirming Other. As we
have seen, fundamentalism is a spiritual worldview defined by a
sense of siege. How might this siege mentality not only suggest the
need for a defensive posture on the part of the fundamentalist but
simultaneously actually provide such a defense against the disconfirming
potential of those who believe differently?
We are, by now, familiar with the structure of pluralistic
disconfirmation. I hold certain spiritual beliefs, and my grounds for
those beliefs are claims of divine revelation or something akin to
revelation. But I encounter persons with spiritual beliefs that
contradict my own. By itself, this does not disconfirm my own
convictions. The problem arises from the fact that those other
persons make the same sorts of claims to revelation as grounding for
their beliefs as the claims that I make. And this means that my belief
system is, in effect, neutralized. We are faced with a host of
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conflicting claims and no reliable means for adjudicating among
them and demonstrating that some of the claims are legitimate
while their competitors are not. The contradictory spiritual beliefs
cancel one another out.
Spiritual and religious beliefs – and here we are concerned with
beliefs, as opposed to the many other phenomena associated with
spirituality, such as engagement in ritual and the practice of prayer –
are, of course, of a particular type. Unlike existentially neutral beliefs,
such as my belief that Abraham Lincoln was the sixteenth rather
than the seventeenth President of the United States, there is often a
great deal riding on spiritual beliefs: both my sense of the meaning
of life and my assumptions about the significance of death may well
be a function of my spiritual beliefs. But there is another category
of belief, one whose existential weight can be equal to that of
spiritual beliefs, that is nonetheless distinct from them, namely, our
moral convictions. One way to distinguish between the two is to
note that, however important a spiritual belief is to me – for
example, the belief that God exists – a spiritual belief is a conviction
that something is the case. A moral belief, by contrast, is a
conviction, not that something is the case, but that something
ought to be the case: I ought, for instance, to love my neighbor as I
love myself.
It turns out that the siege mentality in Christian
fundamentalism introduces the special category of moral conviction
into the mix in its confrontation with the disconfirming Other. This
is of the utmost significance, because it suggests that, while I might
find myself at an impasse if I had only my spiritual beliefs (and the
grounding that goes with them) to put up against the disconfirming
Other, the impasse can be broken if I have another sort of belief in
addition to those spiritual beliefs, namely a moral belief. The
fundamentalist concludes – and this is often one reason why he or
she becomes a fundamentalist – that particular spiritual truths of
the greatest importance are under attack and that it is therefore his
or her moral duty to defend those truths. While the Other’s spiritual
beliefs might appear simply to cancel out my beliefs if my spiritual
beliefs are taken just on their own, they do not in fact stand on their
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own. They are augmented by a distinct, additional category of
belief, belief about my moral duties. Spiritual beliefs point to
moral duties here because the perceived assault upon beliefs of
ultimate importance makes it incumbent upon me to do all that I
can to protect those ultimate convictions. And it is of the very
nature of moral convictions that they are supposed to trump all
else, to guide all aspects of our behavior, including our cognitive
behavior. To take a non-spiritual example, my moral conviction
that all people should be treated as equals will lead me to look
askance at any cognitive claim that one racial group is mentally
inferior to others, even if someone presents me with evidence for
that cognitive claim that possesses initial plausibility. To the extent
that the Christian fundamentalist experiences the disconfirming
challenge of other belief traditions as an assault that he or she has
the moral duty to repulse, the fundamentalist has potentially
broken the impasse that results when one has only propositional
beliefs (beliefs about what is the case) to put up against the
propositional beliefs of others.
In order fully to understand the dynamic at work here, it is
essential that we distinguish between a logical-argumentative
analysis of this defensive move on the part of the fundamentalist
and what we might call a phenomenological analysis. From a
logical-argumentative perspective, the scenario that we have just
sketched, in which the believer wards off the disconfirming assault
of the Other via a sense of moral duty, is fallacious. One has a moral
duty to defend certain spiritual propositions if and only if those
propositions are true. But the very problem at hand is that the
disconfirming Other puts me in a position where I cannot know
that the spiritual propositions that I have been embracing up to this
point are true. Indeed, if I consider the many different competing
religious visions that exist in our pluralistic society, then the
mathematical odds are against the spiritual propositions that I have
hitherto embraced being true. From a logical point of view, then,
the moral duty to defend the propositions, the card that supposedly
trumps the cognitive challenge of the disconfirming Other, never
actually arrives in my hand: if spiritual pluralism suggests that the
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propositions are most likely false, then the moral duty to defend
them cannot arise in the first place. To put the matter in a slightly
different way, the sense of moral duty arises too late.
Human nature being what it is, however, an analysis of the logic
at issue will not necessarily suffice as an explanation of what actually
happens when I confront the disconfirming Other. The designation
of our species as homo sapiens is woefully incomplete if it is taken to
mean that we will always follow the most logical course. In order to
capture what, I wish to argue, frequently occurs in the
fundamentalist’s real-life response to the disconfirming Other, we
must take what might be deemed a phenomenological approach.
That is, we must ask, not what the rules of logical argumentation
dictate, but what the fundamentalist believer experiences upon
encountering the potentially disconfirming Other, what is actually
given to his or her consciousness. This kind of phenomenological
inquiry suggests, first of all, that the sense of moral duty will indeed
appear as a “given,” a dictum that confronts the believer as a
powerful responsibility imposed on him or her from without and
that, as such, has no chance of being interpreted as something that
he or she is illicitly throwing into the gap. The analysis reveals,
secondly, that the moral duty will by no means be experienced as
something that comes too late, after the encounter with the
disconfirming Other has destroyed the believer’s truth claims and
hence any moral duty to defend them. Rather, the believer will
experience the moral duty to defend his or her convictions about
ultimate truth as given simultaneously with the recognition that
those convictions are under siege.5
The challenge of the spiritual Other, simply by threatening
to undo one’s own beliefs, rather than by advancing to the point
of actually undoing them, already brings the moral duty to
defend those beliefs to the forefront of consciousness. This
phenomenological fact becomes evident not only in the zeal with
which fundamentalists defend their beliefs but also the energy
that they put into attempting to convert others. They go to the
effort, in many cases, to walk from house to house and knock on
doors, seeking to convince others to embrace their convictions,
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and many are willing to travel to far-away places to engage in
this behavior.
Thus it is that the fundamentalist is defiantly averring, “I
believe because they do not” and doing so in a twofold sense. First
of all, what the fundamentalist picks out as the most fundamental
of his or her beliefs – Jesus’ virgin birth and the literal inerrancy of
the Bible, for example – are a function of what is under attack by
others. Secondly, his or her ability to hold onto the overall spiritual
worldview that these fundamentals polemically symbolize is
provided, in part, by the overwhelming sense of moral responsibility
that arises precisely because of this attack.
Of course, the evangelical Christian form of fundamentalism,
as is the case with other spiritual fundamentalisms, does not have to
rely simply upon the believer’s own resources to oppose the threat of
the unbelieving Other. Many fundamentalist Christians
passionately aver that God himself will go so far as to spirit the
believer away from the potentially debilitating influence of that
other. A sizable portion of contemporary Christian fundamentalists,
true to the convictions of their forebears throughout Christian
history, believe that Christ will shortly return to earth. Apocalyptic
expectations, which include the expectation of the return of Christ,
were apparently part of earliest Christianity, as is apparent from the
Gospel of Mark, the first of the canonical Gospels to be written.
While early Christian apocalypticism, which rises to a fever pitch in
the book of Revelation in the New Testament, did not pay a great
deal of attention to what contemporary fundamentalists call the
“rapture,” it is at the heart of much fundamentalist Christian piety
today. Based on a short passage in Paul’s First Thessalonians (4:17),
the doctrine of the rapture, as it is most frequently articulated in the
present day and age, holds that one of the first miraculous
accompaniments of Christ’s world-ending return will be the
“rapturing” of true believers into heaven. That is, in one
extraordinary moment, God will literally whisk the born-again away
to heaven, leaving the unsaved on their own here below. If a true
believer happens to be driving a car or piloting an airplane when the
rapture occurs, woe be unto those left behind, who may find the
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now-unguided vehicle careening out of control and into their path.
Hence the familiar automobile bumper sticker displayed by some
fundamentalist Christians: “Warning: In Case of Rapture This Car
Will Be Unmanned.”
The implications of this rapture theology are genuinely striking.
First of all, as already indicated, the clear implication is that the threat
of the unbelieving Other will be supernaturally removed: born-again
Christians will be taken up to the ultimate safe haven, and the
potentially disconfirming Others will be left behind on earth. In fact,
Left Behind is one title in the extraordinarily popular series of
Christian apocalyptic fiction authored by Tim F. LeHaye and Jerry B.
Jenkins, of which there is even a Hollywood film version.6
Second, not only will God take care of spiriting the believer
away from the potentially corrupting influence of the unbelieving
Other, but the theology of the rapture encourages the
fundamentalist Christian to engage in undisguised Schadenfreude
about the fate of that other. As their obvious delight in the image of
out-of-control cars and airplanes wreaking havoc among the
unsaved makes clear, devotees of rapture theology take solace in the
notion that those whose beliefs contradict their own will be subject
to a world of suffering precisely as a function of their holding the
wrong beliefs. And the ante will be upped when the merely thisworldly suffering of the left behind is followed by eternal suffering
in Hell when they die. As is the case with most apocalyptic thinking,
going back to its origins in Judaism in the second century B.C.E.
when Palestine was under the rule of Antiochus IV (the tyrant of
Hanukkah fame), the threat to the faith is perceived as so great that
it is necessary for God to step in and violently overthrow the present
order. That so many Christian fundamentalists hold to apocalyptic
theology as basic to their belief system – the imminent return of
Christ is one of the beliefs listed in the all-important The
Fundamentals mentioned in the Introduction as a founding
document of Christian fundamentalism7 – only serves to underline
the oppositional structure of fundamentalism.
Having attempted to lay bare the basic oppositional structure of
fundamentalist belief and one of the defensive moves that comes
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with it, it is now important for us to reiterate an important fact.
While much of the sense of siege underlying fundamentalist Christian
belief and the oppositional structure of that belief may have their
roots in the historical-critical approach to the Bible and the dictates
of the natural sciences (which is already an indirect encounter with
pluralism, in that science and historical critique are embraced by
other Christians and many Jews), a direct encounter with spiritual
pluralism is also an important factor. I have already alluded to the
incessant proselytizing activities of fundamentalist Christian groups,
which includes both the attempt to convert various sorts of Jews and
Christians to the fundamentalist fold and the desire to convert
devotees of other world religions. We are all familiar with the overseas
missionary work that fundamentalist Christians undertake in an
effort to upend the spiritual convictions that animate non-Christian
religions. But we do not have to consider simply what Christian
missionaries are up to in places such as Africa and Asia to see the
fundamentalist antipathy to non-Christian religions. At a rally for
candidate John McCain during the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign,
the former pastor of the Grace Evangelical Free Church in Davenport,
Iowa, Arnold Conrad, offered up the following prayer:
There are millions of people around this world praying to
their god – whether it’s Hindu, Buddha [sic], Allah – that
his [Senator McCain’s] opponent [Senator Barack Obama]
wins, for a variety of reasons. And Lord, I pray that you will
guard your own reputation, because they’re going to think
that their God is bigger than you, if that happens.”8
To this list of opponents, we can add New Age piety, most forms
of which are often seen by fundamentalists as anti-Christian paganism.
As already indicated above with the example of the door-knocking for
which fundamentalists are renowned – with Jehovah’s Witnesses
providing the clearest example – fundamentalist evangelization efforts
occur here in the United States as well as abroad.
While the fundamentalist oppositional tactic explored
above, which centers on the sense of moral responsibility to
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defend one’s beliefs, can be applied equally well to the threat
posed by spiritual pluralism in its most direct form, to the threat
from historical criticism of the Bible, and to challenges from
natural science, there is another fundamentalist strategy that
appears tailor-made to address the threat represented by
pluralism in particular: one can attempt to create one’s own
social plausibility structure.
Our beliefs will be the more firmly held the more intersubjective validity they possess. In a society in which everyone
believes that there is a God in heaven who rewards the righteous and
punishes the wicked, the reality of that God can virtually be taken
for granted. By contrast, if there are many persons in my midst who
reject belief in such a God, the belief will seem to me, at the very
least, open to question (the “fragilization” of which Charles Taylor
speaks). In short, if my social group is characterized by unanimity
in holding a particular conviction, it provides a potent structure for
reinforcing the plausibility of that conviction.
The whole phenomenon of the disconfirming Other can be
expressed in terms of the dissolution of any such strong social
plausibility structure. Fundamentalist Christians, with their
aforementioned predilection for constant proselytizing and for
withdrawing into a self-generated subculture, are, in effect, creating
a workable social plausibility structure: by converting others to their
own religious worldview, they buttress their plausibility structure by
increasing the number of persons who share their convictions; by
retreating into a subculture, they maintain the integrity of a
particular plausibility structure that might otherwise be undone by
the presence of disconfirming Others.
While the zeal to convert others to their own belief system
continues unabated within fundamentalist Christianity, the retreat
into an independent subculture described in the quotations from
Balmer above – the subtitle of Balmer’s book is A Journey into the
Evangelical Subculture in America – is not as thoroughly
characteristic of Christian fundamentalism as it once was. Balmer
himself is fully aware of a transition in this regard that actually
began as early as the 1970s:
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. . . especially since the mid-1970s, as evangelicals began to
emerge, albeit tentatively, from their self-imposed exile, . . .
suspicion of “the world” has dissipated considerably. The
antipathy toward the broader culture so characteristic of
evangelicals in the twenties and thirties has gradually given
way to ambivalence. Even as many evangelicals retain the
old rhetoric of opposition to the world, they are eager to
appropriate many of that world’s standards of success. This
explains, for instance, the proliferation of prosperity
theology in evangelical circles.9
A particularly potent example of this so-called “prosperity
theology,” which trumpets the notion that true believers, far from
needing to live abstemiously, should expect to receive economic
blessings from God, is provided by the extraordinary popularity of
preacher Joel Osteen. Today’s fundamentalist Christians, including
those who tune into Osteen’s television program and devour his
books – whether they identify themselves as born-again, as
evangelicals, or as fundamentalists – are perfectly comfortable
driving a new Mercedes and parking it in the three-car garage
attached to their mini-mansion in an upscale suburb.
But to say that fundamentalist Christians have emerged from
their previous cultural isolation insofar as they have embraced
contemporary American notions of success and wealth is not to
suggest that fundamentalism is no longer defined by an
oppositional mentality. On the contrary, precisely as a function of
their moving into the larger culture, fundamentalist Christianity has
spawned what commentators on American society have dubbed the
“religious right.” That is, while they are now more than happy to
insinuate themselves into the larger social and political processes
(recall Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority and Pat Robertson’s
presidential campaigns) that characterize American life,
fundamentalists energetically oppose much of what they see as the
norm in those processes. They vociferously oppose the Supreme
Court’s Roe vs. Wade abortion decision, they agitate to bring prayer
into public school classrooms and the Ten Commandments into
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courtrooms across the country, and they get out the vote to oppose
legislation allowing gays to marry. Hence, the very notion of the
“religious right” is defined by a sense of opposition on the part of its
adherents toward what they take to be America’s deficient mores.
Just as fundamentalists’ emergence from an isolated subculture
does not necessarily undercut the oppositional character of the
fundamentalist mindset, so too it does not undo their attempt to
create and reinforce a plausibility structure for their beliefs, thereby
fighting back against the disconfirming power represented by
pluralism. For one thing, the political activism that is part and
parcel of the “religious right” phenomenon is, like the zealous efforts
to convert members of other religions to fundamentalist Christian
belief, an attempt to make the larger American society fall into step
with the fundamentalist worldview, thereby creating a more
effective social plausibility structure.
Given the continuing importance of shoring up the
fundamentalist plausibility structure in the face of the
disconfirming Other, especially as fundamentalists move out of
their erstwhile cultural isolation, it should not be surprising that
what is often dubbed the “mega-church” has appeared on the scene
in contemporary American fundamentalism. For the mega-church
allows fundamentalists to embrace important aspects of the larger
culture while still wrapping themselves in a supportive plausibility
structure. In essence, the mega-church sees to it that the church itself
provides a broad array of services and activities that the believer has
come to expect through his or her participation in the larger culture.
It thereby allows one to buy into important currents of mainstream
culture, but sees to it that those currents are monitored by a
fundamentalist community. The mega-church is frequently a nondenominational, evangelical organization founded and led by a
high-profile, communication-savvy preacher, a congregation with
over a thousand members. But, once again, the mega-church is
notable not simply for the number of its members, but also for the
number of services and activities that it provides for them.
The stereotypical mega-church is built around a huge sanctuary
boasting the latest in high-tech audio-visual equipment. That
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equipment will be augmented by a professional choir and band.
One who attends such a church expects that the message proclaimed
by its preachers, whose images will be projected on a huge viewing
screen, will be reinforced by a spectacle as entertaining as anything
that Hollywood has to offer. And what happens on Sunday morning
is only a small portion of the story. The church may also have a
bowling alley and a basketball court, along with organized leagues
to exploit them, for church members to enjoy throughout the week.
A church member who has a problem with substance abuse will not
need to seek help outside the mega-church, since it will provide its
own internal, Christ-centered support groups. Similarly, in a culture
in which it is taken for granted that the problems that we confront
are not a function simply of external challenges but are often
problems best addressed through psychological therapy, the megachurch will have on its staff minister-therapists to offer its members
the psychological support services that they require. In short, the
member of a fundamentalist mega-church can have the best of both
worlds: the believer can take advantage of many of the benefits that
the larger, non-fundamentalist culture has to offer, but can enjoy
those benefits within the safety of the church and its fundamentalist
worldview. The plausibility structure for fundamentalist belief is
thus kept intact even as American fundamentalism emerges from its
erstwhile cultural ghetto. The disconfirming power of the Other is
held at bay despite the fundamentalist’s decision to buy into some
of the perquisites of American culture at large.
Perhaps the best way to classify fundamentalism, then, when we
consider its response to American spiritual pluralism, is as a halfway
house between avoidance tactics and strategic modifications of
belief. On the one hand, it is not a mere evasion of the pluralistic
challenge.10 Fundamentalism is a self-conscious and vigorous
response to that challenge. But, on the other hand, its response is
decidedly defensive in tone and attempts to hold onto certain
“fundamentals” rather than to meet the pluralist challenge by
strategically modifying belief in the fashion that we shall explore in
the chapters that follow.11

CHAPTER THREE

Defusing Disconfirmation:
Modification Strategies

I

n the first two chapters, we have considered avoidance tactics
and defensive reactions to the challenge represented by the
disconfirming Other in a spiritually pluralistic America. But, of
course, not all spiritual practitioners react to the challenge of
pluralism negatively: there are also those whose response to the
disconfirming Other is to see the disconfirmation at issue as
essentially a positive provocation to rethink traditional forms of
faith. They venture the possibility that, if they are willing to make
some strategic modifications to the traditional faiths in which they
were raised, it might be possible to remove the contradictions
between one’s own faith and that of others. The Other might then
be no longer disconfirming but, rather, reinforcing, a fellowtraveler on the spiritual journey. While the New Age seekers
profiled in Chapter Five also approach American spiritual
pluralism positively, their strategy is almost wholly to abandon
mainline faiths, those stalwart belief systems represented by
American religious denominations from Catholicism to
Methodism to Conservative Judaism. But the topic of this chapter
is about how mainline religions might compromise. It is about
letting go of some of the exclusivist claims of one’s mainline
tradition so that a core set of theological tenets from that same
tradition can be harmonized with the convictions of believers
from other traditions. While the main concern among those
whom we discuss will be to find a degree of consonance among
Christianity and other world religions, the principles set forth will
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have relevance too for harmony among non-Christian religions
and spiritualities.
Anyone even remotely attuned to the violence that the clash of
religions has generated around the world in recent decades, from
India to Iraq to the destruction of the World Trade Center in New
York City, must surely comprehend the urgent need for dialogue
and understanding among different religious traditions. But such
dialogue and the enhanced understanding that it aims to produce
ordinarily do not rise to the level of the so-called modification
strategies that we shall be considering in this chapter. In his book
Beyond Tolerance: Searching for Interfaith Understanding in America,
Gustav Niebuhr profiles a whole host of activists who seek, for
example, “to find common ethical principles to bridge the volatile
theological chasms” that separate traditions.1 But the modification
strategies that we shall investigate below seek not to leap over the
theological chasms and onto the relatively safe ground of common
ethical principles, but, rather, to descend into those chasms and do
some serious theological prospecting. The modification strategies
will grapple with the apparent contradictions in theological tenets
rather than with the allegedly harmonious ethical outlooks of the
world religions. While one representative of Jewish-Christian
dialogue is quoted by Niebuhr as saying, “This isn’t about meeting
in the middle,” the advocates of the modification strategies that will
be at issue in our exploration often do attempt something
sufficiently radical to be deemed an attempt to find theological
middle ground.2
Our investigation will be divided into four main parts. First, we
shall provide two brief examples of scholarly theological proposals
that hold out the promise of defusing the disconfirming power of
the Other via modification strategies. Second, we shall consider two
other proposals, each seeking to show that the whole phenomenon
of the disconfirming Other can be sidestepped as an illusion. In the
third part of the chapter, we shall look at recent popular attempts to
harmonize Christian belief with one or more other world religious
traditions. Finally, we shall consider the argument that, while the
modification strategies under discussion appear to avoid the
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problem of disconfirmation, they may in fact represent a
particularly subtle variation on the theme of disconfirmation. That
is, it may be that the modifications they make to traditional
Christian claims about Jesus Christ give up too much: they actually
disconfirm Christian belief by abandoning the “essence” of
Christianity. This argument raises the possibility, in other words,
that the modification strategies are simply one more example of
pluralism fatally undermining belief.
Professional Theology and Modification Strategies
The twentieth century produced a vigorous discussion among
academic theologians about how Christianity should approach the
other great world religions. It has become commonplace in this
discussion to distinguish among “exclusivists,” “inclusivists,” and
“pluralists.” The exclusivists maintain that Christianity is the one
and only route to salvation. Inclusivists maintain that while all
salvation comes through Jesus Christ, his salvific power is
extended to non-Christians in some fashion. Pluralists attempt to
see Christianity and other world religions as genuinely equal in
the access that they provide to salvation, however that salvation
may be conceived.3 What we are terming modification strategies in
our investigation belong in the pluralist camp. The pluralist
approach is sometimes also called a “world theology” or a
“theology of religions.”
We shall begin by briefly examining the positions on
Christianity and other religions set forth by two professional
theologians in the twentieth century, the first inclusivist and the
second pluralist.4 We must begin our exploration of the two classic
professional theological strategies with a crucial clarification: our
focus in the whole of this study is upon the effect of the
disconfirming Other upon the average believer, rather than upon
professional theological discussion about the fact of religious and
spiritual pluralism. Thus, the point of outlining the theological
positions below will be to lay bear what they might, at least in
theory, offer to those workaday believers. As a result, the real
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significance of the professional efforts profiled below is their
potential to have an influence beyond the confines of academic
theology. To what extent can they permeate, or have they already
permeated, the larger cultural mindset?
Our example of inclusivism is provided by the German theologian
Karl Rahner, often regarded as the single most influential Roman
Catholic theologian of the twentieth century.5 Rahner, who died in
1984, was a Thomist, a follower of the philosophy and theology of the
greatest of the Medieval Christian thinkers, Thomas Aquinas. But he
was a Thomist with a difference, a “transcendental Thomist.”
Rahner reworked Thomistic theology with the help of
Immanuel Kant’s transcendental philosophy, which sought the
conditions for the possibility of all our knowing, the preset
configuration of the human mind that, as prior to any particular act
of knowing, forms and limits our way of knowing. But while Kant
concluded that the nature of the mind rendered knowledge of God,
including the bare fact of God’s existence, impossible (at least
knowledge narrowly conceived, that is, “theoretical” or “scientific”
knowledge), Rahner employed transcendental inquiry to a very
different end: he argued that knowledge of God is not only possible,
but that an implicit, subliminal awareness of God is precisely one of
the preconditions of human consciousness uncovered by
transcendental investigation. For Rahner, as for other thinkers
dubbed transcendental Thomists, an inquiry into the preconditions
for human knowing reveals the open-endedness of human
consciousness, a trajectory that aims at infinite being.
Consider, first of all, the nature of human questioning. Asking
questions is a crucial practice for our coming to know the world.
But the human mind is set up in such a way that questioning never
comes to a definitive end. The answers to our questions beget new
questions. It appears that it is in principle impossible for us ever to
come to an absolute end to our ability to ask questions. But this fact
about the nature of our minds points, argues Rahner, precisely to
the fact that those minds operate within an infinite horizon, the
horizon of unlimited being, which for a Christian theologian is
necessarily identified with the being of God.
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Consider how, in parallel fashion, we use concepts to grasp
reality, to know it. The medieval philosophers called concepts
“universals,” and for good reason: our concepts – dog, tree,
goodness, distress – are by their very nature universal, in that they
are universally applicable. That is, the concept dog – our concepts
are, of course, tied to language and the words that help make up a
language – can never be exhausted. Rather, it can be applied to as
many dogs as might ever come to the attention of the human mind.
Concepts are universal; they are open-ended. And this means that
concepts, like the potential infinity of our questioning, reveal the
open-endedness of all human inquiry, the fact that it is aimed at
unlimited being.
This is not the same thing as claiming that we have a fullyformed innate idea of God implanted in our consciousness. First
of all, the awareness of the unlimited horizon of being is not the
same thing as the idea of a discrete infinite being, the Supreme
Being of traditional Christian theology. Second, the awareness of
the unlimited horizon of being uncovered by Rahner’s
transcendental analysis is, precisely as a horizon, not ordinarily the
object of our attention. We do not consciously focus upon it.
Rather, it is the context in which we think, the ever-present and
encompassing setting, akin to what the ocean is for a whale.
Hence, Rahner says that the constitution of our consciousness
provides us with a “pre-grasp” or “fore-grasp” of the infinity of
God. It is, as he also puts it, an “unthematic” awareness of the
divine. This means that the infinite horizon is ordinarily not the
conscious object of our reflection, yet we are subliminally aware of
it. Of course, we can always turn to reflect upon this condition for
the possibility of all thinking and awareness, making it a theme for
consciousness as opposed to unthematic. And when we do so, we
can, especially if we are schooled in Christian faith, then identity
the presupposed horizon of conscisousness with the God to which
that faith testifies.
Though Rahner himself is not interested in developing this line
of thought so as to end up with a pluralist theology, one might see
the basis for a pluralist theology here, that is, for a theological
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pluralism that interprets one’s own faith as but one pathway to the
same summit. After all, it follows from Rahner’s analysis that all
human beings have a real, if unthematic, awareness of infinite being.
Might not the different world religions be simply different ways of
understanding that self-same presence of the infinite, whether
conceived as a substantive infinite or in terms of Buddhist or Taoist
emptiness? Might not the differences between my faith and that of
the Other turn out to be about relatively incidental matters of
interpretation instead of about the heart of spirituality, which can
here be interpreted as a deep and unavoidable connection with the
ultimate reality? Might it not turn out, in other words, that the
different beliefs held by the Other are not ultimately disconfirming
of my own convictions, at least if I am indeed willing to employ a
modification strategy that will allow me to regard certain features of
my belief system as incidental to it?
Rahner’s reason for stopping short of a radical pluralist position
is not far to seek. He remains firmly rooted in the Christian
tradition in maintaining Christ’s unique, supernatural role in
redeeming humanity from sin. All human beings do indeed possess,
just qua their human way of being, an unthematic awareness of
God. But each human being is also free and can use that freedom to
place his or her individual being in opposition to the very God that
provides the encompassing horizon for his or her existence. That is,
I am always free to attempt to make myself my own god, to secure
the meaning of my own being, turning my back on the
encompassing presence of the real God, despite the fact that that
encompassing presence is, at the end of the day, constitutive of my
own true being. The reality of sin means that we are all, in fact,
estranged from God and, thus, from ourselves. Some religious
thinkers might imagine being extricated from such estrangement
simply by coming to a fuller consciousness of God than the
minimal, unthematic one with which we all begin, a goal that they
imagine achievable via one’s own spiritual efforts. Rahner, however,
is a sufficiently orthodox thinker to depict the power of sin and
estrangement in more dramatic terms and thus to require an equally
more dramatic salvific role on the part of the Christ. Rahner does

DEFUSING DISCONFIRMATION

65

depart from some elements of traditional Western Christian
thought by refusing to see the redemption effected by Jesus
exclusively in terms of Jesus’ atoning death on the cross. But by
extending Jesus’ salvific work to the whole of his existence,
embracing his life as well as his death, Rahner only makes the
unique work of the Christ all the more essential.
All of this means, of course, that, for Rahner, Jesus Christ
cannot be seen as simply one clarifying lens, bringing the universal,
unthematic consciousness of God more clearly into view, a lens that
could have equally effective counterparts in the teaching of the
Upanishads or the Buddha or the Quran. At the same time, Rahner
does provide a fascinating version of inclusivism in his notion of the
“anonymous Christian.” For Rahner, one need not be in a dedicated
and conscious faith-relationship with Jesus Christ in order to reap
the benefits of Christ’s saving work. Rather, someone who has never
had the opportunity really to confront Christ may still attain
salvation if that seeker does his or her utmost to respond to the
gracious presence of God to consciousness that is the birthright of all
human beings. But this person’s salvation will nonetheless have been
purchased by Jesus Christ, who effects the definitive, irrevocable
victory of God over sin and estrangement. That the seeker in
question may look to the Buddha as her spiritual guide while,
unbeknownst to herself, she is actually put into proper relation to
God via the saving grace of Christ means that she is a Christian
despite her own self-understanding, an anonymous Christian. The
anonymous Christian concept is an updating of earlier motifs in
Catholic thought such as the so-called “baptism of desire.”
Critics of Rahner inevitably point out that his concept of the
anonymous Christian is condescending. Would a Christian, such as
Rahner himself, want to be told that he is an anonymous Buddhist,
only eking his way into a blessed spiritual state thanks to the work of
the cosmic Buddha? Most likely not. But the problem of condescension
is, of course, simply a manifestation of the fact that Rahner’s position is
a conservative, inclusivist instead of a radical, pluralist one.
Yet we ought not to dismiss this sort of inclusivism just yet,
despite the fact that we are seeking modification strategies that can
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protect the believer from the disconfirming power of the Other in
a fashion that does not sink to the level of mere avoidance tactics
or amount merely to a defensive reaction. For while the potential
disconfirmation most directly at issue in our investigation is the
straightforwardly cognitive one to which we have repeatedly
returned – the Other’s beliefs, because I have no better grounding
for my own, call my own beliefs radically into question – there is
also a non-cognitive type of disconfirmation that should not be
overlooked at this point. This less obvious threat of disconfirmation
has to do with what we might term the disconfirmation of both
the believer’s own humanity and that of the other believer. Just to
the degree that spiritualities and religions are often about what
their adherents consider ultimate matters, those adherents may
well fear that if the Other is wrong – i.e., in this scenario we have
not yet gotten to the crisis of the cognitive disconfirmation of the
adherent’s own beliefs – that other may miss out on genuine
fulfillment as a human being. And for some persons, a selfexamination in which they find that they do indeed believe that
persons with other faiths will forfeit the fullness of their humanity
seems intolerable.
Indeed, just to find oneself holding this position about others
may call into question one’s own humanity: What kind of person
can I be if I can consign my fellows to a status of less than full
humanity (not to mention some version of an eternal hell after
death)? But someone who adopts Rahner’s anonymous Christian
perspective will be freed of this burden. Disconfirmation of the
believer’s own humanity and that of those with other beliefs will be
avoided. And this may be enough for some people. That is, as long
as they can trust in the ultimate fulfillment of all persons of good
will, they can rest easy in their faith.
Rahner is certainly not alone among contemporary Roman
Catholic thinkers in offering this particular kind of solace, what we
have called freedom from the disconfirmation of the other believer’s
humanity and of one’s own. Indeed, no less a figure than the
German theologian Joseph Ratzinger, who became Pope Benedict
XVI, puts it eloquently:
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Everything we believe about God, and everything we
know about man, prevents us from accepting that beyond
the limits of the Church there is no more salvation . . . .
We are no longer ready and able to think that our
neighbor, who is a decent and respectable man and in
many ways better than we, should be eternally damned
simply because he is not a Catholic.6
Indeed, according to the Pope,
The question we have to face is not that of whether other
people can be saved and how. We are convinced that God
is able to do this with or without our theories, with or
without our perspicacity, and that we do not need to help
him do it with our cogitations.7
Of course, at the end of the day, this solace about the Other’s
spiritual destiny, which is by no means insignificant, taken by itself
does not confront the central challenge before us, namely, the
cognitive disconfirmation threatened by the other believer. Yet, if
we wish to designate this an avoidance technique, we ought
nonetheless to recognize that it is an avoidance technique that
deserves to be distinguished from the ones that we examined in
Chapters One and Two.
There is another ramification of Rahner’s position that takes us
back to our main topic of cognitive disconfirmation, indeed that
lets us deeper into some of the contradictions among the world’s
religions and, hence, the potential depth of the Other’s
disconfirming power. We tend to think of the disagreements
between the faith of a Roman Catholic Christian, for example, and
a Buddhist as about such relatively obvious topics as God and the
afterlife. But some of those obvious matters, while literally of
ultimate importance, are tied to some less obvious but absolutely
basic assumptions about the human condition that, as such, are of
hardly less momentous consequence. As our brief foray into
Rahner’s position has indicated, Rahner assumes, as any reasonably
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orthodox Christian theologian will, that humanity’s greatest
challenge is the problem of sin, which estranges us from God and,
hence, from the very source of our own personhood. Thus, if
religious faith is to provide us with anything, it must provide us
with redemption from sin.
But numerous subdivisions of Buddhism begin with very
different presuppositions. For the Buddha, and for much of the
tradition that follows him, the dilemma in which human beings are
ensnared is not sin, not some fundamental moral failure that blunts
our potential humanity, but, rather, suffering. It was the famous
passing sights of the haggard old man, the diseased man, and the
corpse that set Siddhartha Gautama on his quest for Buddhahood.
This only goes to show that the disconfirmation that the Other
potentially wields threatens to sever not only the large and
immediately evident branches of the tree of my faith, but even some
of its roots, underlying assumptions so basic that I may scarcely be
aware of holding them.
At the same time, the spiritual assumptions of American
culture continue to change, and they do so at an ever-increasing
rate. It does not take a great deal of imagination to suppose that
one of the assumptions that many contemporary American
Christians, even the most spiritually inclined, have left behind is
that we are all ensconced in sin. Indeed, anyone who has spent time
in a religious studies or theology classroom with the present
generation of undergraduate students can testify that the burden of
sin is not taken with anything approaching the seriousness that it
once was. Whatever that change may mean for the health of
traditional Christian theology, it is the sort of change that makes it
significantly easier to meet the otherwise disconfirming Other
halfway, for it will undermine the necessity of Jesus Christ being
the (unique) atonement for sin. But the topic of atonement need
not be left here: it will be appropriate to return to it at the end of
the present chapter.
In order for professional theologians truly to meet the Other
halfway, of course, will require that they offer a theological pluralist
philosophy in place of an inclusivist one. The Anglican theologian
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John Hick provides us with what may be the best known pluralistic
theology.8 And it is worthwhile to note the paradox that, while
Rahner arrives at his rather conservative inclusivism through what
many historians of theology would regard as a more “liberal”
theological method, Hick comes to his pluralism via what has often
been deemed a more “traditionalist” way of proceeding. Using the
requisite theological jargon, we can say that Rahner does his
theology, in large part, “from below,” while Hick proceeds “from
above.” That is, Rahner opens up our initial approach to God not
by citing alleged revelatory documents or special events of divine
intervention (though these are clearly essential at later points in his
theology) but, rather, by analyzing the supposedly universal nature
of human being. He begins down here, with us. Hick, by contrast,
will appeal to special divine acts of revelation that are alleged by the
various world religious traditions themselves.
This is not to say that Hick does not use philosophical analysis
and argumentation in order to prepare the ground for his pluralist
theology. On the contrary, he makes a clever adaptation of that
previously mentioned giant of modern Western philosophy,
Immanuel Kant. Kant made a distinction between the noumenal
world and the phenomenal world. The noumenal world is reality as
it is just in itself. The phenomenal world is the world as we filter it
through our noetic equipment, that is, the world as we perceive it.
According to Kant, I never really know a cow as it is in itself, but
only as it appears to me, synthesized by the forms and concepts that
constitute my knowing process. Hick’s claim, however, is that there
is a special application for the noumenal-phenomenal distinction
(one that Kant himself did not make) where God or the ultimate
and its self-manifestations to us are concerned. Following the
philosopher Karl Jaspers, Hick refers to an “Axial Period” in human
history, beginning roughly with the Jewish prophets in the ninth
century B.C.E. and continuing until roughly the fourth century
B.C.E., in which relatively short time the roots of all of the great
world religions can be found. Hick takes seriously the suggestion
that this Axial Period represents the point in human history where
human beings had become sufficiently sophisticated to receive
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special gifts of revelation. There is already a oneness, then, at the
very birth of the world’s great religions, including Hinduism,
Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.
But what about all of the differences among those various belief
systems? That, after all, is where our problem lies. Hick’s proposed
answer is that it is the self-same ultimate behind all of the
revelations in the Axial Period. But that is, of course, the noumenal
ultimate, the ultimate as it is in itself. And human beings have no
access to that ultimate. Rather, the self-manifestations of the
ultimate during the Axial Period must all be refracted through the
lens not only of human cognitive capabilities generally but, more
important here, through the very different lenses of diverse cultural
milieus. Different cultures are different “worlds,” after all: persons
in different cultures actually experience reality differently. Hence,
the revelatory light refracted through my cultural lens will inevitably
look different from the light that beams through the lens of
someone living in a different cultural world. Hence the payoff: I
may see the ultimate in the form of the personal Supreme Being of
traditional Christianity, while the person living to the left of me sees
it in the Hindu Godhead named Brahman and the person living to
the right of me sees it in the Buddhist Nothingness called Nirvana,
but we are all seeing the same ultimate reality! The differences in
what we see, which we might previously have taken to be mutually
disconfirming, are not matters of contradiction at all; they are
simply a function of the very same ultimate reality, in its noumenal
aspect, having to traverse our different phenomenal filters.8
There are surely some attractive features in Hick’s position for
one who seeks a radical pluralistic theology. He seems to have
succeeded in combining philosophical sophistication with an
admirable cognitive humility. And, after all, humility is often taken
to be one of the prerequisites for genuine piety. The spiritual
quester who wants to hold onto the core of his or her traditional
beliefs but who, in the humble recognition that his or her own
cultural vantage point is necessarily limiting, is willing to make
some compromises around the edges of those beliefs, would appear
to have a useful ally in Hick. For instance, if a Christian can allow
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that the human need for redemption can be conceived in a number
of different ways (though all involving relation to something
ultimate) and that Jesus Christ is one of several diverse avenues to
that redemption, cannot that Christian hold onto the essential core
of his or her Christianity while now finding that the belief of others
has lost its disconfirming power?
That is what Hick would like to have us believe, but his
proposal leaves us with what some may take to be a significant
unsolved problem. It is one thing to say that one person may see the
divine in the form of a heavenly queen while another sees it in the
form of a heavenly king. After all, the ultimate is not a physical
being, so both kings and queens are simply metaphors in this case,
and while the one metaphor might emphasize some characteristics
of the ultimate while the other metaphor emphasizes different ones,
there need be no contradiction in that. But the juxtaposition of the
different belief systems represented by the great world religions
presents us with much stickier instances than this.
For example, many Buddhists conceive of the ultimate not as
any sort of being at all, not as any sort of God, but as
incomprehensible Emptiness. Jews, Christians, and Muslims, by
contrast, traditionally think of the ultimate as an all-powerful and
loving personal being who created the world and who can
intervene in their lives. Can one really say, as Hick must, that these
are just two different phenomenal adumbrations of the same
noumenal ultimate? The two different views appear to be not just
different – different in ways that we can chalk up to interpretation
or emphasis – but simply contradictory. And to claim that two
contradictory claims are really just different interpretations of the
same view might be taken to make the notion of “the same view”
simply meaningless.
But whether this is in fact a fatal flaw in Hick’s version of
pluralist theology turns, in the end, upon one’s assessment of his
most central claim, namely, that the ultimate is so far beyond our
phenomenal comprehension that we are faced not simply with each
culture and religion falling short of anything like a full
comprehension of the ultimate, but that that ultimate so transcends
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our grasp that even our logic is inadequate to it. If the latter is the
case, then our notions of contradiction may simply not apply here,
and Hick’s position may be potentially sound. Critics, of course,
will argue that to say that the ultimate transcends even the most
basic principles of our logic is tantamount to saying that we really
cannot understand anything about it all or make any meaningful
statements about it.
It is also worth noting that, while Hick does employ Kantian
philosophical notions, however highly modified, to advance his
position, the overall weight of his proposal is largely a function of
faith, and of empathy toward the Other. With his aforementioned
theology “from above,” Hick takes for granted the basic notion of
revelation, which he sees breaking forth in particularly powerful
fashion in the Axial Period. And surely a great deal of the
convincing power of Hick’s proposal, for those to whom it is in fact
convincing, is a function not of complex arguments but of the
ethical appeal of Hick’s openness to the potential truth and value of
all of the world’s great religions.
In any case, while professional theologians will necessarily be
concerned with the technical soundness of the arguments set
forth by Hick and his fellow pluralists, what may be more
important for the non-theologians is a certain permission granted
them by the vigorous discussion of the equality of the world
religions among the professionals. That is, to the extent that the
spiritual quester sensitive to the beliefs of the others round about
him is aware of theologians’ work on radical pluralism, however
ignorant of its technical details, that quester is freed to believe
that his or her own path is but one avenue to the same spiritual
summit. The non-specialist can feel justified in holding onto the
core of his faith even though he neither possesses any evidence for
his beliefs that the differently-believing Other lacks nor has
worked out a technical modification strategy on his own. There
are people who spend their professional lives thinking about these
things, and they reassure the quester that there are perfectly
consistent ways to see Jesus Christ and the Buddha as equally
efficacious redeemers.
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Isn’t this, after all, at least one way in which shifts in the
country’s religious mindset often in fact occur, however glacially?9
Professional theologians respond to new challenges that arise,
precisely such as the challenge of a potentially disconfirming
pluralism, and their own shifts in attitude in the face of these
challenges eventually have an effect on large segments of the rest
of the religious and spiritual spheres. Seminarians are assigned
particular religious thinkers to read, and when those seminarians
get to their parishes, the attitudes found in those works find their
way into sermons and homilies. What is more, all perspectives can
now reach the larger society more effectively than ever before,
given the electromagnetic information bubble in which we are
nearly all enclosed.
But, at the end of the day, it is almost by definition popular
religious writers who have the most direct theological impact on
American religious and spiritual attitudes. In short order, we shall
examine three popular religious opinion-makers, thinkers who have
a more direct effect upon Americans’ sensibilities about the
modification strategies that we might adopt in order to find an
ultimate harmony among the world religions.
A Technical Aside: Does Belief Require Evidence?
Before we move on to our investigation of the popularizers of
modification strategies, however, a technical aside is necessary: we
need to consider an argument advanced by various Christian
thinkers in the last part of the twentieth century that may seem to
undercut the whole premise of the disconfirming Other. This
argument suggests that religious belief cannot be contradicted by a
disconfirming Other in the fashion that we have been suggesting it
can. Our assumption has been that, if I have a spiritual belief system
but I recognize that others have apparently contradictory ones, and
I further realize that I have no stronger evidence than those others
have for their beliefs, then that pluralism can be disconfirming of
my own convictions. Indeed, if, with this dearth of special evidence,
my belief system is only one of a large number of systems, and the
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systems are genuinely mutually contradictory, then the simple
mathematical odds are that my belief system is wrong.
But what if the very assumption that, in order for my beliefs to
be justified they require evidence, is in error? Wouldn’t that mean
that, even though I have no more evidence for my own beliefs than
my neighbors have for their opposing convictions, that the whole
challenge of disconfirmation would not arise in the first place?
Justified belief, spiritual or otherwise, just would not be about
evidence, at least not in all cases. Surely I hold some beliefs without
any evidence, indeed without any grounding of any sort. For
example, suppose that I believe that all packages of M & M
chocolate candies contain more red candies than any other color,
even though I have never bothered to count the color frequencies in
even one package. For motives unknown to myself, I have simply
come to believe that the reds predominate. This is an irrational
belief, since it has nothing to back it up, but it is also trivial and,
thus, most likely harmless. Other sorts of beliefs we hold had better
not be irrational, though. If, for instance, a financial planner comes
knocking on my door and asks to take over the management of my
investments, I had better not just hand over my money. The belief
that he or she could safely manage my assets without my having
gathered any evidence to that effect would, like my beliefs about red
M & Ms, be irrational, but this time my irrationality could have
serious consequences. For my belief that the planner can in fact
handle my assets safely to be rational, I would have to go to the
effort of talking to other investors, looking for information about
the financial planner on the internet, and so on. Thus, we have an
example of a belief that has no evidence behind it and is clearly
irrational and unfounded. And we have an example of a belief that
could be rational if sufficient evidence were gathered before I
formed it.
But might there be a third sort of belief, one that has not been
formed via the accumulation of evidence but that is nonetheless still
rational? Another way to put it might be to ask, “Can there be a sort
of belief that I form without gathering evidence but that is still not
groundless, and thus is still a legitimate belief for me to hold?” We
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get a positive answer to this question, specifically in the context of
religious or spiritual belief, from Alvin Plantinga, a philosopher of
religion who hails from the Reformed tradition and who
concentrates on what he calls “basic beliefs.”10 These are beliefs that
are not formed via the gathering of evidence but yet are not
groundless, and hence not irrational. This seems to hold out the
possibility that, even though I do not have any better evidence for
my spiritual beliefs than someone with competing beliefs, that other
believer need not be taken as disconfirming my beliefs, for evidence
is not at issue.
The expression “basic belief ” suggests a belief that is at the
starting point of a set of beliefs. It is basic, so that it does not have
to rely on evidence. Yet it is not arbitrary, as if I should just decide
to make it a basic belief of mine that red M & Ms outnumber all
other colors in every package of the candies. Plantinga gives as an
example of a basic belief a so-called memory belief, namely, the
belief that I had breakfast this morning. I believe that I had
breakfast this morning. The belief is not based on evidence: I am
sitting at my desk at work now, so I have no access to evidence in
the form of dirty breakfast dishes in my sink, nor do I note any
remnants of egg that I spilled on my tie. But to say that the belief
does not rest on evidence is not to say that it is groundless: it is
grounded in my memory of having had breakfast. Basic beliefs are a
particular category of belief, then, that do not rest on evidence yet
are not irrational. In fact, they are perfectly justified, and we employ
them all of the time. Of course, as Plantinga points out with
reference to his breakfast example, if I know that my memory is
defective, then my belief that I had breakfast this morning could not
in fact count as basic. I have to be unaware of any defects in my
experiential equipment for the belief to count as properly basic.
Plantinga’s intriguing move is to suggest that, for the genuinely
pious person, spiritual or religious beliefs are often properly basic. I
might believe, for example, that the God and Father of Jesus Christ
loves me. There is nothing akin to ordinary evidence that I could
amass to prove this to someone. But the particular contours of my
life are such that I seem to experience the love of God for me in
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much that happens to me, parallel to how I have a memory of eating
breakfast this morning. For me, then, though not for someone for
whom my experience is unavailable, the belief that God loves me is
a properly basic belief. It is not based on evidence that I could
present in a court of law, but neither is it groundless or irrational.
Once more, for me it is quite properly a basic belief. Thus, it would
initially appear that even though my neighbor holds religious beliefs
that contradict my own, and even though I cannot accumulate
evidence to convince a jury of my peers – I cannot even collect
evidence to convince myself – that my case trumps my neighbor’s,
my neighbor’s beliefs are not disconfirming, for evidence is not
required to confirm my belief in the first place.
The fatal difficulty here is that while Plantinga seems accurately
to have described the notion of a basic belief and shown that such a
belief is perfectly rational, religious or spiritual beliefs, the very ones
at issue for him, lose their status as properly basic precisely when
confronted with the contradictory beliefs of Others. My belief that
I had breakfast this morning based on my memory of having had it
is a properly basic belief, as long as I am unaware that my memory
is defective. My belief would no longer be basic if my wife reported
to me later in the day that, despite what I seemed to remember, I
had been running late that morning and had skipped breakfast, and
if my children confirmed her story. But notice what happens in my
confrontation with the religious Other. I believe that the personal
God of Christian faith loves me, and as long as nothing calls into
question the life experiences giving rise to this belief, it is properly
basic for me. But it is a crucial, defining characteristic of that belief
itself that the “God” at issue is the Lord of the Universe, the Creator
in whom all human beings move, live, and have their being. Now
when my Buddhist neighbor reports that he has very different life
experiences leading to very different basic beliefs, beliefs according
to which all things are embraced in an encompassing Nothingness,
my experiential equipment is called into question, just as when the
efficacy of my memory is called into question, and my belief is no
longer basic for me (nor is my neighbor’s belief for him). In
conclusion, the notion of properly basic belief will not serve as a
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modification strategy (nor even as a successful avoidance strategy,
for that matter) to defuse the Other’s disconfirming potential.
The Lutheran theologian George Lindbeck starts out from a
different philosophical landscape but ends up in roughly similar
territory to Plantinga’s position, in that Lindbeck too calls into
question the assumption that it even makes any sense for me
argumentatively to defend my religious beliefs in the face of
contradictory beliefs found in other religions.11 Lindbeck thinks of
a religion as a relatively self-contained “cultural-linguistic” world,
not unlike the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of discrete
“forms of life” with their accompanying unique “language games.”
It is not the case that Christians have religious experiences that form
the particular language that they employ, but rather that their
experiences are formed by the cultural-linguistic framework – in
this case, the whole biblical story about life before God – in which
they are trained. And just as the rules of baseball do not apply to the
rules of basketball, and vice-versa, so the Christian and the Buddhist
operate with beliefs and attitudes that are so independent of one
another that there is no way to translate statements from one
tradition in a way that will make sense in the other:
When affirmations or ideas from categorically different
religious or philosophical frameworks are introduced into a
given religious outlook, they are either simply babbling or
else, like mathematical formulas employed in a poetic text,
they have vastly different functions and meanings than they
had in their original settings.12
Hence, it once more appears as if we have come upon a perspective
according to which the Other’s religious beliefs cannot be
disconfirming of my own. For my beliefs are part of the warp and
woof of my cultural-linguistic world, and they will ultimately not
make any sense when artificially transplanted into a different world.13
Therefore, it seems that the very notion of contradiction between
beliefs cannot arise here, for contradiction presupposes some
common grammar of meaning upon which two assertions can rest.

78

DEFUSING DISCONFIRMATION

But Lindbeck’s position too falters. Note that persons within
the Christian cultural-linguistic framework intend their
statements about God to refer to a reality independent of any
particular cultural-linguistic framework, including their own.
Indeed, they will hold that the possibility of all such frameworks
depends upon God’s creation of human beings and his continual
sustenance of them (even though this conviction itself will have
to be articulated within the terms provided by their unique
cultural-linguistic frame). And Lindbeck does not want to
embrace the radical postmodernist position, something akin to a
Nietzschean view, according to which there are no objective
realities outside our frameworks and the different frameworks
are simply alternative fictions. Hence, he floats the possibility
that there is
a sense in which truth as correspondence [with reality as it
is in itself ] can retain its significance even for a religion
whose truth is primarily categorical rather than
propositional [i.e., for a religion conceived as culturallinguistic system]. A religion thought of as comparable to a
cultural system, as a set of language games correlated with
a form of life, may as a whole correspond or not correspond
to what a theist calls God’s being and will. As actually lived,
a religion may be pictured as a single gigantic proposition.
It is a true proposition to the extent that its objectivities are
interiorized and exercised by groups and individuals in such
a way as to conform them in some measure in the various
dimensions of their existence to the ultimate reality and
goodness that lies at the heart of things.14
It follows that it may be that
there is only one religion which has the concepts and
categories that enable it to refer to the religious object, i.e.,
to whatever is in fact more important than everything else
in the universe [i.e., to what Christians call God]. This
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religion would then be the only one in which any form of
propositional . . . religious truth or falsity could be present.
Other religions . . . would be neither true nor false. They
would be religiously meaningless just as talk about light
and heavy things is meaningless when one lacks the
concept “weight.”15
But now the problem of the disconfirming Other has simply
returned in a slightly different guise, for I must recognize that
many persons embrace religions different from my own, in other
words, that those persons are ensconced in different culturallinguistic religious frameworks. Yet, it is likely that only one of
those frameworks, at most, can enable a way of life that
corresponds to what is really the most important thing in the
universe. And because we have no meta-perspective from which
to compare the different cultural-linguistic frameworks with that
most important reality as it is in itself, we have no way of
determining which of the religions, if any, is the one framework
that really does form a way of life that corresponds to that
ultimate reality. The Other threatens disconfirmation of my
beliefs after all.16
What have we discovered, then, in our brief detour from our
exploration of modification strategies and onto the roads
suggested by Plantinga and Lindbeck? Both thinkers put forth
sophisticated proposals that may appear to suggest that, at least
where religious belief is concerned, the problem of the
disconfirming Other cannot arise. The very notion of
disconfirmation, as we have laid it out, results from the believer’s
inability to present superior evidence for his or her own belief in
the face of a contradictory belief. But Plantinga and Lindbeck
hold out the hope either that evidence, superior or otherwise, is
not required for my belief to be valid, or that the evidence that
supports my beliefs exists within a discrete cultural-linguistic
framework such that nothing arising from within a different
framework can logically qualify as counter-evidence to my own. If
these positions turned out to be valid, then we would, at the very

80

DEFUSING DISCONFIRMATION

least, have to radically rethink the idea that the Other can possess
the power of disconfirmation. But, in fact, we have seen that,
whatever their other merits, these positions fail to defuse the
disconfirming power of the other believer.17
Three Contemporary Proposals by Popular Religious Writers
We begin with the Vietnamese Buddhist monk Thich Nhat
Hanh (Thich is not a personal name, but a title bestowed upon
Vietnamese Buddhist monks and nuns). Over twenty of his books
have appeared in the United States, and he is a revered figure who
had the chance to enter into dialogue with both Martin Luther
King, Jr. and the Roman Catholic spiritual seeker and writer
Thomas Merton. Many of his publications have been on the quest
for peace, inner and outer. The particular work of concern to us
here, however, is his book Living Buddha, Living Christ. It presents
a pluralist approach to Christianity and Buddhism from the
perspective of a learned and pious Buddhist. That Nhat Hanh is not
afraid of a radical pluralism is apparent in a story with which he
begins his book:
Twenty years ago at a conference I attended of theologians
and professors of religion, an Indian Christian friend told
the assembly, “We are going to hear about the beauties of
several traditions, but that does not mean that we are going
to make a fruit salad.” When it came my turn to speak, I
said, “Fruit salad can be delicious! I shared the Eucharist
with Father Daniel Berrigan, and our worship became
possible because of the sufferings we Vietnamese and
Americans shared over many years.”18
Indeed, Nhat Hanh goes so far as to embrace the possibility
that one can have more than one world religion as a personal
spiritual root: his own experience has led him to graft Christian
spirituality, as he understands it, as a second root onto the Buddhist
root that has nurtured him throughout his life (pp. 99-100).
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Traditional versions of Christianity have tended to see the risen
Christ as the transcendent second person of the divine Trinity and
to aver that God is in heaven while we are on earth, while
Buddhists have been much more apt to look within to the
possibility of personal enlightenment. It is safe to say, by way of
initial summary, that Thich Nhat Hanh’s approach to harmonizing
Buddhism and Christianity is to put more emphasis than Christian
orthodoxy upon the potential immanence of the divine in
Christian faith. In this way, both Buddhism and Christianity can
ultimately be about finding the ultimate within one’s own
individual experience. It is no accident that Nhat Hahn speaks
more often about the Holy Spirit, which is usually associated with
the immanent side of the Christian God, than with God the
Father. Yet, this will turn out not to be an idiosyncrasy in Nhat
Hahn’s approach: in each of the writers whom we consider in this
chapter, we shall see an ongoing focus upon an immanent God, in
distinction to a God who is radically transcendent.
It should also be noted from the start that Nhat Hahn
modifies the usual Buddhist interpretation of anatman, the
doctrine of no-self. It would make little sense to talk about finding
the divine within if there were no “within,” nothing remotely
resembling what we mean by selfhood. Siddhartha Gautama can
certainly be interpreted as wholly rejecting the notion of selfhood,
seeing it as an illusion, attachment to which leads to our suffering.
But Nhat Hahn nuances his position from the Buddhist side in a
way that will open up the possibility of genuine communication
with Christianity:
The Buddha did not present an absolute doctrine. His
teaching of non-self was offered in the context of his time.
It was an instrument for meditation. But many Buddhists
since then have gotten caught by the idea of non-self. They
confuse the means and the end, the raft and the shore, the
finger pointing to the moon and the moon. There is
something more important than non-self. It is the freedom
from the notions of both self and non-self. (p. 54)
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This means that there need be no contradiction between a religion
such as Christianity, which clearly holds that we each have a core
identity, a substantial selfhood, and the Buddha’s attempt to get rid
of views of the self that lead to suffering.
So too the Buddhist claim of the impermanence of all things
should not be misinterpreted: “According to the teachings of
Buddhism, it is important to look deeply into things and discover
their nature of impermanence (anitya) and non-self (anatman).
Impermanence and non-self are not negative. They are the doors
that open to the true nature of reality,” (183) in other words, to that
which is in some sense beyond impermanence and illusion. They
open to enlightenment, to the infinite or ultimate way of being that
is often called Nirvana. And this is crucial for seeing the link
between Buddhism and Christianity, for Nhat Hahn’s claim will be
that when the Christian looks within himself or herself, he or she
will find the Holy Spirit and the Kingdom of God, that is, the
ultimate beyond the impermanence and illusory character of the
ordinary objects of our experience. What is more, this Kingdom of
God is available in the here and now, not just in some distant
heaven after death.
What the Buddhists call mindfulness is central to Thich Nhat
Hahn’s spirituality. In mindfulness meditation, one concentrates on
the present moment. The many thoughts and emotions that
constantly drift across the stage of my consciousness, thoughts and
emotions that I ordinarily all-too-quickly identify with reality,
including the reality of my own ego-self, are now observed as the
ephemeral phenomena that they are. I am fully mindful of them
simply as they appear in and of themselves, not as I am tempted to
interpret and reify them. There is both a negative and a positive
moment in this sort of meditational practice. On the negative side,
my thoughts and emotions are emptied of their deceptive reality,
and I am freed from the unhappiness and worry that often results
from my emotional and cognitive attachment to them. On the
positive side there appears an immediate experience of something
that stands beyond these pretenders to reality, namely, the very
observational perspective that is mindful of them. But what stands
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beyond the pretenders to reality if not genuine reality, if not what
the Buddha meant by enlightenment and what Jesus meant by the
Kingdom of God? Thus, experience, including the kind of
experience at issue in mindfulness meditation, can provide an
intuitive avenue to ultimate reality.
Thich Nhat Hanh’s program for harmonizing Buddhist and
Christian spirituality is furthered by his contention – it is not an
unusual contention for a Buddhist, at the same time that it bears
some resemblance to Hick’s claims about the ultimate – that the
ultimate is largely beyond our saying. The ultimate is beyond
theology. “Discussing God,” Nhat Hahn avers, “is not the best use of
our energy. If we touch the Holy Spirit, we touch God not as a
concept but as a living reality” (p. 21). Obviously, to steer as clear as
possible of conceptual formulations and to focus instead upon
experience helps to avoid disconfirmation. It is beliefs, after all,
articulated in verbal formulations, that clash with one another and
via which different believers cause the most trouble for one another.
At the same time, we must be careful not to rush too quickly into the
appealing arms of an alleged trans-conceptual religious experience.
For philosophers have often pointed out that experience too requires
concepts. For my experience to be an experience of something, for it
to have any character as an experience, there must be interpretive
categories in which it is formed, and that will require conceptuality.
With this caveat noted, we can push a bit further into Thich Nhat
Hahn’s treatment of the underlying ultimate reality that he believes
is opened to the quester by both the Buddha and the Christ.
It is a truism among contemporary New Testament scholars
that the center of Jesus’ message was the proclamation of the
Kingdom of God. Of course, debates continue to unfold about just
what he meant by the Kingdom. While Jesus may, according to one
translation of Luke 17:20, have announced that in his ministry “the
Kingdom of God is among you” (the rendering found in the New
Revised Standard Version, the translation to which we refer
throughout this book), there is also a familiar interpretation of that
same verse according to which “the Kingdom of God is within you”
(as in the King James translation), and it is the latter that best suits
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Nhat Hahn’s purposes. Of course, he adduces much more than that
single verse to make his point. For example, he explains that
Matthew described the Kingdom of God as being like a
tiny mustard seed. It means that the seed of the Kingdom
of God is within us. If we know how to plant that seed in
the moist soil of our daily lives, it will grow and become a
large bush on which many birds can take refuge. We do not
have to die to arrive at the gates of Heaven. In fact, we have
to be truly alive. The practice is to touch life deeply so that
the Kingdom of God becomes a reality. This is not a matter
of devotion. It is a matter of practice. The Kingdom of God
is available here and now. Many passages in the Gospels
support this view. We read in the Lord’s Prayer that we do
not go to the Kingdom of God, but the Kingdom of God
comes to us: “Thy Kingdom come . . .” Jesus said, “I am
the door.” He describes himself as the door of salvation and
everlasting life, the door to the Kingdom of God. Because
God the Son is made of the energy of the Holy Spirit, He
is the door for us to enter the Kingdom of God. (p. 38)
The ultimate is not a wholly other, radically distant reality. Indeed,
the Christian Eucharist, in its own way, points us inward:
The body of Christ is the body of God, the body of
ultimate reality, the ground of all existence. We do not have
to look anywhere else for it. It resides deep in our own
being. The Eucharistic rite encourages us to be fully aware
so that we can touch the body of reality in us. Bread and
wine are not symbols. They contain the reality, just as we
do. (p. 31)
Jesus’ importance, then, is not principally as an extraordinary
God-man who died on the cross to atone for human sin. Rather, he
is a seer in whom God is powerfully present and whose teaching
shows us how to find the presence of God, his Kingdom, within our
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own hearts. And, as Nhat Hahn points out above, this will not be a
function so much of devotion to Jesus, of worship, but of following
the practices that he teaches. And that, of course, sounds very
Buddhist. The Buddha is not a being to be worshipped, but a
teacher who shows the way to ultimate reality, to enlightenment.
At the same time, the Mahayana Buddhism that Nhat Hahn
favors understands the Buddha, like Jesus, to be a teacher who is also
the embodiment of the ultimate to which he points, an ultimate that
one might go so far as to designate the “ground of being”:
After the Buddha passed away, the love and devotion to
him became so great that the idea of Dharmakaya changed
from the body of teaching to the glorious, eternal Buddha,
who is always expounding the Dharma. According to
Mahayana Buddhism, the Buddha is still alive, continuing
to give Dharma talks. If you are attentive enough, you will
be able to hear his teachings from the voice of a pebble, a
leaf, or a cloud in the sky. The enduring Buddha has
become the living Buddha, the Buddha of faith. This is very
much like the Christ of faith, the living Christ. Protestant
theologian Paul Tillich describes God as the ground of
being. The Buddha is also sometimes described as the
ground of being. (p. 51)
Especially if one can conceive the ultimate to which both the
Buddha and Jesus point as essentially a matter of a higher form of
experience that transcends theological categorization, then the
Buddha and Jesus Christ do become strikingly similar figures here.
“Christian contemplation includes the practice of resting in God,”
Nhat Hahn explains, which he goes so far as to say “is the equivalent
of touching nirvana” (p. 154). Hence, “I do not think there is much
difference between Christians and Buddhists. Most of the
boundaries we have created between our traditions are artificial.
Truth has no boundaries” (154).
At some points, Nhat Hahn is willing to leave the realm of
esoteric experience and look for harmony amidst more conceptually
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constricted and apparently difficult differences between Buddhism
and Christianity. He observes, for example, that “recent polls show
that nearly one-fourth of all Europeans and North Americans
believe in some form of reincarnation” (p. 131). And, he suggests,
given the Christian belief that a soul must become incarnate in a
body, the notion of reincarnation is not as inconsistent with
Christianity as most Christian leaders through the ages would have
us believe (p. 132). Finally, of course, the attitude that we have been
outlining here makes it unsurprising that Thich Nhat Hahn is
willing to see a degree of harmony not just between Christianity and
Buddhism, but among all of the world’s religions: “Only their
manifestations are different. Authentic experience makes a religion
a true religion. Religious experience is, above all, human experience.
If religions are authentic, they contain the same elements of
stability, joy, peace, understanding, and love” (p. 194). And yet,
having said all of this – and despite his comment about fruit salad
that we quoted at the outset – Thich Nhat Hahn does not look for
some future amalgamation of religions. Rather, he expects that each
individual can live happily in the religion of his or her birth, and live
happily beside fellow-seekers in other traditions.
*

*

*

*

*

The second popular work that we shall examine is Deepak
Chopra’s The Third Jesus. Like Thich Nhat Hahn, Chopra is a
prolific author. One might initially assume, however, that his many
books and talks put him more in the category of a New Age
therapist than that of a religious thinker, of however popular a bent,
seeking unity among the world religions. But Chopra has a long
interest in traditional Indian and Buddhist spirituality as well as the
figure of Jesus. Indeed, he has written fictional accounts of the life
of the Buddha and of Jesus. And we shall find that his argument in
The Third Jesus overlaps with Thich Nhat Hahn’s position in Living
Buddha, Living Christ in instructive ways.
Given that Chopra himself is schooled in the Asian spiritual
traditions, it should probably come as no surprise that his manner
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of harmonizing Jesus with Buddhism and various strands of
Hinduism entails making Jesus more Buddha-like than making the
Buddha more Jesus-like, at least where traditional understandings of
Jesus and the Buddha are presupposed. Who, precisely, is the “third
Jesus” of Chopra’s title? The first Jesus is the actual historical figure
Jesus of Nazareth, a man about whom we can never hope to know
very much. The historical sources simply do not exist that would
allow us to come to anything resembling a reasonably thorough
biography of Jesus. The second Jesus is the Jesus Christ of the
Church’s ongoing theology, the Jesus of the creeds and theological
tomes. For Chopra, as for numerous critics of Christianity at least
since the nineteenth century, this second Jesus is almost wholly the
Church’s creation. But there is a third, real Jesus, or so Chopra,
along with so many other questers, is convinced. Chopra, however,
has a particularly provocative point of entry into his discussion of
what he takes to be the real Jesus, for he claims that the problem
with the first and second Jesuses is not just that they are essentially
fictional, but that the frameworks provided by the first two readings
of Jesus actually make Jesus’ teachings impossible to follow. As a
result, they appear to turn Jesus himself into a failure as a spiritual
and moral guide.
It has been recognized since the inception of Christianity that
dicta of Jesus such as “Love your enemies” (Luke 6:27) and “If
anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also”
(Matthew 5:39b) strain credulity regarding human moral
capabilities. Various interpretations have been proposed. In the
heyday of Christian monasticism, it was suggested that Jesus
intended these most stringent of his teachings only for the monks.
The teachings were known as the “evangelical counsels” and were
not meant to be seriously imposed on lay Christians struggling to
live in the difficult world outside the monastery. Some twentiethcentury scholars proposed that Jesus’ words represented an “interim
ethic.” That is, Jesus expected the imminent, literal end of the
world, and while in ordinary life-circumstances one could not
possibly maintain the rigorous standards he was proposing, a tiny
community of believers huddled together who expected the end at
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any moment could in fact muster the ethical fortitude to respond,
at least to one another, according to Jesus’ dictates. But Chopra
takes a different tack. What the Christian tradition has so
consistently overlooked is that Jesus’ moral teachings make sense
only in the context of a wholly new iteration of human nature. Jesus
had in mind a radical transformation of consciousness, one
thoroughly foreign to our everyday perceptions of reality. That the
transformation at issue is indeed a radical one is evident in the fact
that the world we perceive via ordinary consciousness is essentially an
illusion, akin to the Indian notion of the world as maya. At the heart
of that illusion is the notion that the essence of each of us is
something called the ego, a separate entity, a tightly bounded discrete
self. Yet, even the most ordinary among us from time to time sense
that our true being is something that transcends an ego-self:
We are aware of beauty and truth. We feel led by intuitions
and insights. In scattered moments we sense something
beyond. None of these experiences is ego created. In fact,
they are its enemy. Anything that gives a hint of life’s
wholeness, any experience that transcends “I, me, mine,”
threatens the ego’s claim to dominance. This is because by
definition, “I” is a separate entity. It wants certain things
and not others. It wants to make friends out of some egos
and enemies out of others. The one thing it can’t abide is
the reality that separate egos don’t exist, that everything
comes from a single source. Jesus brought just such a
message to earth, and although he labeled it “God,” in
keeping with the language of his time, words aren’t the
same as experience.19
There is much here that sounds like the Advaita Vedanta
tradition, the non-dual philosophy in Indian thought. And there is
also much that sounds like what we heard in Thich Nhat Hahn’s
Living Buddha, Living Christ: the ultimate is an encompassing
oneness beyond conceptual distinctions; this is the oneness that
Jesus had in mind when he talked about God and about God’s
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Kingdom; it is a oneness that is to be attained in the here and now,
not in the bye and bye of heaven; and this ultimate is something
that we encounter via a particular kind of experience, with
experience always a more accurate guide than theologizing. In
Chopra’s own preferred vocabulary, the experience of unity at issue
here is tantamount to the attainment of “God-consciousness,” and
the more fully developed one’s God-consciousness, then the more
fully one has moved beyond the illusory world of the everyday.
Hence, for Chopra, “What made Jesus the Son of God was the fact
that he had attained God-consciousness,” indeed essentially a perfect
God-consciousness, so that Jesus could say, “‘the Father and I are one.’
He knew no separation between his thoughts and God’s thoughts” (p.
3). Now to claim that what made Jesus the Son of God was his perfect
God-consciousness rather than his possessing a divine nature (along
with a fully human one), as asserted by the Church’s Council of
Chalcedon in 451 C.E. or his being the one who could atone for human
sin by dying on the cross, seems to add weight to the previously offered
observation that Chopra’s Jesus is cast in an Asian mode. Yet it is striking
that to define Jesus’ sonship to God in terms of his perfect Godconsciousness echoes the Christology of the nineteenth-century
German theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher, who is perennially
tapped as the “father of modern Protestant theology.”20 And it should
be unsurprising, given the common focus of Schleiermacher and
Chopra, that both award special prominence to the Gospel of John,
since its Jesus is indeed much more of an enlightened teacher,
frequently discoursing on something akin to God-consciousness, than
is the Jesus of the so-called “synoptic Gospels” (so named because they
tend to “see together,” i.e., to view Jesus in the same light), Matthew,
Mark, and Luke. Thus, while we shall continue to note the Asian motifs
that Chopra finds in his version of Jesus, we ought not to go too far in
arguing that he is offering something terribly radical and unprecedented
in his interpretation of Jesus.
According to Chopra, the real Jesus, then, sought to save
humankind not by offering himself on the cross as a sacrifice for sin,
but, rather, “intended to save the world by showing others the path to
God-consciousness” (p. 10; emphasis in original). Chopra admits that
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Indians are scornful of outsiders coming in to skim the
cream of ancient Vedic teachings, turning yoga into a
weekend exercise class. Westerners are scornful of outsiders
coming in to claim Jesus as a teacher on the order of
Buddha and Muhammad instead of seeing him as the one
and only Son of God.
Once we move outside the boundaries of dogmatic
Catholicism and Hinduism, both positions can be seen to
have deep flaws. Consciousness is universal, and if there is
such a thing as God-consciousness, no one can be excluded
from it. By the same token, no one can lay exclusive claim,
either. If Jesus rose to the highest level of enlightenment,
why should he be unique in that regard? Buddha may be
his equal (hundreds of millions of followers believe so),
along with Vedic rishis like Vasishtha and Vyassa, who
didn’t happen to have religions named after them. (p. 20)
Chopra’s position clearly represents what we are calling a
pluralist theology, then, a modification strategy that seeks to allow
a hypothetical Christian to acknowledge the Other’s beliefs – with
the Other in this case being a Buddhist or Hindu – without those
beliefs necessarily proving disconfirming to what that Christian
regards as the essential core of his or her own belief system.21 Of
course, a crucial component in the success or failure of such a
modification strategy will be the Christian’s decision about just
what does constitute the nonnegotiable, essential heart of her faith.
We shall return to the concept of the “essence” of Christianity later
in this chapter.
What is most distinctive about Chopra’s pluralist theology is the
previously noted emphasis on our ordinary consciousness as illusory.
In the everyday mode of consciousness, it is genuinely impossible to
follow Jesus’ most stringent commands, such as returning love for
hate or refusing to resist evil. But in the transformed mode that
Chopra calls God-consciousness, the impossible becomes possible:
“to the extent that you rise toward God-consciousness, evil
withdraws, leaving you invulnerable” (p. 27).
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“Evil is everything when you are susceptible to it; it is nothing
when you aren’t” Chopra avers (p. 27). If Jesus was not quite as
explicit about how this all works as we might like, Chopra thinks
that we can fill in some of the blanks by drawing upon the world’s
various wisdom traditions. For example, consider what those
traditions teach about meditation:
Sit every day and find the silence insider yourself. In this
silence, there is peace without anger. There is no evil, no
attachment to revenge or righteous indignation. With
practice, you learn to identify yourself with this place. It
becomes natural to master anger, an energy like any other.
When this happens, evil begins to release you from its hold.
(p. 27)
Again,
When you fear evil, you are certain that it must be real.
This certainty forces you to engage in the eternal struggle
between good and evil. No amount of passive resistance
will extricate you . . . . But if you can see that the war
between good and evil is nothing but a play of light and
shadow, your certainty about the existence of evil will fade
away. (p. 28)
Chopra goes so far as to assert that
despite its intensity, pain is only temporary. Evil depends
on our forgetting this fact. If it couldn’t inflict pain, evil
would have no power at all . . . . Realize that there is a
reality beyond our present misery. You are that reality, and
you will return to it as your suffering lessens. (p. 29)
Just as Thich Nhat Hahn happily appropriates Paul Tillich’s
expression “ground of being” for God, Chopra is willing to claim
that that reality with which we ourselves are one, and to which Jesus
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guides us – the Gnostic Christians made this especially clear – is
nothing less than “Being itself,” which is another of Tillich’s
formulation for the divine (p. 89). At the same time, lest we suppose
that Chopra and Nhat Hahn are in perfect agreement, we should
note that Chopra is not nearly as interested in the political
implications of spirituality as Nhat Hahn is. Chopra’s contention
that Jesus taught that not just the ego, but the whole of physical
reality, is in some sense illusory contradicts Nhat Hahn’s conviction
that even though the Kingdom of God announced by Jesus is within
us, life in that Kingdom ought to spur us to ethical and political
activism in the messy outer world, such as Nhat Hahn’s own
activism in matters of war and peace.22
Indeed, Chopra sounds as if perhaps he must simply be
classified as a New Ager when he goes so far as to say that “the world
‘out there’ responds immediately to the world ‘in here’ – in other
words, outward reality mirrors the self ” (p. 209). Or, again, “Godconsciousness creates its own reality” (p. 25). But, to be fair to
Chopra’s approach, it should be noted that it does allow him to offer
a consistent interpretation of Jesus’ extraordinarily puzzling
declaration in Matthew 6 that we ought not to worry about where
our food or clothing or shelter will come from, since God will
simply provide these things for us if we seek the Kingdom of God
(pp. 63-64).
Our brief consideration of Thich Nhat Hahn’s Living Buddha,
Living Christ and Deepak Chopra’s The Third Jesus finds both of
them interpreting Jesus Christ in such a way that genuine faith in
Jesus is not threatened by believers from other traditions, at least not
from the Asian traditions upon which these two authors principally
draw. What is more, there are important commonalities in how they
avoid the problem of other faiths being disconfirming to the
Christian’s own belief system. For one thing, both authors
emphasize the Ultimate or God as something encountered primarily
within the depths of the self rather than as a radically transcendent
being, and the inner experiences described by the world’s religions
have much more in common with one another than their
conceptual descriptions of ultimate reality. Furthermore, given their
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focus upon experience and the concomitant de-emphasis upon
conceptualization that goes with this inward-looking piety, these
authors steer us away from the arena in which disconfirmation can
even be at issue: disconfirmation is a function of propositions, and
thus not of the sorts of experience that are allegedly largely ineffable.
That is, the content of Hinduism, for example, that appears to
contradict what Christians believe lies in what Hindus say about the
ultimate; it lies in propositions. It does not lie in inner experiences.
The very notion of disconfirmation has to do with a proposition or
set of propositions contradicting other propositions. If I claim that
2 + 2 equals 3, while you say that 2 + 2 equals 4, we are
contradicting one another. And to the extent that you can show me
the flaw in my computation, you have disconfirmed my claim. But
if I am feeling sad while you are feeling happy, we are experiencing
different emotions, but it would be odd to say that we are
contradicting one another, and even odder to say that you are
disconfirming my emotional state.
*

*

*

*

*

But what of a popular take on our topic from the Christian
side? For a Christian work aimed at a popular audience that has the
potential to blunt the disconfirming effect of the Other, we look to
Episcopal bishop John Shelby Spong’s Jesus for the Non-Religious.
Spong is a controversial figure within his own denomination. He
has never hidden his vigorous, some might even say vitriolic,
conviction that many of the theological trappings of traditional
Christianity are no longer viable. Indeed, one of the constituent
elements of historical Christianity that Spong is convinced collides
with the sensibilities of our age is what he calls the theistic notion
of God, which God he defines as a supernatural being “dwelling
outside this world and able to invade the world in miraculous ways
to bless, to punish, to accomplish the divine will, to answer prayers
and to come to the aid of frail, powerless human beings.”23 There are
echoes here of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s call for a religionless
Christianity, as well as of Nietzschean and Freudian claims that
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traditional Christian piety is a function of weakness and
immaturity, the desire for a cosmic father figure to deliver us from
the slings and arrows of our finite fortune.
Yet, despite his enthusiastic denunciations of the tradition,
Spong is equally enthusiastic in his claim that God is genuinely and
powerfully met in the person of Jesus. As a result, his position is a
strong candidate for the sort of modification strategy we are seeking,
namely, one that presents the classic Christian claim that God was in
Christ in a way that is not vulnerable to disconfirmation by the
beliefs that constitute other world religions. This despite the fact that
he himself does not wrestle with the implications of the clash of
religions. Nhat Hahn explicitly juxtaposed Christ with the Buddha.
Chopra sought what he took to be the real, but largely unknown
Jesus, and this Jesus turned out to have much in common with
Hindu and Buddhist traditions, traditions to which Chopra made
explicit reference. Spong, though he does not confront his faith in
Jesus Christ with the claims of other religions, tends, like Nhat Hahn
and Chopra, to radically immanentize the reality of God, to make
our contact with God much more a function of experience than of
conceptualization, and it is of course the clash of concepts that is
primarily at issue in disconfirmation. Furthermore, Spong focuses
upon a Jesus who empowers this God-experience rather than upon a
Jesus who becomes a sacrifice to God the Father on behalf of human
sin. Given that Christian tradition ordinarily pictures the sacrifice of
Jesus on the cross for our sin as an absolutely unique event that he
alone can perform, deemphasizing that part of Jesus’ significance also
lessens the tension between devotion to Christ and the claims of
other religions. And while Spong does not make the relationship
between Christianity and other religions his focus, it does come up
in his book, and his position on the matter is clear:
For even Jesus, I submit, is not an end in himself, as
Christians have so mistakenly assumed. Jesus is but a
doorway into the wonder of God. The first followers of
Jesus were not called Christians, as if knowing Christ was
their goal; rather, they called themselves “the followers of
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the way,” as if Jesus was himself but part of their journey.
The Christ path was a path toward wholeness, a journey
into that which is ultimately real and for which no words
have yet been devised. All religion must ultimately flow into
this same mystical reality. (p. 137, emphasis mine)
There is a sense in which this quotation from Jesus for the NonReligious summarizes Spong’s entire case, a case that can be broken
down into three main contentions: (1) Encountering Jesus provides
the opportunity to experience God. (2) This experience of God
means, concretely, that the one who has the God-experience moves
toward wholeness as a human being. And (3), we have no words
that can adequately or literally express this experience, and that is
why mythic tales about healing, bodily resurrecting the dead, and
walking on water began to be told about Jesus.
Let us consider each of these contentions in turn. First, what
does Spong mean when he claims that encountering Jesus can be
tantamount to encountering God? The infinite reality of God
transcends all boundaries, and such transcendence of boundaries
comes out concretely in the Jesus that we meet in the Gospels. In
order to see how this is so, it is essential, Spong points out, to know
a fair amount about the Jewish culture of Jesus’ day. Spong has the
deepest appreciation for that culture; he in no way wishes to
denigrate it as narrow or legalistic. But we do need to acknowledge
that, just as with all other cultures, including our own, the culture
in which Jesus lived had its prejudices. For example, the Jews held
the neighboring Samaritans in extremely low regard. Again, Jewish
religious law dictated that a man could easily be ritually polluted by
contact with women, for instance if a woman was menstruating. It
is against this background that Jesus’ parable of the Good Samaritan
and his seemingly total openness to women – even including total
strangers, such as the woman at the well with whom he converses,
who was a Samaritan to boot (John 4:7-27) – demonstrate that
Jesus broke through such prejudices. In Jesus’ concrete acts of
interpersonal transcendence, we encounter the unlimited power of
God. Like Chopra, Spong is happy to identify this God with Paul
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Tillich’s “Being itself ” (p. 11) (recall that Nhat Hahn embraced the
parallel Tillichian formulation “ground of being”).
The notion that in Jesus one encounters the power of God as Being
itself provides a segue to the second contention. To see God as Being
itself is to recognize God as the one who not only grants me and all
other things their bare existence, but also offers me the possibility of
fullness of being. While Nhat Hahn and Chopra tend to see such
fullness in terms of my consciousness merging with God, Spong takes
a more decidedly Western approach: he thinks in terms of psychological
wholeness. The God met in Jesus offers me the opportunity to break
free from the prejudices and pettiness that hold me back from the
fulfilled humanity that I am meant to experience. At the same time, we
ought not to draw an overly sharp distinction between what Spong has
in mind in his talk of the God experience with what Nhat Hahn and
Chopra intend. For as the quotation above from Spong reminds us, to
experience God is to enter a “journey into that which is ultimately real
and for which no words have yet been devised.”
The third contention, namely, that there are no words adequate to
describe the God experience is a position that Spong clearly holds in
common with Thich Nhat Hahn and Deepak Chopra, but Spong adds
a twist. Once again emphasizing that it is essential to understand the
Jewishness of Jesus and his followers in order to decipher the Gospel
accounts, Spong maintains that the early Christians and the Gospel
writers reached for the literally unsayable by employing symbolic and
mythic motifs fashioned from events in the Hebrew Bible and the larger
Jewish tradition. For example, to say that Jesus could miraculously feed
five thousand people with only a few loaves and fishes is to recall how
God provided manna in the desert for the ancient Israelites, and to
claim that Jesus was the “lamb of God” who miraculously removed the
sins of the world is to think back both to the Paschal lamb of the
Exodus and to the ritual offering of lambs in the Temple in Jerusalem.
It is as if Spong wants to take us back behind Rudolf Bultmann’s famous
project of demythologizing the New Testament and show us how the
Jesus events were mythologized in the first place. The myths and
symbols are by no means simply the overenthusiastic results of the early
Christians’ embellishment of the Jesus stories, and they are surely not
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mere falsehoods. Rather, they arose because they were the most effective
means at the disposal of Jesus’ followers to reach beyond the
inadequacies of ordinary language and its inability to communicate the
tremendum of the Jesus encounter.
Given this summary of Spong’s position, it seems that the title
of his book, Jesus for the Non-Religious, fits his message: The Jesus
that he describes, and the God met in this Jesus, can be
appropriated by those who are “spiritual but not religious,” which
means that this Jesus is not tied to some (or perhaps any) of the
specific claims of traditional, institutional Christianity that clash
with central claims of the other world religions. There is no threat
of disconfirmation here, since embracing Spong’s Jesus does not
entail holding Jesus to be the one and only atoning avenue to God,
the sole door through which one can walk to spiritual fulfillment.
*

*

*

*

*

As we have proceeded in our explorations of Thich Nhat Hahn,
Deepak Chopra, and John Shelby Spong, we have noted significant
common features in their approaches: each thinker emphasizes the
immanence of God more than God’s transcendence; each holds that
this immanence means that spirituality is a highly experiential
undertaking; and each avers that the experience at issue cannot
adequately be expressed in words.24 It is important to note that these
three interpreters were picked not because of these overlapping
emphases, but simply because of their salience on the popular
spiritual scene. Hence, we ought eventually to inquire about what is
behind these common features, something we shall do in the
following chapter.
Definitions, Essences, and Other Conundrums
By way of conclusion to the present chapter, however, there is
another topic that deserves our consideration. We noted in previous
chapters that, beginning several decades ago, academic
commentators upon religion began to question the possibility of
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objectively defining religion, or whether any discrete phenomenon
even exists that can be summed up under the word “religion.”
Jonathan Z. Smith’s contention that religion is not a natural
category has become the emblematic expression of this hesitation
about the attempt to define religion.25 The objection here is
ordinarily not to the practical undertaking of stipulating a
definition of religion to be used in a specific discussion, a
contingent definition that simply highlights what is of greatest
interest to a particular investigator, but in holding that it is possible
to uncover some genuinely objective and irreducible essence
corresponding to the word “religion” or “spirituality.” The objectors
claim that the ways of being to which we attach labels such as
Judaism and Buddhism do not have some special set of features in
common that we can self-evidently choose as the key to defining a
phenomenon called “religion,” a phenomenon that scholars in the
past, such as Rudolf Otto and Mircea Eliade, took to be thoroughly
sui generis, impossible to understand except on its own, essentialist
terms.26 But according to today’s objectors, to talk of the essence of
“religion” would be to run roughshod over the particular practices
of diverse traditions.
There is both a political and a more purely academic dimension
to this concern. The political concern is that, ever since the
undertaking was begun in the early modern period, the thinkers who
have attempted to define a general phenomenon called religion have
tended to be white male Europeans or their intellectual offspring. As a
result, when the general category “religion” is used as a grid to lay over
individual traditions, there will be an unavoidable evaluative
component in the investigation, so that when elements of Buddhism,
for example, don’t fit neatly into what is inevitably a biased
investigation, those elements will be undervalued, if not condemned.
Such use of a general, overarching definition of religion is, in the
postmodern jargon, “totalizing.” The academic concern, while
generating less controversy, is closely related: if we begin with a
definition of a general phenomenon and then use it as a grid to lay over
individual traditions as a key to their meaning, we shall inevitably miss
out on some of the distinctive features of those traditions.
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As was mentioned in an earlier chapter, the world has been
confronted in recent years with what some have called the “return
of religion.” And this means not just that advocates of secularization
hypotheses have what appear to be counter-examples on their hands
in the upsurge of traditionalist Islam and evangelical Christianity
around the world. Rather, it is also the case that theorists who have
been opposed to employing general, potentially totalizing
definitions of religion may find their well-wrought objections
simply swept away in a simultaneous resurgence of traditions from
various parts of the world that suggests to the casual observer, at
least, that these traditions are somehow part of a single
phenomenon, that they are all instances of something that we can
in fact put under the common heading “religion.”
What is of interest for our purposes here is how the
modification strategies that we have explored in this chapter seem to
have something to offer to both sides of the argument over whether
there is anything out there answering to the general category
“religion.” On the one hand, the whole impetus behind the
modification strategies, namely, the awareness of the problem of the
disconfirming Other, comes down on the side of those who want to
respect the individual differences among traditions. To be troubled
by the fact that my neighbor holds convictions different from my
own and that I have no firmer evidence for my convictions than she
has for hers is to be sensitive to the uniqueness of each tradition. If
one began with the conviction that all those traditions that we call
the world religions are just variations on an essentially common
theme, there would be no problem of the disconfirming Other in
the first place. On the other hand, the goal of the modification
strategies is precisely to discover commonality, indeed a sufficiently
significant commonality among religions or spiritual traditions so
that one can conclude that what lies outside the circle of that
commonality is not, finally, of overriding importance.
The debate about whether it is possible to define the term
“religion” or “spirituality” so as to uncover an irreducible, common
essence is replayed one level down, as it were, when we ask whether
it is possible to define a particular religion such as “Christianity” or
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“Buddhism” in such a way as to get at some “essence,” at some set
of characteristics without which the phenomenon in question
would simply not be Christianity or Buddhism. This particular
debate is relevant to our exploration of modification strategies in
that there will certainly be those who will hold that the harmonizing
of Christian faith with other traditions undertaken by Hick, Nhat
Hahn, Chopra, and Spong has been accomplished at the
unacceptable price of throwing the essence of Christianity
overboard. If this charge is valid, then the approach to the
disconfirming Other that we have labeled modification strategies,
far from avoiding the feared disconfirmation, unintentionally abets
it. Spiritual pluralism is destructive of belief in one more way, then,
in that the boldest attempts to escape its disconfirming power
actually destroy the individual faith that they are meant to protect.
One possible response to this complaint, a response alluded to
above, is to say that we do not have to worry about the thinkers we
have surveyed recasting Christian faith in a manner that destroys the
essence of Christianity for the simple reason that there is no such
essence. We lump together many different movements and designate
them all instances of Christianity, so the argument might go, not
because of some common theological core at the center of each of
them, but simply because they all look to Jesus Christ as their
gateway to spiritual fulfillment. Just how they understand Christ’s
role as this gateway varies tremendously from church to church.
Or perhaps the reason that the many different church traditions
that we call Christian share that designation is, again, not because of
some profound common essence, but because of Wittgensteinian
family resemblances. I might say of the Smith children, “You can
always spot a Smith; all of those kids are unmistakably related.” But
this doesn’t mean that the four Smith children each have the same
physical characteristics. The first Smith child and the second might
share a distinctive nose and unusually dark eyes; the second child and
the third might share the distinctive nose and a unique grin; the third
and the fourth might have the unique grin and curly black hair. Note
that in this scenario, the first Smith child and the fourth have no
characteristics in common, yet both are still unmistakably Smiths
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because of the way in which specific characteristics overlap among the
four children. Perhaps versions of “Christianity” are all “Christian” for
the same reason. In this scenario too, there is no need to posit some
common essence, and thus there is no sacrosanct set of essential
principles that the authors we have explored have abandoned.
Certainly the versions of devotion to Jesus set forth by Thich Nhat
Hahn, Deepak Chopra, and John Shelby Spong have at least some
characteristics that overlap with other forms of devotion that have,
over the long haul of history, been designated “Christian.”
What may be more significant than such defenses against the
destruction-of-essence charge, however, is to recognize that the
challenge posed by spiritual pluralism changes the significance of
the very notion of the essence of Christianity, or of any other faith.
Most persons with an investment in the idea that Christianity has a
discernable essence, something that endures over time despite
external changes, have a potent interest in the truth question. That
is, they are Christians who believe that the Christian faith is a
function of divine revelation and a secure pathway to salvation. The
concern is that if one deviates from the essence of Christian belief,
one falsifies the Christian tradition and loses contact with the divine
truth that genuine Christianity has to offer. If the modification
strategies outlined above have abandoned the essence of
Christianity, they have also forfeited its truth.
But we need to recall the nature of the pluralistic challenge. I
might begin with confidence that the Christian faith I embrace is
unquestionably an expression of some discernable essence of
Christianity. But when I recognize that those of other faiths have
convictions that contradict my own and that the grounds for those
convictions are every bit as solid as what grounds my belief, I face
disconfirmation. Whether or not my version of Christian faith
captures what I have hitherto confidently embraced as the eternal
essence of Christianity, I confront the mathematical odds to which
we have so frequently referred before: the odds are that my faith
convictions are false.
If follows from this that the loss-of-essence problem must take
second place to the challenge of the disconfirming Other. But
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suppose that I identify a modification strategy that I am convinced
meets the Other’s challenge. If I have taken that all-important step,
surely then it is reasonable to examine the Christian faith with
which that modification strategy leaves me and ask whether it is
sufficiently close to the faith with which I began that this modified
faith is worth holding onto. Without reentering the fray about
whether notions such as the essence of Christianity make sense,
there is one particular question that many a Christian who
contemplates the modification strategies represented by Nhat
Hahn, Chopra, and Spong will surely ask themselves: Is it
acceptable to abandon the theme of Jesus Christ’s atoning death on
the cross as God’s once-and-for-all conquest of human sin?
Granted, atonement for sin is not the only task that traditional
Christianity equates with the role of Jesus Christ. The
contemporary Catechism of the Catholic Church lists the following
reasons for the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ: “in order to save
us by reconciling us with God,” “so that we might know God’s love,” “to
be our model of holiness,” and to make us “‘partakers of the divine
nature’” (the last phrase is quoted from 2nd Peter 1:4).27 There is no
surprise, however, that atonement or “reconciliation” leads this list.
The other tasks associated with the Christ’s incarnation appear, at
least at first blush, to be shareable with other redeemer figures,
especially if one recalls Nhat Hahn’s willingness to interpret
Buddhism, which is usually taken as non-theistic, as offering
something akin to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the spiritual
quester. But can one who wants to maintain his or her identity as a
Christian adopt a modification strategy that foregoes the cross as
atonement? It would seem unlikely, and if it in fact cannot be done
then pluralism will indeed prove a challenge to belief: without a
modification strategy, pluralism pits religions against one another so
that they essentially cancel each other out. But with a modification
strategy that overcomes pluralism’s threat of disconfirmation, one’s
faith may end up being unrecognizable and perhaps no longer
worth affirming.
At the same time, however, changes in American culture over
the years have rendered the notion that we are caught up in sin
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much less salient, even for pious Christians. Thus it is that the
psychologist Karl Menninger could ask, as early as 1973, in the title
of a book, Whatever Became of Sin?28 Could it be, then, that tasks
other than atonement assigned to Jesus Christ by the Christian
tradition, tasks that appear to be kept intact in the modification
strategies of Nhat Hahn, Chopra, and Spong, will be sufficient for
many Christians? One would be unwise to bet on such a scenario.
Indeed, it is advisable to recall one of the Christian tradition’s most
venerable insights about how it crafts its theological doctrines,
namely, that the lex credendi follows the lex orandi: the law of
believing, of doctrinal affirmation, follows the law of praying. That
is, the Christian church’s central theological doctrines were not spun
out by theologians (nor revealed to them) with the Christian liturgy
faithfully following and expressing those doctrines. Rather, it more
often works the other way around: the concrete, day-to-day worship
practices of the faithful stimulate theological reflection and
explanation. Christians were baptizing infants before theologians
worked out the details of infant baptism as a sacrament that washes
away the effects of original sin.
Now consider the fact that the central worship practice of
Christianity’s largest body, the Roman Catholic Church, is the
sacrifice of the Mass. The Catholic liturgy is built around Jesus’
sacrificial, atoning death on the cross. Thus, even if contemporary
Christians are less likely than their foremothers and forefathers to
dwell on the idea that the human condition is constantly threatened
by sin and guilt, it is hard to imagine casting aside Jesus’ role as the
sacrificial lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world. Every
time a Christian, Roman Catholic or otherwise, participates in Holy
Communion, which most Protestant Christians too consider a
sacrament initiated by Jesus himself, Jesus’ identification with
atonement is reinforced.
On the one hand, it would be foolish to suppose that there is
absolutely no way in which the traditional emphasis upon Christ’s
sacrificial role can be integrated with the picture of Christ that
follows from embracing the modification strategies. For instance,
one might begin by noting that in all of the world religions, the
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world is regarded as somehow “out of joint,” as the Buddhists put
it; there is something fundamentally wrong with the way in which
human beings relate to reality. Nhat Hahn, Chopra, and Spong all
lay out their proposals in a way that allows us to look at reality at
least quasi-theistically. Hahn’s comments on the Kingdom of God
and the Holy Spirit make it clear that even a Buddhist can make
sense of theistic language, though perhaps it would be most accurate
to say that God-language can be taken by a Buddhist such as Nhat
Hahn as symbolic speech that can be translated into language more
familiar to Buddhists. In any case, given this general commitment
to the meaningfulness of God-language, it is possible to view the
world’s being out of joint as tied up with human estrangement from
God. The various spiritual quests that the world religions preach
would not need to be so difficult, so rigorous, and so constant if we
were not separated from the divine ground of our being. Therefore,
religion and spirituality must offer some way in which to overcome
this separation.
A goodly number of rabbis will tell us that such reconciliation
is in our own hands: no matter how sinful we are, we can take
comfort in the teaching about teshuvah or “turning” back to God:
we always have it in our power to turn back to God, no matter how
badly we have lived our lives. Most other world religions will
probably agree with this sentiment, or at least with some variation
upon it. Again, symbolic translation may be required when a
religion such as Buddhism or Taoism encounters this sort of Godlanguage. In Taoism, for instance, the “estrangement” is that of the
human self or ego from the Way of the universe. One can overcome
this estrangement by emptying oneself of one’s egotistical projects
and harmonizing oneself with the Tao so that one’s actions are a
function of the Tao flowing through the self.
As it turns out, the traditional Christian must also engage in
some symbolic translation if he or she wishes to embrace both the
modification strategies and the notion of Christ’s death as an
atoning sacrifice. That is, he or she must be able to take the
traditional language of atonement and see it as having dimensions
beyond its most unimaginative, literal meaning. But perhaps this is
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not quite as difficult a maneuver as it first appears. For the problem
actually lies with one particular interpretation of that atoning
sacrifice that has been worked out in Western Christianity. By far
the dominant interpretation of the cross is based on the famous
argument set forth by Anselm of Canterbury in his Cur Deus
Homo?29 That argument suggests that the atonement was an
objective process, something akin to a legal proceeding that took
place between God the Father and God the Son, rather than an
event that effected a subjective process, a change within the human
heart. Human beings are debtors before the Father in as much as the
Father has been done a grave injustice by human sin. Christ the Son
gives himself to the Father as a sacrifice that pays that debt. In the
Anselmian picture, Christ’s sacrifice is a thoroughly unique, onetime intervention on behalf of all humanity that provides for the
possibility of human salvation from sin. Hence, given the
Anselmian model, it appears to be impossible to square Christ’s role
as savior from sin with the perspective derived from the
modification strategies emerging from the books by Hahn, Chopra,
and Spong.
But the Anselmian interpretation of the cross is not the only
interpretation available. For instance, in the twelfth century, the
century following Anselm’s own, the theologian Peter Abelard
proposed what is often called the “moral influence” theory of
atonement. Here, the atoning power of the cross is not to be found
in a supernatural transaction between God the Father and God the
Son but rather in a straightforward interaction between Christ and
individual human beings. Christ is the preeminent revelation of
God, and he brings the message of God’s love for humanity. Because
Jesus Christ is himself God in the flesh, the cross makes apparent
the extraordinary lengths to which God will go in the name of this
love for us. The individual seeker, contemplating this
demonstration of unconditional divine love, will be moved to
accept God’s offer of grace which will allow him or her to live in
obedience to God and in fellowship with other human beings.
If our hypothetical twenty-first-century Christian adopts
Abelard’s view of the cross, then he or she can also embrace the
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modification strategies. First of all, the picture of the cross as an
instrument that reaches deep into the human heart and turns
estranged humans back to God can easily be integrated into the
modification strategies’ notion of the ultimate and the centrality of
our consciousness of it. Second, because Jesus’ death on the cross
now need not be regarded as an essential, one-time transaction
between the Father and the Son on behalf of all of humanity, the
claim of its absolute uniqueness can also be abandoned. Hence, the
cross might be regarded by Christians as one powerful way in which
God penetrates the human heart, a way that is not in competition
with other ways in which the ultimate breaks down our
hardheartedness, such as the teachings of the Buddha or the yogic
paths offered by Indian religion. In this way, it is only the claim that
the cross is a unique necessity that is left behind. The cross is an
extraordinarily powerful way – one way among several others – via
which our inadequate God-consciousness, the source of our sin, can
be repaired.
In any case, the proposals set forth by Nhat Hahn, Chopra, and
Spong are sufficiently suggestive with regard to our primary topic,
the threat of the disconfirming Other, that we need to analyze the
three motifs that their work shares – the immanence of the ultimate,
the importance of experience in knowing that ultimate, and the
ineffability of the ultimate – in greater detail and to push deeper
into what their proposals portend for pluralism. That will be the
task of the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

Modification Strategies:
Their Elements and Their Social Context

A

t the outset of our study, we explored several tactics that are
essentially attempts to avoid the challenge of the disconfirming
Other, namely, compartmentalization, the eschewal of logic where
spiritual matters are concerned, and self-deception, along with the
oppositional strategy that is fundamentalism. Then, in Chapter
Three, we concentrated on modification strategies that attempt to
meet the pluralistic challenge head-on. To the extent that these
modification strategies initially appear to be successful in dealing
with the challenge of the disconfirming Other, it behooves us to
push further in our investigation of them. That further investigation
should give us insight not only into the specifics of how the
modification strategies are constructed, but also into how their
constituent elements are part of the larger American culture.
Furthermore, given the fact that the phenomenon of religious
pluralism is our focus, we must investigate other relationships that
the modification strategies have to American spiritual and religious
pluralism beyond warding off disconfirmation. On this last matter,
I shall argue that modification strategies find themselves in a
circular relationship with American spiritual pluralism, a
relationship of reciprocal causation. First of all, the very
characteristics that power the modification strategies and thus
protect belief from the disconfirmation threatened by pluralism
draw upon that pluralism as conditions of their own possibility.
And, secondly, the modification strategies themselves add to the
very pluralism that makes them necessary.
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The popular modification strategies that we considered shared
a number of significant characteristics. Thich Nhat Hahn, Deepak
Chopra, and John Shelby Spong all embraced approaches to
spirituality, and to Jesus Christ in particular, that emphasized divine
immanence over transcendence, that focused on experience rather
than on the explicitly reflective or the deed-oriented elements of
spirituality, and that claimed that the experience of the ultimate is
often ineffable, that is, that it cannot adequately be expressed in
words. These three characteristics are, of course, tightly linked to
one another: It makes sense to suppose that I might be able to
experience the ultimate if it is truly immanent, whereas I might not
be able to experience a radically transcendent ultimate.
Furthermore, while the cognitive dimension of spirituality can,
perhaps by definition, be put into words (concepts being dependent
upon language), what we are here calling “experience” can be
construed, especially if it is a particular sort of experience, as
something that words cannot adequately express. The two
professional religious thinkers whom we briefly considered in our
investigation of modification strategies, namely, Karl Rahner and
John Hick, present a less unified perspective on immanence,
experience, and ineffability in their work, and we shall have
something to say about their approaches later on.
Let us begin, however, with a more detailed investigation of
what we have identified as the three defining emphases of the
popular strategies that we have considered. Our first topic is
immanence. It seems likely that spirituality and religion have
almost perennially displayed a dialectic of immanence and
transcendence. There are numerous examples to be found in the
world’s spiritualities of a dynamic in which a high god, a creator
god who is often believed to reside in the sky, is understood as
radically transcendent, and more attention is paid to other, more
immanent manifestations of the divine as a result of the human
desire to be in contact with ultimate reality. For instance, we find
anthropological accounts of African traditions that believe in a
God that is sufficiently transcendent that this deity becomes of
little day-to-day significance among its people, so that worship
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and invocation are directed to intermediary forces or beings
instead.1 Along the same lines, the influential sociologist Max
Weber famously speaks of the “disenchantment” of the world that
he sees effected by both Judaism and Protestantism.2 Judaism
arises in a world where there are, among Israel’s neighbors and
perhaps initially among the Israelites themselves, a host of
immanent deities, manifestations of the ultimate that are found in
sacred objects such as statues – recall the Israelites’ own infamous
lapse into idolatry in the Golden Calf story in the Hebrew Bible
(Exodus 32) – and in the world of nature, as evidenced by the
notion of sacred powers that fructify the earth. But Hebrew
theology, at least at some point in its development, attempts
mightily to oppose these radically immanent deities in favor of a
more transcendent (and singular) God. Where the notion takes
hold that divine reality is to be found only in the ineffable Yahweh,
a God sufficiently transcendent that no human being can see him
face-to-face and live and whose name, “I Am,” is essentially the
mysterious refusal of a name, then the world here below is
effectively bereft of supernatural realities. This is what Weber had
in mind when speaking of disenchantment.
Christianity begins as a Jewish sect, but its central claim,
namely, that God has become incarnate in the man Jesus offers the
possibility of re-enchanting the world. Yet Jesus too can become a
remote figure, as when he is depicted as the fierce Pantocrator (Ruler
of All) who shall preside over the Final Judgment, in which a vast
number of souls will be condemned to eternal damnation. It has
often been observed that the remoteness of God, even in his form as
the Christ if Christ be conceived as the Pantocrator, gave rise to the
whole apparatus of sacraments and devotion to Mary and the saints
that arose within Roman Catholicism, for these all suggest a more
available divine. The dialectic of transcendence and immanence has
here effected a move from the original Jewish emphasis upon
transcendence to a much greater emphasis upon immanence: to the
extent that God the Father and the ascended Son become remote
and intimidating, ordinary piety turns to more immediate
representatives of the supernatural.
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But some forms of Protestantism continue the dialectic by
disenchanting the world once more. Particularly in its Calvinist
form, Protestantism eschews veneration of the saints and Mary as
tantamount to idolatry.3 While it hardly negates all immanence,
given its continuing emphasis upon the Incarnation of God in
Christ, its actual worship practices and iconography – or perhaps
more accurately, its striking lack of iconography – swing back in the
direction of the transcendent.
The fact that the back-and-forth between transcendence and
immanence is indeed, at least in some instances, a “dialectic” is
highlighted in Mark C. Taylor’s reading of twentieth-century
Christian thought:
The history of theology in the West . . . is the story of
repeated “altarnation” [from the Latin for “other”] between
monisms in which the real is immanent, that is, in some
way present here and now, and dualisms in which the real is
transcendent, that is, absent or, more precisely, present
elsewhere. Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding,
these theological alternatives are not simply opposites but
are dialectically related in such a way that, when either is
pushed to its limit, it negates itself and turns into the other.
In the course of the twentieth century, the immanence of
liberalism gives way to the transcendence of neoorthodoxy,
which, in turn, is negated by the death of God theology.
For many religious conservatives, the death of God was
symptomatic of the relativism and nihilism of the sixties.
The recent emergence of neofoundationalism represents
the effort to reverse this perceived decline by reasserting
religious and moral absolutes.4
If there appears to be an ongoing dialectic of transcendence and
immanence, then, in the history of religions and spiritualities, it
makes sense to ask whether there are factors in contemporary
cultures, especially the United States, that presently favor the note
of immanence. For if there are, this would help explain the character
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of the modification strategies that we have examined by establishing
that the emphasis upon immanence is ready-to-hand in
contemporary American culture.
Surely there are such immanence-privileging factors. We begin
with the philosophical environment in which modern Christian
theology came to birth. The bulk of modern philosophy, as initiated
by René Descartes, is indelibly marked by the famous “turn to the
subject.” According to this sensibility, philosophizing (and perhaps
also theologizing) ought to start with the knowing subject rather
than with what is alleged to be known. Immanuel Kant argued,
persuasively for many, that we can know things only as they have
always already been worked over by our mental apparatus, never as
they are in and of themselves. If religious thinkers take this turn to
the subject seriously, as many of them have done from the
nineteenth century to the present, then our ability to know God or
the ultimate will always be a knowing “from below.” God cannot in
this case be absolutely other, for there must be something in the very
constitution of the human subject that provides a point of contact
for encountering the divine and that dictates that the divine does
indeed have an immanent dimension. It is worth noting that
Friedrich Schleiermacher and Johann Adam Möhler, a Protestant
and a Roman Catholic respectively, turned out to be two of the
most influential religious thinkers of the nineteenth century, and
that both set forth theologies based upon an examination of the
human subject’s inherent capacity to intuit the divine.
While Karl Barth and his followers attempted to steer theology
away from the turn to the subject, American religious thought has
tended, throughout the modern period and into our own time, to
be guided by that historic turn and, thus, to privilege the immanent
dimension of the divine over the transcendent. Hence, some of the
most influential works of twentieth-century theology in America
were produced by thinkers such as David Tracy and Sallie McFague,
both of whom self-consciously address epistemological issues and
have clearly imbibed something of the subjective turn, especially in
their earlier work.5 It should be noted, in addition, that even
postmodern thinkers who abandon the turn to the subject (thanks
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in large part to Martin Heidegger’s critique of the human subject’s
attempts at cognitive mastery and the consequent forgetfullness of
Being) can continue to emphasize an immanent divinity. Witness
Mark C. Taylor’s equation of language with the divine milieu in
which all things arise and pass away.6
Of greater importance than the philosophers’ turn to the
subject, however, is the emphasis upon democracy, egalitarianism,
and individuality in American culture. There is perhaps no more
paradigmatically American novel than Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man
(1952), in which the protagonist is advised to be his own father, to
create himself. Ellison’s radically existentialist take on the human
condition may well rule out a decidedly spiritual or religious
perspective. But Americans who do embrace a spiritual vision will
likely bring to that vision an Ellisonian emphasis upon the necessity
of being true to one’s own values and perspective. And, of course, it
is worth noting that Ellison’s full name was in fact Ralph Waldo
Ellison, and that his namesake Ralph Waldo Emerson’s
championing of self-reliance ended up including the conviction that
God was very immanent indeed, that the individual human being
was an organ of the divine. The Transcendentalist movement, of
which Emerson is the most distinguished representative, focused
upon the immediacy of the divine to the human. The emphases
upon egalitarianism and self-reliance that permeate American
culture and that are enshrined in the thought of Emerson mean that
even theologies that are not concerned with academic debates about
the turn to the subject will very likely emphasize divine immanence
of one sort or another. Rosemary Radford Ruether’s notion of the
divine as the “Primal Matrix” that embraces men and women in the
down-to-earth circumstances and struggles of their everyday lives,
along with the world of nature, qualifies as a significant example.7
That a sense of divine immanence, indeed a conviction that
human beings actually participate in divinity, has been at the heart
of American piety for some time is the burden of Harold Bloom’s
The American Religion.8 Bloom is at his best here, for, like one of his
heroes, Sigmund Freud, he reaches for the big hypothesis, the
grandiose claim, and spares his readers the qualifications and caveats
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that punctuate the flow of the argument in much scholarly work.
According to Bloom, distinctly American religions such as
Mormonism, the Southern Baptist churches, and Christian Science
are animated by the conviction that the human soul is older than
creation: we are closer to divinity than to the finite, created order.
And Bloom claims that this conviction has not been confined to
religions born on these shores, but has had an impact on many
traditional European religions as they have become acculturated to
the American scene, even religions such as Roman Catholicism and
Lutheranism. The conviction that the soul is older than creation is
in the spiritual atmosphere that Americans of all stripes breathe.
We return to our earlier observation, then, that the notion of
divine immanence is ready-to-hand to those who, in today’s
America, wish to embrace a modification strategy designed to avoid
disconfirmation by the Other. And, of course, not only is the idea
of divine immanence readily available to the contemporary
American spiritual quester, it has peculiar strengths in dealing with
religious and spiritual pluralism, as we have seen, and thus will be
particularly attractive to those questers whose focal concern is to
avoid disconfirmation by the Other.
An emphasis upon experience is the second hallmark of the
modification strategies that we have examined. Thich Nhat Hahn
goes so far as to assert that “Authentic experience makes a religion a
true religion.”9 The focus upon experience fits seamlessly with the
emphasis on divine immanence: if the divine is not distant from us
but, rather, close by, then we can do more than simply represent it
to ourselves via concepts or behave according to moral dictates that
we believe to be divine demands: we can encounter the divine more
directly, specifically through our own “experience.”
The word “experience” is used in so many different ways and in
so many diverse contexts, however, that we need to examine it in
more detail and specify its meaning as used in the modification
strategies with which we are concerned here. Suppose that I am
asked by a friend, “Have you ever experienced white-water rafting?”
I will say “No,” even though I know what that kind of rafting is and
have frequently seen television and movie footage of people engaged
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in it. For me to be able to say that I have actually “experienced”
white-water rafting requires that I have engaged in that activity
myself. In other words, “experience” suggests actual participation,
and the sort of participation that is involved in the case of rafting is
physical and vigorous.
By contrast, consider the case where I inquire of a friend,
“Have you ever had the experience of seeing the Mona Lisa?” She
will probably only answer my question affirmatively if she has
been to the Louvre and looked at the actual painting. In this
instance, however, experience is not tied up with vigorous activity,
but it does once again suggest proximity, an intimate participation
in something: she must have seen the original painting with her
own eyes, not just reproductions of it, in order to claim to have
had the experience.
If experience demands proximity to or some sort of
participation in a particular phenomenon, it is even more obvious
that it demands an accompanying consciousness. If I were loaded
onto a white-water raft while in a coma and remained comatose
throughout the raft’s journey, I would not be able to claim upon
coming out of my coma that I had experienced rafting, even though
one might argue that, at least in a weak sense, I had participated in
it; certainly I was proximate to the phenomenon. Thus, experience
in the relevant sense demands not just proximity and not just any
sort of participation, but participation in the sense of being
consciously involved in a phenomenon.
Our analysis of experience thus far is consistent with Kant’s
definition of it as “knowledge by means of connected perceptions.”10
Both the words “knowledge” and “perception” in his formula are
functions of consciousness. Perception as Kant understands it is
given through sensible intuition. Whether I am white-water rafting
or gazing at a famous painting, my experience will be dependent
upon the five senses. But the notion of “actually experiencing”
something as opposed to merely being acquainted with it from a
distance often includes not just the input that is sensible intuition
and the proximity to an object that sensible intuition presupposes
but also certain accompanying subjective states, most obviously
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what we call “emotions” or “feelings.” Thus, to “really experience”
white-water rafting in the sense in which we are ordinarily inclined
to employ that phrase includes the fact that braving the river
produces in one a sense of excitement and adventure, or perhaps of
terror. As for one’s seeing the actual Mona Lisa, that experience
could be accompanied by a state of boredom and thus lead to the
conclusion that the painting is highly overrated. But such
disappointment and boredom are nonetheless part of what defines
the experience.
Our authors’ emphasis on “experience” in their modification
strategies suggests proximity to and participation in ultimate reality,
then, along with a subjective state that the experiencer reads as
consistent with such contact with the ultimate . But in the case of
spiritual or religious experience, the subjective states may well take
on a different and much more important role than they have in our
examples of experiencing rafting and a famous painting. A cursory
consideration of the experience of white-water rafting and of seeing
the Mona Lisa suggests that the subjective states are caused by one’s
rafting or seeing the Mona Lisa, though the states exist in the midst
of the rafting or the viewing of a painting. In other words, I still
need to have the subjective states in order to have the full-blown
experiences of rafting and viewing the Mona Lisa, but there will be
a definite causal order such that the subjective states are results of
my braving the river’s currents or of my placing myself in front of
the painting. But where ultimate reality is concerned, the reality
that Thich Nhat Hahn, Deepak Chopra, and John Shelby Spong
are all happy to call the Ground of Being or Being-itself, the object
of the experience is not a physical phenomenon. I cannot touch it
or see it and, as a result, be put into a particular subjective state. It
seems, rather, that the subjective state or states will have to be
intuitive in the relevant technical philosophical sense: those states
themselves will need to be interpreted as the reception of something
given to the mind, in this case the reality of Being-itself. A subjective
sense of overwhelming mystery, for example, might be the way in
which I claim that God or Being-itself shows itself to me, rather
than simply my response to being in the divine presence.
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What we have here is an instance of what can be called
“intuitive internal experience,” insofar as the subjective or internal
states are intuitive and thus definitive of the experience.11 As
internal, they obviously pass the test of proximity or participation.
Of course, the skeptic can immediately contest the claim that such
internal experiences are intuitive rather than simply generated by
one’s own mind. Or, if the skeptic is inclined to grant that such
internal experiences can be intuitive, that they can present
something to the mind that stands outside it, he or she will
undoubtedly point out that we cannot be certain just what reality
they are presenting. I don’t have to conclude, for instance, that the
experience of radical mystery puts me in touch with Being-itself.
But however one decides to evaluate the trustworthiness of
what we have decided to call intuitive internal experience, it is
nonetheless evident, I think, that the emphasis upon piety as
intuitive internal experience is, like the note of divine immanence,
ready-to-hand in contemporary American culture. George
Lindbeck’s The Nature of Doctrine underlines this point. In Chapter
Three, we examined Lindbeck’s notion of a spirituality or religion as
a cultural-linguistic construction, a discrete world with internal
principles that dictate the meaning of assertions and behaviors. We
found Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic approach vulnerable to the
disconfirming Other and, thus, not a viable interpretation of
spirituality and religion for one who wishes to craft a modification
strategy addressing pluralism’s challenge to belief. But while the
cultural-linguistic perspective is the one that Lindbeck himself
advocates, it is not the only perspective that he analyzes. He
recognizes two major alternative approaches to spirituality among
theologians, namely, the “cognitive-propositional” approach and
the “experiential-expressive” one. It is the latter that seems to be
presupposed in the writing of Nhat Hahn, Chopra, and Spong.
Lindbeck provides a useful description of experientialexpressivism, which he grants has been the regnant model in
modern and contemporary theology. More specifically, he
provides a description of it that makes evident experientialexpressivism’s potential appeal to anyone seeking to find unity
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among different religious or spiritual traditions. Most basically, the
experiential-expressivist will “locate ultimately significant contact
with whatever is finally important to religion in the prereflective
experiential depths of the self [this surely suggests what we have
called “intuitive internal experience”] and regard the public or
outer features of religion as expressive and evocative
objectifications (i.e., nondiscursive symbols) of internal
experience.”12 What is more, “Different religions are diverse
expressions or objectifications of a common core experience.”13
That is, since the core of religion or spirituality is an internal
experience and religious doctrines and rubrics are simply outward
expressions of this inner experience, and because such outward
expressions can never do justice to the actual experience, different
traditions might very well be pointing to the exact same experience
despite expressing it in different words or acts.
Further evidence that, especially where the spiritual quest is
concerned, an emphasis upon intuitive internal experience is
endemic to contemporary American culture can be had by noting
that, beginning in the 1960s, Americans have displayed an
insatiable appetite for mystical religious traditions, from Hindu and
Buddhist meditation-centered varieties to historic Christian
mysticism as exemplified by John of the Cross and Julian of
Norwich to the Jewish Kabala.14 That American questers have often,
in the interest of instant gratification, watered down these classical
mysticisms, sometimes to the point of inanity, is not of concern to
us here: we are simply noting yet another indication of the ready-tohand character of an emphasis upon internal experience in the
spiritual journey.
The notion of intuitive internal spiritual experience is only an
intellectual stone’s throw away from the claim of ineffability,
which is the third distinguishing mark of the popular
modification strategies that we have investigated. The writers
whom we have considered appear to hold that an immanent
ultimate can be given to consciousness in intuitive internal
experience, but that neither the object of such experience nor even
the experience itself can adequately be described via the
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conceptual tools available to finite human beings. Theology is
frequently a waste of time. Better simply to open oneself to the
experience. Of course, much depends upon the word “adequately”
in the expression “adequately described,” for, after all, if it were
impossible to understand or to communicate about the experience
of the ultimate in any fashion whatsoever, then there could be no
books such as Living Buddha, Living Christ; The Third Jesus; and
Jesus for the Non-Religious. For the ultimate to be totally ineffable,
in other words, would mean that we could never encounter it, for
there would be nothing for our minds to grasp. Nothing would be
given to consciousness. We must be able to understand something
about the reality in question even to claim that it is ultimate and
(to a large extent) ineffable.
Christian theologians, in particular, have long wrestled with the
challenge of how little we apparently know about God and what we
can in fact say about God. They have come up with at least three
possible ways to proceed. Perhaps, given God’s infinity and our
finitude, we can only say what God is not. Thus, the familiar
Christian claim that “God is love” really means no more than that
God has no characteristics contrary to love. A second possibility is
that, in addition to saying what God is not, we can say what God is
in relation to us. In this case, “God is love” is not talking about the
inner being of the divine, something far beyond our ken, but is
describing the loving, compassionate way in which believers
experience God acting toward them. The third possibility thinks of
our statements about God as symbolic (note that Lindbeck links
this recourse to symbolism with experiential-expressivism in the
quotation above).
Of course, “symbolic” is another slippery term. Even if we
confine it to just one of its possible meanings, namely, analogy, we
must be satisfied with choosing one possible interpretation among
others, since analogy has been variously understood by different
Christian thinkers down through the centuries. Here is one
representative interpretation of analogical language: to say that
“God is love” means that, while we can never grasp God’s infinite
and perfect love, we can say with confidence that it is at least
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something like human love. Succinctly put, to say that “God is
love,” then, means that God is a loving being (or the loving ground
of being) akin to the fashion in which my best friend Jamie is a
loving being, except that God’s love is free of any limitation or
imperfection. Because the human mind cannot grasp love that is
free of limitation or imperfection, analogical language about God
still has a good deal of modesty attached to it.
What does all of this mean for the claim made by Nhat Hahn,
Chopra, and Spong that the ultimate is somehow ineffable? We have
already suggested that they hold that the ultimate is given to
consciousness in certain experiences, which experiences necessarily
have an internal, emotional component. They go on to say that
there is much about this ultimate, the Ground of Being or Beingitself, that escapes the conceptual tools available to finite human
beings. This large degree of incomprehensibility means that the
experiences through which the ultimate is given to consciousness are
themselves only vaguely describable, more difficult to describe, that
is, than ordinary subjective states. While we have all had experiences
of inner peace, for example, these garden-variety experiences of
peace do not begin to approach the power of the experience of
unconditional peace that the spiritual seeker claims to have had.
The latter is what St. Paul refers to as the “peace that surpasses all
understanding” (Philippians 4:7).
Just where does the phenomenon of symbolism (in the form
of analogy explained above) come into play, then? Let us say that
our hypothetical spiritual seeker has an experience of
unconditional peace (a large component of which is the
cognitively negative and hence humble experience of being unable
to find any gaps in the experience of peace; our seeker can detect
no portion of his or her selfhood left untouched by this
experience). Let us suppose, furthermore, that the seeker in
question is a Christian (so that she identifies the source of
unconditional peace with Jesus Christ as the revelation, indeed the
presence, of God) and that she wants to tell me of her experience.
It is unlikely that she will start right off with symbolic talk: she
will not look at me and blurt out “Jesus is the Good Shepherd”
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(see John 10:11). Rather, she will begin speaking literally, in a
manner something like the following: “I felt that I was directly in
touch with Christ. An indescribable feeling of peace came over
me. It was as if I was being sustained by Christ in such a way that
nothing could ever harm me, or even cause me worry, ever again.
The feeling was so intense, I really can’t describe it.” This
attempted description makes use of language not about God or
Christ in themselves, but of Christ’s peace-giving relationship to the
experiencer. It is followed by the quite literal confession that the
experience was sufficiently intense and unique that the
experiencer has no adequate way literally to describe it.
At another moment in her Christian practice, however, the
subject of this experience may well feel herself particularly drawn to
the biblical affirmation, attributed to Jesus himself, that Jesus is the
Good Shepherd. Indeed, it may become for her the most powerful
of Jesus’ “I am” statements, given its ability to suggest Jesus’ care for
his followers, a care that inspires a sense of peace. Jesus’ affirmation
is clearly symbolic or, to revert to the terminology we have used
previously, analogical. As far as we know, the historical man Jesus of
Nazareth was not a shepherd. But we are talking, in any case, about
an experience not of the historical Jesus but of Jesus as the eternal
presence of God. Thus, the statement, “Jesus is the Good Shepherd”
is a symbolic or analogical statement in the requisite sense for our
purposes: it allows the experiencer to say something about the
extraordinary experience of inner peace that she attributes to Jesus
Christ but does so with the noetic modesty characteristic of analogy,
since Jesus Christ is not literally a shepherd.
What does all of this have to do with the attraction to analogy
on the part of our advocates of modification strategies? If a
Christian avers that “Jesus is the Good Shepherd” as the result of her
spiritual experience and a Buddhist tells us that, given his
experience, the ultimate is like a body of perfectly pure water whose
glassy surface is undisturbed by so much as a ripple, the two questers
need not be seen as threatening to disconfirm one another’s sense of
the ultimate. In other words, two symbolic statements, unlike two
literal ones, can draw on very different material without
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contradicting one another in any way. If I say in one stanza of a
poem that my true love is like a star shining down from the heavens
and in another stanza that she is like a dew-covered rose, I can fairly
be accused of writing bad poetry, but not of contradicting myself.
*

*

*

*

*

Thus far, this chapter has provided the occasion to look at the
defining emphases of the modification strategies advanced by Nhat
Hahn, Chopra, and Spong in some detail and to note the ready-tohand character of those emphases in the larger American culture.
Before we move on to a consideration of some additional ways in
which these same emphases are connected to pluralism, i.e., ways
beyond simply warding off the disconfirmation threatened by
spiritual pluralism, we need briefly to return to the two professional
religious thinkers whom we also considered in the previous chapter.
Karl Rahner set forth what we categorized as a spiritual inclusivism,
while John Hick provided an example of a pluralist theology. To
what extent is their thought too driven by the elements of
immanence, experience, and ineffability?
The philosophical foundations of Rahner’s theology that
were of concern to us displayed all three with great clarity. What
God could possibly be more immanent than Rahner’s God, who
makes himself present to us as an a priori condition for the
possibility of any human mental act? This God is, in the words
of the Quran, closer to us than our jugular vein (50:16).15 And
while we did not go on to discuss the sort of religious experience
that Rahner attaches to so-called “special revelation,” the
thematic revelation he believes was provided to humanity in
Jesus Christ, the ever-immanent God who communicates
himself in the constitution of our consciousness is also ever an
object of our experience, albeit unthematically. Every waking
hour, we possess a pre-grasp of the being of God. And, finally,
Rahner is emphatic in his assertion that this same God who is
ever-present to all human beings is “holy mystery,” an infinite
far beyond our means of comprehension. That is, Rahner avers
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that, where Christian theology is concerned, an emphasis upon
immanence need not rule out an equally ardent emphasis upon
transcendence.
John Hick presents a bit more complex case. According to the
scenario that he suggests, during Jasper’s “Axial Period,” the ultimate
presented itself in several cultures around the world. On the one
hand, Hick does appear to assume that this meant that the different
spiritual seers behind the various world religions did indeed each
have an experience of the divine. They did not simply philosophize
about the divine or draw conclusions about human responsibilities
implied by the existence of the divine. On the other hand, he does
not accept the claim that, at root, all of these experiences of ultimate
reality were one and the same and that the differences among the
world religions resulted from subsequent choices about how to
express this single experience of the ultimate. Instead, he argues that
the experiences had by the original seers were themselves different,
because the seers came into the presence of divinity already
conditioned by the multi-faceted characteristics of their diverse
cultures. Hence, for example, some prophets and seers experienced
the divine from the beginning as personal, while others experienced
it as an impersonal Absolute.
Of course, at the end of the day, this contrast with the oneexperience-many-expressions formula at the heart of our three
paradigmatic popular modification strategies may be a distinction
without a difference. For Hick goes on to claim that the different
cultural lenses that the religious pioneers brought to their encounter
with the ultimate meant that they were not experiencing the
ultimate as it is in itself – the noumenal ultimate – but only the
ultimate as it appears through those lenses – the phenomenal
ultimate. Therefore, despite the religions’ different foundational
experiences, all of those experiences were in fact of the same
ultimate reality. As a result, Hick too can finally claim that the
contradictory theologies of the different world religions are not
really fatally contradictory after all, for – and this is a move that
connects Hick’s discussion with the notion of ineffability – those
theologies are merely phenomenal adumbrations that, as such, may
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contradict one another with regard to their phenomenal claims
without actually being in disagreement about the noumenal reality
to which they point.
Hence, it appears that the familiar emphases on experience and
an element of ineffability are both present in Hick’s proposal.
However, one possible interpretation of Hick’s approach is that the
experiential element was really only of definitive significance for
the founders of the various traditions: these founders had their
religious experiences and then formed systems of belief and ritual
based upon those experiences. And this might mean, in turn, that
for the followers down through the ages, in distinction to the
founders, internal, intuitive experience of the ultimate does not
really come into play. Rather, these followers’ lives are formed by
the belief and ritual systems handed down to them. Of course, the
beliefs and rituals inspire experiences in the followers, some of
which are no doubt powerful, but these experiences might well be
interpreted as emotional responses to the beliefs and rites, not
intuitive phenomena via which the ultimate is given to
consciousness. If this be the case, then experience is not as
important a player in Hick’s version of things as it is in the thought
of Nhat Hahn, Chopra, and Spong.
But what of the remaining characteristic, namely, immanence?
Once again, it is possible to read Hick in a way that does not put
the same emphasis on divine immanence that our other authors
have. For, to the extent that the ordinary religious person’s piety is
largely determined by the belief system that has been handed down
to him or her and not to his or her own intuitive experience of the
divine, it is quite possible that that very belief system will emphasize
divine transcendence at the expense of divine immanence.
Remember our observation in the previous chapter that Hick’s
theology proceeds largely “from above” rather than “from below.”
The divine seeks out prophets who can communicate something of
divine reality to the larger human community, rather than the
divine being ever-present to each and every human being given the
very constitution of human nature. Of course, the formative
prophets themselves must be able claim that God was immanent for
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them, at least at those moments in which they were receiving their
purported revelations.
Despite Hick’s standing as something of an “odd man out,”
however, we must recall that his noumenal/phenomenal distinction
allows one to avoid the disconfirmation with which religious
pluralism threatens the believer. Indeed, he imagines a profound
degree of convergence among the world’s religions in the future, so
that the differences among traditions such as Hinduism, Buddhism,
Judaism, Islam, and Christianity come to be seen as akin to the
relatively mild differences that exist among so-called Christian
“denominations” today.16
What is more, the suggestion that perhaps the elements of
immanence and experience are more applicable to the founders
of religions in Hick’s view than to their workaday followers
raises an additional issue that ought at least to be mentioned
here. If there is such a thing as an “average” believer – not to be
confused with our ideal type of the traditional Christian, the
individual who is on the quest of faith seeking understanding
and thus is anything but average – say, an average Christian who
finds himself or herself sitting in church on most Sunday
mornings, isn’t it likely that this person’s sense of divine
immanence and experience of the divine, including its
ineffability, will most likely all be fairly mild? Our hypothetical
average Christian will indeed have the experience of feeling
closer to God in church than he or she does while at the office
during the work week, but the sense of immanence and its
accompanying experience will probably be less dramatic than
what writers such as Thich Nhat Hahn, Deepak Chopra, and
John Shelby Spong describe. The upshot of this is that the seeker
who goes to the trouble of adopting a modification strategy
because that seeker is troubled by the disconfirming Other is,
generally speaking, more intensely involved in the spiritual life
than most. It is these latter persons, in other words, whose sense
of immanence and personal experience of the divine may be
characterized by the intensity suggested in the thinking of Nhat
Hahn, Chopra, and Spong.
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Pluralism has been at the heart of our entire investigation up to
this point. Specifically, we have been interested in how religious
persons deal with the threat of disconfirmation that spiritual
pluralism wields. When it comes to modification strategies that
attempt to face that threat head-on, we have seen how those
strategies rely upon immanence, experience, and ineffability as
essential motifs. A bit of further investigation, however, will reveal
that two of these all-important motifs have a circular relationship
with pluralism. More exactly, they exist in a reciprocal causal
relationship with pluralism. We shall begin with the paradoxical fact
that an emphasis upon immanence and experience, which the
modification strategies use as tools for warding off the threatening
aspect of pluralism, is itself the product of American society’s
spiritual pluralism. Then we shall consider how the modification
strategies add to that same pluralism.
How is it that writers such as Thich Nhat Hahn, Deepak
Chopra, and John Shelby Spong can so effectively appeal to the
notion that the ultimate is immanent and that spirituality is built
around individual experience? They can do so, at least where their
American audiences are concerned, because, as we have seen, these
notions are already firmly ensconced in American culture. As Harold
Bloom has suggested, the American spiritual seeker believes that the
soul is older than creation. It is always already intimately tied up with
ultimate reality. But the nearly taken-for-granted status of divine
immanence and immediate experiential access to divinity in America
is the result of spiritual pluralism. In noting the ready-to-hand
character of these motifs in America we have cited the importance of
figures such as Ralph Waldo Emerson. We need to remind ourselves
that historically influential American spiritual questers who
emphasized immanence and individual spiritual experience such as
Emerson and his fellow-travelers, from Mary Baker Eddy to
Madame Blavatsky, are potent examples of American spiritual
pluralism. That is, the historically most effective spokespersons in
this country for immanence and experience in the life of the spirit
frequently stood outside the walls of mainstream religion and
contributed decisively to the diversity of American spiritualities.

126

MODIFICATION STRATEGIES

Of course, divine immanence has ever been one pole of the
traditional Christian dialectic of immanence and transcendence,
and we recall that revivalism and Christian fundamentalism both
put a premium on an emotionally-charged experience of Jesus
Christ as their savior. But the emphasis on immanence and the
closely-connected notion of individual experience of divinity are
taken much further by Emerson and his ilk than most orthodox
Christians would be willing to go. One need only think here about
traditional Christianity’s opposition to the notion of private
revelations. That is, traditional church theology, both Catholic and
Protestant, has held that, while the individual believer can feel God’s
presence and be guided by God in making decisions, no insight into
the divine nature itself that is not already a part of the orthodox
deposit of revelation will ever be vouchsafed an individual, a
principle that Emerson clearly transgresses. Recall that this was, in
fact, one of the sticking points between Martin Luther and the socalled “radical reformers.” For Luther, radical reformers such as
Andreas Karlstadt went far too far in allowing for the possibility that
God can speak directly to the individual believer. Hence, Luther’s
famous dismissive observation that Karlstadt had “swallowed the
Holy Spirit, feathers and all.”
Note that the tie to pluralism here is not only a function of the
fact that the movers and shakers in American history who put
special emphasis upon immanence and individual spiritual
experience frequently stood outside the religious mainstream. It is
also the case that those favored themes of divine immanence and the
individual’s experiential access to divinity are themselves
inextricably tied up with pluralism, for they empower the individual
quester to follow an idiosyncratic spiritual path, thus encouraging
the creation of a multitude of unique spiritualities. Hence, we find
that the very motifs employed by the modification strategies to
block pluralism’s potential threat to belief are themselves (before
they are taken up into the modification strategies) a result of and
even productive of America’s history of vigorous spiritual pluralism.
But the modification strategies that have been under
investigation here not only encourage a variety of faiths in the sense
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that they privilege the divine presence within each individual and
each individual’s experience of the divine: they also encourage
further pluralism in that they offer the possibility of any number of
different combinations of exemplars of the ultimate. For instance,
Thich Nhat Hahn is explicit about his having grafted the figure of
Jesus onto his already existing reverence for the Buddha. But others
are free to privilege Jesus and the Quran, or Jesus and Krishna, or
Jesus and the Tao, and on and on. Thus it is that the modification
strategies, in countering the threat of disconfirmation represented
by spiritual pluralism, draw constituent elements from that same
spiritual pluralism and even contribute to its expansion.
That the modification strategies draw upon and even enhance
that spiritual pluralism the disconfirming power of which they are
meant to parry suggests a circular, reciprocal causal pattern. But is
this circle vicious and destructive? Thich Nhat Hahn and Deepak
Chopra suggested that belief in Jesus as the presence of God is
consistent with Buddhism and with much of what goes under the
heading of Hinduism, and Spong implied as much. And if
commitment to Jesus is consistent with these, it surely ought
potentially to be consistent with Christianity’s sister religions,
Judaism and Islam. The suggestion, in other words, is that the
modification strategies can disarm pluralism’s threat of
disconfirmation when the pluralism in question is that of the major
world religions. Thich Nhat Hahn and Deepak Chopra, in
particular, suggested that this was the case by grappling with specific
tenets of Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism. They did not
grapple, however, with specific tenets of the endless number of
smaller spiritual movements, from ancient preliterate traditions to
Zoroastrianism to Scientology. No doubt it is most often the other
great world religions that a believer finds most challenging: reflective
Christians are troubled by the fact that their convictions appear, on
the surface, to be contradicted by the other world religions and that
they have no stronger basis for their convictions than do the
adherents of those other world religions. By contrast, they may lose
little sleep over their lack of any definitive epistemological edge over
Scientology. But is this untroubled slumber justified?
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The arguments set forth by Nhat Hahn, Chopra, and indirectly
by Spong, as well as the position staked out by Rahner, did not aver
that, simply as a function of mere chance, there are profound,
underlying similarities among the world religions. Rather, they
engaged in theological or spiritual anthropology: they analyzed the
human way of being and the quest for the ultimate that follows
from it, and they found certain features that they hold to be
universal. It is part of being human to have a relationship to the
ultimate or infinite in which the latter is potentially immanent in
the former; it is part of the human way of being to be able to
connect with this infinite or ultimate via a particular kind of
experience; and the spiritual experiences that we have, as well as the
reality to which they point, are often ineffable. Undeterred by
postmodernist strictures against the notion of human nature, the
thinkers we have profiled did attempt to describe the universal
human condition, and they found the relevant forms of
immanence, experience, and ineffability at its heart.
As a result, the Christian believer who is willing to modify the
orthodox outlines of his or her belief system can regard adherence
to the figure of Jesus Christ as perfectly consistent with what is
going on in the other world religions; there are no contradictions
after all and, hence, no problem with the fact that those other
traditions too appeal to phenomena such as divine revelation to
back up their claims. If the Christian believer, having adopted the
sort of modification strategies we have been investigating here, can
feel at home among the other world religions rather than in danger
of being undone by them as competing belief systems, a great deal
has been accomplished indeed. Far from a confrontation with the
other world religions sowing seeds of doubt about one’s own
convictions, the underlying unity among them, based on the
universal phenomena represented by immanence, experience, and
ineffability, obviously enhances the plausibility structure
undergirding those convictions: there is strength in numbers.
So what, then, if traditions such as Scientology, without the
worldwide impact of those commonly regarded as the great world
religions, do not share the emphases upon immanence, experience,
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and ineffability found in the most venerable world religions? Does
the specter of the disconfirming Other now simply arise from new
quarters? It need not. Not only does the now-apparent underlying
agreement among the vast majority of spiritual questers in the world,
the members of the world religions, provide a potent plausibility
structure that may well allow the Christian simply to disregard
hundreds of smaller spiritual movements that may still contradict his
or her convictions: that Christian (or Buddhist, or Hindu, or other
devotee of a world religion) can disregard them in good conscience
precisely because, as contradictory, these movements must be
assumed not to be putting proper emphasis upon the unifying motifs
of immanence, experience, and ineffability.
The worldview pushed by writers such as Nhat Hahn and
Chopra asserts, as we have seen, that these motifs are built into the
nature of human being. Hence, for a smaller movement such as
Scientology to contradict my own convictions by underplaying
immanence, experience, and ineffability is a function of it failing
accurately to read the human condition. In other words, in
contrast to where the believer found herself when first confronted
with the potentially disconfirming power of the Other, that
believer now possesses clear convictions about how immanence,
experience, and ineffability inform her beliefs and about their
presence within the other world religions, and thus, this time
around, the believer does in fact possess criteria that ground her
convictions, criteria that are presumably lacking in spiritual
movements that contradict those convictions.17
This is not the last word on spiritual and religious pluralism,
however, nor even upon their potentially destructive effects. For we
have yet to examine a portion of American spirituality where
pluralism might be said to run wild, and where anything resembling
the traditional world religions is conspicuously absent: it is time for
us to turn to an investigation of New Age spirituality.

CHAPTER FIVE

Pluralism and the New Age

W

hat is loosely designated “New Age spirituality” in America
today clearly has its roots in what Catherine Albanese calls
“metaphysical religion.”1 Recall the four defining characteristics of
metaphysical religion that she provides. First, it focuses upon mind
and its powers, where mind is an expansive concept leading all the
way to psychic notions such as clairvoyance. Second, it emphasizes
a correspondence between a divine macrocosm and the human
microcosm (an emphasis consistent with Harold Bloom’s
contention that characteristically American religion regards the soul
as older than creation: the soul essentially is the divine in
microcosm). Third, metaphysical religion’s approach to reality
emphasizes movement and energy. And fourth, the metaphysical
quest seeks therapeutic effects for the agitated human soul.
If so-called New Age spirituality is a contemporary
manifestation of this metaphysical spirituality, with metaphysical
spirituality having been a part of nearly the whole of American
history, what distinguishes the New Age from the rest of that
history? Albanese suggests that the “New Age movement” came into
being sometime in the 1970s and 1980s when a critical mass of
metaphysical practitioners became aware of their own impressive
numbers and when, as a result, both the practitioners and the press
became convinced that they could identify a genuine, discreet
spiritual movement in American culture.2
A perusal of the New Age section of a typical bookstore or of an
internet bookseller’s New Age offerings will inevitably reveal the
following topics, among others: astrology, Tarot, the I-Ching,

PLURALISM AND THE NEW AGE

131

channeling the dead (that is, communicating with the dead via a
“medium”), the body’s chakras or energy centers, aroma therapy,
healing through the manipulation of energy fields (Reiki, for
example), the meaning of dreams, extra-sensory perception, the
power of crystals, palmistry, casting spells, Native-American
spirituality, eco-spirituality, past lives regression therapy (where one
is aided in recalling one’s previous incarnations on the wheel of
rebirth), and devotion to the Goddess or goddesses. This list,
though inevitably incomplete, makes it clear that the New Age is the
pluralistic spirituality par excellence. But its pluralism is not simply
a function of how many practices it offers its devotees – the plethora
of the sources upon which it draws – but also of the fact that the
individual New Age practitioner is free to take up as many of these
practices as he or she sees fit. In other words, the pluralism of the
sources of New Age spirituality is coupled with what might be called
an internal pluralism: a quester is likely to experiment not just with
one offering collected under the New Age heading but, rather, an
array of practices that suits his or her individual needs.
Our interest in pluralism in this study, however, has been with
its potentially disconfirming powers. More specifically, we have
considered how a reasonably orthodox adherent of one of the great
world religions deals with the fact that the other world religions
profess beliefs contrary to her own, and that she recognizes the fact
that she has no more evidence to back up her beliefs than members
of other religions have to support theirs. The latter part of this
formula is crucial: the Christian will claim divine revelation as a
source of his beliefs, but the Muslim will also claim divine revelation
as the source of her convictions. Note, however, that this second
component of the disconfirmation dilemma probably will not come
into play when the New Age believer confronts the traditional world
religions. The devotee of the New Age will, in most cases, not appeal
to divine revelation contained in a sacred Scripture, for example,
which is something that at least the three Abrahamic religions
certainly will. The matter is more ambiguous when we attempt to
compare New Age claims about sources of truth with something
such as the claim made on behalf of the Upanishads, namely, that
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their content was intuited by special seers. Because we are
concentrating upon spirituality and religion in the United States,
however, it is most pertinent, for our purposes, to think about how
New Age spirituality lines up with the Abrahamic traditions,
Judaism and Christianity in particular. And to the extent that the
New Age mentality will make appeal to very different sources of
evidence than do Judaism and Christianity, the New Age believer is
not as likely to be confronted with the threat of disconfirmation
from those traditions. For, given that the New Age sources are
genuinely different than those claimed by the Abrahamic traditions,
the devotee of the New Age can always claim that the basis for New
Age convictions is more profound and reliable than what props up
the beliefs of Jews and Christians.
The very idea of a “new age,” after all, suggests that we can tap
into a new spiritual dispensation, one unavailable to, or at least
unrecognized by, the traditional world religions. Recalling
Albanese’s four characteristics of metaphysical religion and
condensing them into a summary formula that can be used to
describe just what New Age practitioners see as the source of New
Age rites, we can say that they claim that a potent energy fills the
universe and that enlightened human beings can tap into it and
experience first-hand its therapeutic effects. They can do so since all
humans are from the start, whether or not they are sufficiently
enlightened to recognize it, connected to this supernal energy; the
soul, once more, is older than creation. Our conclusion, then, is that
a self-described New Age spiritual seeker will not confront the
disconfirming Other when considering the beliefs of Christianity or
Judaism, for that quester will inevitably point out that those older
religious traditions simply do not afford the New Age’s much more
immediate relation to the energy that fructifies the universe.
But we have seen that New Age spirituality is tied up with
American spiritual pluralism not only in the vast array of spiritual
traditions (traditions most often outside Judaism and Christianity)
upon which it draws, but that that spirituality is inevitably
internally pluralistic as well. Might not the problem of the
disconfirming Other arise here, since now we are not juxtaposing
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the New Age with Christianity or Judaism, but, rather, considering
persons who all fit under the New Age umbrella that we have
described above? What we appear to have in many instances of
what gets labeled New Age spirituality is a whole host of spiritual
practices that differ in their specifics yet all rest upon a worldview
according to which the properly prepared mind (and body) can
participate in some type of encompassing, therapeutic energy field,
whether that field is most easily accessed by reading the stars or by
manipulating the body’s own chakras. Now we seem to have the
necessary ingredients for a disconfirmation challenge: my New Age
practices will differ from those of some other practitioners and may
seem to contradict those other practices, yet my defense of the
efficacy of my practices – the ability of the enlightened mind to
tap into healing energy – will be little different from that advanced
by those engaging in practices apparently incommensurable with
my own. Suppose I look to a medium and communication with
the dead in order to see into the future, while you do not believe
in such “channeling” and turn instead to casting the I-Ching or
look to a psychic who claims no connection with the departed.
Aren’t we now right back where we started, namely, with Charles
Taylor’s “mutual fragilization” of belief, the challenge of the
disconfirming Other?
One clue that the answer to this question may be “No” is to be
found in our description of New Age spirituality as being internally
pluralistic, meaning not just that many different practices can go on
under one big conceptual tent, but that the individual New Ager,
qua individual, frequently adopts a multitude of spiritual practices,
practices which may appear to an outsider to be mutually exclusive.
One finds empirical evidence of this by, for example, attending one
of the Celebrate Your Life conferences that have been held for
several years across the United States, where one finds seekers
enthusiastically participating in a menagerie of New Age events. Of
course, we might choose to argue that the practices do in fact often
rest on contradictory notions that become apparent when we push
beyond the superficial New Age similarities (the notion of energy
fields and the like) and that therefore we ought to conclude that
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New Age practitioners are employing one or more of the avoidance
tactics that we explored in Chapter One – compartmentalization,
overstepping the bounds of logic, and self-deception – in order to
ward off disconfirmation. But this would, I think, be an overly
hasty conclusion, for the ease with which an individual New Age
devotee is able to pull together a conglomeration of different
spiritual practices suggests that there are dynamics at work in the
New Age mentality that are simply not ordinarily a part of the
mainline religions.
It turns out that there are at least two important answers to the
question “How is the New Age devotee protected from
disconfirmation given that he or she is allowed, if not encouraged,
to adopt a potpourri of New Age practices?” The answers are not
independent of one another, but fit together into a coherent New
Age package. First of all, one should note that the list of New Age
options proffered above is not, first and foremost, a
conglomeration of different belief-systems. It is, rather, more akin
to a list of different techniques. If we were to compare these options
to what goes on in the Christian tradition, we would have to
conclude that they are more akin to intercessory prayer than to
reciting the Apostle’s Creed. And while it would be foolish not to
recognize that some persons are attracted to metaphysical and New
Age spiritualities precisely because of the speculative worldviews
that they offer – some devotees of theosophy might fit in this
category, for example – the New Age is above all a therapeutic
approach to the human condition and its sundry challenges, an
approach meant in a very direct sense to help you through the
practical challenges of life and to cure what ails you, whether your
ailments be physical, psychological, or left over from a previous life.
And just as there may be several treatment options open to a
decidedly non-New Age physician in treating a patient’s illness, so
the New Age offers a host of techniques that, while they may
appear to contradict one another when mistakenly understood as
essentially belief systems, avoid contradiction when understood as
techniques. Different belief systems or worldviews conflict;
different practical techniques need not.3
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Second, it is hard to miss the element of commodification in
New Age spirituality. I can personally testify that a visit to a New
Age convention, such as the aforementioned Celebrate Your Life
events, affords one the opportunity to walk up and down the aisles
of an exhibition hall with its myriad books, DVDs, and other New
Age wares in almost the same way that one goes up and down the
aisles at the supermarket: I see many things in the supermarket that
I don’t care to eat, but that does not bother me in the least, for
there will also be a whole host of foods that I do like to eat. As long
as my nutritional needs and desires are met by my supermarket, I
have no reason to begrudge others access to foods that are to their
taste but not to mine. In other words, I am expected to “shop,” not
just in the literal sense that occurs at a New Age convention, but to
shop also among different spiritual techniques by trying them out
in my quest.
These two considerations fit together nicely: techniques offer
themselves up for commodification in a way that worldviews do
not. One does actually pay for a session with a medium or a
treatment intended to put one’s energy centers back in balance. By
contrast, while the traditional mainline church attendee may put
money in the collection plate on most Sunday mornings, this is
hardly a matter of directly purchasing the belief system proclaimed
in that church.
It is essential to note, however, that while the New Age
emphasis on technique and commodification means that the New
Age is, with the inevitable exceptions noted above, less invested in
belief-systems than many other forms of spirituality, the belief
system dimension cannot easily disappear altogether for any New
Age practitioner, but is simply relegated to second-tier status. We
have already mentioned the general New Age conviction about
access to special forms of cosmic energy. Furthermore, the
techniques that the New Age sells its devotees, from astrology to
channeling the dead, each presuppose certain more specific
convictions. Astrology, for example, clearly commits one to the
belief that the stars have a powerful connection with the fates of
individual human beings. And in order to buy into the notion of
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channeling the deceased, one must believe that there is some
form of life after death and that the dead are sufficiently
interested in those of us here below that they are willing to
provide us with guidance.
Yet, the mixing and matching of individual spiritual practices
that characterizes the life of the New Age seeker suggests that the
belief systems behind the practices do not ordinarily conflict with
one another to the point of disconfirmation. Perhaps they can,
after all, work together smoothly under the overarching belief that
enlightened human beings can tap into special sources of spiritual
energy. But this does not protect New Age spirituality from
disconfirmation. For the New Age’s investment in technique
brings to the fore a different kind of disconfirmation threat: the
claim that a particular technique provides physical healing or
allows one to make accurate predictions about the future can be
empirically tested.
Let us consider a concrete example, one connected to one of the
New Age’s most audacious claims, namely, that certain persons
dubbed mediums have the ability to contact the dead and to receive
various sorts of information from them, including information
about events that will occur in the future. Two of America’s
currently most famous mediums are John Edward and James Van
Praagh. They appear regularly on U.S. television, and they have sold
millions of copies of their many books. Most often these alleged
mediums are seen not working with simply one inquirer (though
one can pay to have such one-on-one sessions) but with a whole
room full. One would expect skeptics, especially those with the
training to engage in statistical analysis, to have challenged the
claims of alleged mediums, and indeed they have.
Mediums such as Edward and Van Praagh frequently begin a
session by asking their audience a question such as “Does the name
Eddie mean anything to anyone here? I am getting a very strong
impression connected with that name.” In any group of twenty
people or more – and mediums such as Van Praagh and Edward
usually work with significantly larger groups – there is bound to be
someone who is named Eddie or who at least knows someone of
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that name. Where the latter category is concerned, someone in the
audience will inevitably say that they had a dog named Eddie or that
their second cousin is named Eddie; some person in the audience
will find a connection with the name, however tangential. Suppose,
for instance, that an audience member volunteers that she had an
uncle named Eddie. Now the medium is on his or her way. He or
she will ask questions of the particular person now in the spotlight,
questions such as “Was Eddie ever injured in any way?” “Did Eddie
have a dark complexion?” “Did Eddie’s job have something to do
with the business world?”
It turns out that the answers to the medium’s questions will
more often be negative than positive, but inquirers are apparently
impressed by even a very low number of “hits” (sometimes no more
than ten percent), no doubt because, as has been suggested by
skeptical analysts, these inquirers so desperately want to connect
with a deceased loved one. Skeptics have actually gone so far as to
pretend to be mediums and have demonstrated that by carefully
listening to the responses they get from their inquirers, they can
come up with as much or more accurate information than the
alleged mediums do.4
Of course, channeling the dead does not constitute the whole
of the New Age. For example, many New Age techniques are
invoked for physical healing. In some cases, the claim will be that a
gifted New Age practitioner can directly heal an ill person by
manipulating the patient’s energy fields. In other instances one
consults a New Age shaman who claims to be schooled in so-called
“alternative” treatments and in the therapeutic use of various
substances, the farther outside the scope of traditional scientific
medical practice in the United States the better. It will come as no
great surprise to those outside New Age circles, however, that, when
rigorous tests are performed to assess the sorts of alternative
therapies that are now so popular among New Age practitioners,
here too the claims cannot be verified.5
Long before there was a movement known as the New Age,
there has been an intense interest in America in claims about
“psychic phenomena,” involving everything from telepathy to the
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existence of ghosts to the mind’s ability to manipulate matter at a
distance. What is more, there have been, and continue to be, a
whole host of institutes and “research centers” dedicated to
investigating psychic claims and trumpeting positive results from
their inquiries. The Edgar Cayce Institute is a good example,
named after one of the country’s most famous twentieth-century
claimants to psychic abilities. But, alas, once again, when science of
the most rigorous kind puts the claims of the psychics to the test,
those claims almost invariably prove thoroughly unfounded. The
experience of psychologist Susan Blackmore, who began her Ph.D.
studies convinced of the reality of psychic phenomena, is
instructive in this regard:
I did the experiments. I tested telepathy, precognition, and
clairvoyance; I got only chance results. I trained fellow
students in imagery techniques and tested them again;
chance results. I tested twins in pairs; chance results. I
worked in play groups and nursery schools with very young
children (their naturally telepathic minds are not yet
warped by education, you see); chance results. I trained as
a Tarot reader and tested the readings; chance results.
Occasionally I got a significant result. Oh, the excitement!
I responded as I think any scientist should, by checking for
errors, recalculating the statistics, and repeating the
experiments. But every time I either found the error
responsible, or failed to repeat the results.6
Blackmore tells us that “parapsychologists called me a ‘psi-inhibitory
experimenter,’ meaning that I didn’t get paranormal results because
I didn’t believe strongly enough. I studied other people’s results and
found more errors, and even outright fraud.”7
I have suggested that the belief-system component of
spirituality takes a back seat to technique and commodification in
New Age spirituality. And we have seen how this emphasis on
technique and commodity and the relegation of a belief system to
second-tier status protects the New Age devotee from the kind of
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disconfirmation with which we have been concerned in previous
chapters of this book, namely, disconfirmation via the other
believer. We have gone on to note, however, that New Age claims
about techniques face their own kind of disconfirmation challenge:
precisely as clearly delimited claims about specific phenomena that
New Age spirituality can effect, New Age contentions leave
themselves open to scientific falsification, or at least to the
scientific conclusion that there is no tangible evidence to back up
New Age contentions.
This state of affairs leads to two pertinent observations. First,
while there seems to be less emphasis on commodified techniques
among the world religions and more emphasis upon a religion as a
belief system, those traditional religions do sometimes venture into
territory that seems to parallel New Age claims regarding
techniques. For instance, Christians of some stripes put a great deal
of emphasis upon petitionary prayer, that is, prayer in which they
ask God to accomplish some particular feat, such as healing a
diseased loved one. Cannot one scientifically test the Christian
claim that God responds to prayer and heals the sick in much the
same fashion as one can test New Age claims (and find them
wanting)? As a matter of fact, one can indeed do so, and the most
rigorous tests done thus far on petitionary prayer for the ill have
turned up largely negative results. Ill persons being prayed for
showed no more improvement in their health than did control
groups for whom no prayers were said.8
But the notion of petitionary prayer is embedded in a complex
fashion within Christianity as a belief system such that the believer
can fairly easily deal with such negative evidence from scientific
tests of the efficacy of prayer. For example, the believer will trust
that God has very good reasons for not answering some prayers.
Perhaps a particular bout of illness that befalls John fits into God’s
overarching plan for John’s life and will ultimately serve a good
end. Or consider the fact that there is biblical precedent for not
“putting God to the test” (Deuteronomy 6:16). Hence, the believer
may conclude that while, under ordinary circumstances,
petitionary prayer can have miraculous consequences, a controlled
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study testing prayer is not a project in which the Almighty chooses
to participate.
The second observation resulting from the New Age’s
susceptibility to scientific testing of its techniques is to note that,
interestingly enough, some New Age commentators have fought
back by reversing the decision to place the intellectual or beliefsystem component of their spirituality in the background: they have
attempted to articulate a detailed explanation of what Albanese has
pointed to as metaphysical spirituality’s perennial reference to
movement and energy. The thinking here is of the “If-you-can’tbeat-them-join-them” variety. That is, numerous New Age thinkers
have attempted, in essence, to protect New Age practice from
scientific disconfirmation by arguing that the very latest scientific
discoveries about the human mind, energy, and the place each holds
in the structure of the universe actually support New Age claims.
The most fertile ground among the sciences for such New Age
counterattacks is quantum physics, with its notoriously mindbending claims about the counter-intuitive way the universe works
on the most microscopic of levels. In her book The Field: The Quest
for the Secret Force of the Universe, New Age author Lynne
McTaggart focuses on the energy fluctuations that quantum
physicists talk about as existing in what they call the quantum field.
For her, the quantum physicists’ failings are in not going beyond the
purely scientific implications of their discoveries and neglecting the
metaphysical implications. If one does the latter, which she sets out
to do in her book, some of the most fantastic of New Age claims
supposedly become plausible, including its all-important claims
about alternative methods for healing: “The field is the force, rather
than germs or genes, that finally determines whether we are healthy
or ill, the force which must be tapped in order to heal.”9
To take a second example, the writing team of Phaedra and
Isaac Bonewits claims in their book Real Energy: Systems, Spirits, and
Substances to Heal, Change, and Grow that the genuinely astute
student of the universe’s energy can seamlessly combine energy as
understood in contemporary physics with Ceremonial Magic,
Voodoo and Santeria, Taoism, t’ai chi, tantra and kundalini yoga.10
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If there is one overarching and overawing assertion made by
those who claim quantum scientific backing for New Age beliefs, it
is probably, as Victor Stenger has suggested, that it is our own
thinking that creates reality.11 This is, after all, the central notion, in
one of its many permutations, behind the hugely popular book, The
Secret, and it is trumpeted throughout the surprisingly successful
New Age film, What the Bleep Do We Know? (which is particularly
strenuous in claiming quantum physics on behalf of the New Age).12
Here is the strategy, then: argue that the familiar scientific
tests of New Age claims, such as those undertaken by Susan
Blackmore, are not tuned into the newest and most profound
scientific discoveries, that is, those found in quantum physics. If
quantum physics is understood aright, then New Age claims
suddenly become plausible, even intellectually respectable. After
all, there is no more prestigious claimant to the title of intellectual
arbiter in contemporary Western culture than the scientist. The
problem, of course, is that this New Age strategy falls flat if the
vast majority of quantum physicists dismiss it as a wild misreading
of their field, which is in fact what has happened. New Age talk of
quantum physics is what Michael Shermer, with a nod to Nobel
laureate Murray Gell Mann, has dubbed “quantum flapdoodle and
other flummery.”13
At this point, it behooves us to step back and regain the big
picture, lest we lose the proverbial forest, our central concern in this
investigation, for the equally proverbial trees. Let us look back over
what we have found. What, precisely, is the relation of New Age
spirituality to pluralism? The New Age movement is wholeheartedly
pluralistic in the number of different sources upon which it draws.
More important, it is internally pluralistic in that it encourages
individual practitioners to imbibe as many New Age products as he
or she sees fit. But does not this internal pluralism, in particular,
lead to a form of disconfirmation? Does not the individual New Age
devotee find that the various practices that he or she tries contradict
one another? Not necessarily, and we have attributed this particular
instance of resistance to disconfirmation to the fact that the New
Age is more about a pluralism of techniques, indeed techniques that
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have become, for all practical purposes, commodities for sale, as
opposed to being about belief systems.
However, this emphasis upon technique and commodification
opens the New Age to a different kind of disconfirmation: the
individual techniques, thanks to the specificity of the claims
attached to them, can be empirically tested in order to determine
if they deliver what they promise. What is more, there is still a
connection with pluralism in this version of the challenge of
disconfirmation: pluralism does raise the threat of disconfirmation
here, but not by confronting different belief systems with one
another. Rather, the sheer number of practices offered by the New
Age mentality – practice taking pride of place over worldview in
this instance – coupled with the assumption that these many
practices can be mixed and matched, tends to turn those practices
into commodities. That is, in the case of the New Age,
commodification is in large measure a function of offering the
quester so many choices that the spiritual quest becomes essentially
a shopping spree. This suggests that pluralism within the New Age,
especially what we have called internal pluralism, reinforces, if it
does not explain all by itself, commodification. And the
commodification of New Age wares is in sync with the emphasis on
technique over worldview. In summary, insofar as New Age claims
are susceptible to empirical disconfirmation, and to the degree that
the emphasis on technique and commodification that is largely
responsible for this form of disconfirmation is tied to the New
Age’s thoroughgoing pluralism, the link between pluralism and the
threat of disconfirmation remains, albeit in a different form than
that represented by the disconfirming Other, the bane of adherents
of more traditional religions.
And, alas, the attempt of some writers to rescue New Age claims
from the special kind of disconfirmation to which the New Age’s
commodified techniques are susceptible by tying them to quantum
physics or other branches of contemporary science (that is, to focus
more on cognitive claims and a bit less on technique and
commodity) has been, at least from the perspective of the larger
scientific community itself, wholly unconvincing. One can only
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conclude that, where the New Age is concerned, pluralism, via its
connections with commodification and the notion of New Age
practice as technique, has found a way to raise the specter of
disconfirmation here too. We are hardly in a position here to offer a
final pronouncement, the last word, on New Age spirituality. It is
indeed much too “new,” on the timescale of history, for us to know
where it will all end up. But in its present configuration, and given
its vulnerability to disconfirmation via empirical testing, the New
Age movement seems simply to offer an alternative form of
pluralism-induced disconfirmation.

CHAPTER SIX

The Modification Strategies:
A Concluding Analysis

A

s the year 2012 dawned, the journal The Economist greeted its
readers with the following information:

In Nigeria scores of Christians have died in Islamist bomb
attacks, targeting Christmas Prayers. In Iran and Pakistan
Christians are on death row, for “apostasy” – quitting Islam –
or blasphemy. Dozens of churches in Indonesia have been
attacked or shut. Two-thirds of Iraq’s pre-war Christian
population have fled. In Egypt and Syria, where secular
despots gave Christianity a shield of sorts, political
upheaval and Muslim zeal threaten ancient Christian
groups. Not all Christianity’s woes are down to Muslims.
The faith faces harassment in formally communist China
and Vietnam. In India Hindu nationalists want to penalize
Christians who make converts. . . . Regimes or societies that
penalize Christians tend to oppress others minorities too.
Sunni Muslims who demonize Christians loathe Shias.1
One does not often hear about violence against Christians. We
hear more frequently, for instance, about the violent conflict
between Hindus and Muslims in India. But this account serves to
remind us that religious violence is not limited to only one or two
of the world religions. Above all, it should remind us that the desire
to adopt modification strategies is not simply about persons
addressing abstract challenges that confront them as intellectually
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curious individuals: it is also about the possibility of undercutting
the causes of violent persecution.
Having reminded ourselves of the serious implications of our
topic, suppose that we begin this final chapter with a thought
experiment. Imagine that the use of modification strategies such as
those we have explored in the previous chapters becomes
widespread. Two results are likely to follow. First, religious
pluralism, far from being a threatening source of disconfirmation of
one’s beliefs, will be heralded as effecting a particular moral good
(one that we first met in Chapter Three in our discussion of Karl
Rahner). If the world religions were in fact inconsistent, I would
face the Other as a source of disconfirmation. In addition, to the
extent that I nevertheless attempted to maintain my conviction that
my own belief system was correct even though it contradicted the
other religious belief systems, I would likely experience the moral
burden of feeling that the vast majority of my fellow inhabitants of
planet Earth were being denied access to salvific truth. But the
modification strategies eliminate this moral conundrum as
effectively as they ward off disconfirmation: questers in other
traditions are not destined to be cast into the outer darkness but are
fellow travelers who will simply reach the same mountaintop via a
different path.
Now those who have adopted the modification strategies and
who read them as a much more sensitive moral stance toward the
Other than the exclusivism with which they began will trumpet the
moral responsibility to embrace their newly discovered pluralistic
theology. As a result, far from being a threat that ought to be feared,
religious and spiritual pluralism, specifically the particular approach
to pluralism associated with the modification strategies, will be
hailed as something that ought to be taken up by all sensitive souls.
The duty to embrace theological pluralism will, for many, take on
the impassioned character of a creed.
But in addition to taking up a pluralist theology as a moral as
well as spiritual duty, champions of such a pluralist theology might
reasonably be regarded as utilizing a genuinely distinctive religious
or spiritual epistemology. Whereas before embracing the
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modification strategies, the plurality of religions in my midst
weakened the plausibility structure of my own faith, now the
situation is reversed: because every one of the world religions is
believed to be engaged in essentially the same enterprise as I am in
my faith, the plausibility of religious and spiritual belief and practice
is now high. That is, the general tenets of my spiritual convictions
are now mirrored, with what are essentially only cultural differences
(perhaps in the manner that John Hick proposes), in the spiritual
convictions of all of the other world religions so that nothing could
seem more plausible than the existence of the ultimate reality to
which they mutually point.
But something more results from the employment of the
modification strategies allowing us justifiably to speak of a new state
of affairs in religious epistemology. Specifically, widespread
adoption of the notion that the Others’ religions are just different
routes to the same truth to which mine leads gives new life to the
notion of a religious sense built into the human mind, a capacity
that can intuit the presence of the ultimate in a fashion parallel to
how the physical world is given to us through our five senses.
This is, of course, an entirely familiar claim among the world’s
pious (not to mention among various influential nineteenthcentury thinkers such as the German Post-Kantians and the
American Transcendentalists). But let us distinguish two varieties of
this specially attuned sense. First, there are those who would claim
for it the ability to receive specific truths communicated from on
high, whether in the form that the Upanishads are said to be the
product of specially gifted seers or in the form of heirs of the radical
Reformation who claim to receive specific messages from God. The
second form of the claim that human beings possess a special
religious sense is more modest than the first. Rather than supposing
that individual persons can receive detailed revelations from God,
this version of the notion of religious intuition holds that we are put
together in such a way that it is possible for us to intuit the presence
of the ultimate (i.e., rather than a detailed message from that same
ultimate). Rahner’s claim, based on his version of transcendental
method, that we all possess an unthematic and preliminary
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awareness of God can be seen as one form of this more modest
proposal about a faculty of religious intuition (though it is well to
remember that Rahner did not himself move beyond inclusivism to
a full-blown pluralist theology). And it coheres with the specific
sorts of claims about the role of experience and of sensing the divine
presence that we encountered in our three paradigmatic authors
regarding modification strategies, namely, Thich Nhat Hahn,
Deepak Chopra, and John Shelby Spong. Hence it is this second,
more modest form of the claim that we possess an intuitive faculty
sensitive to ultimate reality that will be at issue for us here.
In a world where the widespread adoption of modification
strategies has not yet occurred, not only will the encounter of the
world religions lead the most honest and probing questers to fear
that the existence of a multitude of other religions with other beliefs
are disconfirming of their own, but the claim to an intuitive faculty
aimed at the transcendent, a sense in addition to the five earthbound senses, will appear unfounded and even falsifiable. In order
to see how this is so, one need only consider how differently a
physical sense such as sight operates than does an alleged sense
specially attuned to the ultimate. Suppose that you and I are
walking along a path in the woods at dusk. Suddenly, I stop and
grab you by the shoulder in order to stop you as well. I point to a
spot several hundred feet ahead of us on the trail and whisper
excitedly, “There’s a bear ahead!” You, however, disagree: “That’s
just a large tree limb that has fallen across the path.” One of the
constitutive aspects of our regular five senses is that their
deliverances can be put to the test of inter-subjective validity. To
continue our story, you bravely walk toward the disputed object on
the trail before us, while I hang back in fear and trepidation. You
walk right up to the thing, motion for me to follow, and shout out:
“I told you: it’s just an old tree limb,” at which point I walk toward
you, sheepishly no doubt, and as I get close, I can see for myself that
what had looked to me like a bear is indeed nothing more than an
old tree limb.
This not uncommon sort of incident shows that, while my five
senses can deceive me or be defective in some circumstances – the
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senses may sometimes be undermined by something as insignificant
as a poorly digested bit of dinner, as Ebenezer Scrooge avers to the
ghost of Jacob Marley – most of the time I have every reason to trust
that they are essentially reliable, precisely because I and my fellow
human beings will, at least after a little investigation, agree about
the sort of thing that, to remain with the sense of sight, we are
seeing (even if we cannot figure out what the thing is, we will be
able to agree on the traits it presents to our vision). The momentous
problem that the claim to an intuitive religious sense faces (even
when the claim is only the modest one that we can intuit the divine
presence, not the more radical clam that we can receive specific
revelatory content) is that, when the world religions are regarded as
mutually contradictory, then we have no inter-subjective agreement
to reassure us about the soundness of such a religious sense. In fact,
such an intuitive faculty will appear to be nothing more than
wishful thinking, given the fact that the alleged ultimate reality that
my tradition claims can be intuited will inevitably be appear
significantly different from the ultimate reality that your tradition
claims you can intuit.
If, however, all of the world’s major religions are understood to
be pointing to the same ultimate reality, then I could be excused for
holding that what persons from traditions other than my own are
given by their religious intuition is basically the same ultimate
reality that I intuit. Inter-subjective validity can now be understood
as being applicable to a religious sense in essentially the same
fashion as it is to the five physical senses. If one does embrace this
optimistic approach toward the existence of a reliable intuitive
faculty where ultimate reality is concerned, then it is perhaps not
such a stretch to suppose that scientific experimentation might be
able to shed some empirical light on its existence and operation,
even if the natural sciences are ill equipped to detect the existence of
the ultimate itself.
This brings us to the well-publicized work of Andrew Newberg
and his colleagues, who believe that they have discovered the seat of
spiritual intuition in the human brain and that they have at least a
rudimentary grasp of how it works. Newberg’s hypothesis centers
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upon the parietal lobe of the brain which contains what he calls the
“Orientation Association Area.” This portion of the brain orients
me in space and helps create my awareness that my body possesses
definite boundaries. It thereby helps to build up a sense of my
being a unique entity distinguishable from the other entities that
make up the universe. Newberg’s fascinating work has included
doing brain scans on Buddhist monks in deep meditation and
Catholic nuns in the midst of contemplative prayer. At the height
of their respective spiritual practices, individuals in both groups
report losing the awareness of their own bounded, distinctive
identities and being taken up into something much larger than
themselves. Of course, the Buddhists may name what they are
experiencing “emptiness,” while the Catholic nuns will indubitably
identify the larger reality with which they merge as “God.” In any
case, Newberg has consistently found that, at the height of their
respective spiritual experiences, both the Buddhists’ and the
Catholics’ brains show a readily observable quieting in the parietal
lobe. In other words, according to Newberg, his brain scans are
actually detecting the dissolution of the practitioners’ sense of
having a firmly bounded, separate identity. The quieting of the
Orientation Association Area is the physical correlate of a potent
sense of being absorbed into the ultimate.2 Of course, whether this
indubitably real sensation of self-transcendence actually involves
merging with an ultimate reality is a question beyond the scope of
Newberg’s empirical investigation.
In summary, then, widespread adoption of the modification
strategies would disarm the capacity of religions or spiritualities
other than my own to threaten my beliefs with disconfirmation and
to convict me of moral insensitivity. In addition to this negative
function – negative in the sense that it removes threats – this
widespread adoption would also have a positive function in that it
would greatly enhance the plausibility structure undergirding belief
in an ultimate, infinite reality. Furthermore, in a world full of
persons who have adopted the modification strategies with which
we have been dealing, the notion of a human intuitive faculty for
knowing the ultimate would be rendered a distinct possibility.
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Of course, there is no firm evidence to suggest that the
practitioners of the world’s great religions are rushing to adopt the
modification strategies in large numbers, nor that they will do so
anytime soon. The strategies could, of course, be embraced by a
relatively small number of questers. We might do well to recall our
discussion in Chapter One about the number of actual persons who
can be expected to resemble our ideal type, the Christian quester
dedicated to the task of faith seeking understanding. In the most
stringent reading, that ideal type might be dubbed a Christian
intellectual. What would be the result if, for example, my friend
Bartholomew embraced the modification strategies but did not
know anyone else personally who had also embraced them? At least
initially, it appears that there is nothing preventing Bartholomew
from making this move, though it will not have the aura of
plausibility conferred upon it that it would if a large number of
people, many of whom Bartholomew knew quite well, had already
made the same move.3 Yet, it would still ward off the threat of the
disconfirming Other for Bartholomew, because in his own heart of
hearts, he would now believe that what the Other believes does not
contradict his own faith convictions.
Still, it must be admitted that to embrace the modification
strategies in total isolation from the persons around me would have
its challenges. The plausibility structure backing up the
modification strategies would be less potent and reassuring in this
scenario. And surely it will be difficult for a lone quester to embrace
the modification strategies, or something like them, if religious
persons around him not only fail to embrace those strategies but
actually choose to emphasize the difference between their own
religion and other traditions. For instance, when one major task
that a religion accomplishes for its adherents is to provide them with
a unique history and identity in the midst of a larger world that
seeks constantly to undermine their sense of identity – some
commentators interpret fundamentalist Islam, for example, in these
terms – then it is understandable when that tradition selfconsciously and vocally opposes something such as the notion of
religious unity championed by the modification strategies. And
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thanks to this vehement opposition toward a theology of religious
unity, Bartholomew’s relatively isolated attempt to embrace the
modification strategies and convince himself of the ultimate unity
of the world religions will no doubt be an uphill battle compared to
the task faced by those who live in a world where the modification
strategies are embraced by large numbers of devotees of each of the
world’s major religions.
An even more sober assessment of the modification strategies
and their future results from recognizing that undesirable
consequences for faith might also result if modification strategies
were ever widely embraced. Such unhappy consequences, if they
were to materialize, would mean that religious and spiritual
pluralism are, consistent with this book’s title, destructive of belief
after all. What, specifically, might the undesirable consequences
turn out to be? First, it is not entirely implausible that adoption of
the sort of modification strategies that we explored in Chapters
Three and Four would cause many believers to abandon their
traditional church communities.
Consider the following scenario: One begins as the sort of believer
that we specified as an ideal type in Chapter One. That sort of believer
was an intellectually astute Christian who could in good conscience
and with a reasonable grasp of its meaning stand up in church to recite
the Apostle’s Creed. However, when this believer honestly confronts
the threat of the disconfirming Other, she feels the need to modify her
religious stance; she adopts something along the lines of the
modification strategies explored above, with their emphases on
immanence, experience, and ineffability. Suppose that this modified
way of understanding her Christian faith provides a thoroughly
satisfying spirituality for our believer. She happily embraces it and, as
a result, the religious Other turns from being a potential source of
disconfirmation to being a fellow traveler who reinforces the
confidence of our believer in her (modified) Christian convictions.
The question at hand is whether this idealized believer will
be motivated by the modification experience to cease actively
participating in her church community. On the one hand, there
is no necessity for her doing so, for now her Christian faith is
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immune from disconfirmation from the religious Other. As a
result, she can be an even more confident believer and remain
in her Christian church. On the other hand, her remaining in
her church may require something akin to a constant, and
perhaps unpalatably laborious, translation of much that she
hears in worship. She will hear, for example, the famous passage
from John’s Gospel which quotes Jesus as saying “I am the way,
the truth, and the life. No one comes to the Father except by
me” (John 14:6). Having adopted a modification strategy, our
ideal believer will think of this statement as requiring creative
reinterpretation. Rather than taking it at face value, she may,
for instance, interpret it to mean that no one can attain unity
with God without enhancing his or her God-consciousness –
this is Jesus’ central function – but that “Jesus” here stands not
just for Jesus of Nazareth but for any of the world religions’
central figures.
But she may also find that such exclusivist claims, biblical or
otherwise, simply go too clearly against the grain of her present
religious worldview. She may now feel an outsider to her previous
religious home, an outsider who no longer experiences a sense of
spiritual sustenance when she attends her church. Of course, one
might ask why our hypothetical believer’s abandonment of her
church community is necessarily undesirable. What is the problem
with hitherto faithful members of churches becoming what one
might call religious “free agents”? At least one answer is that
through the bulk of human history, the phenomenon of
community has been one of the most important assets of
spirituality and religion. The ability to count on the support, both
cognitive and emotional, of one’s fellow believers no matter what
difficulties the world throws one’s way is a powerful resource in the
search for a life of meaning and purpose. Such meaning and
purpose can only be found if one feels reasonably secure in his or
her world, and a spiritual community can go a long way indeed
toward engendering that sense of security. Furthermore, at least in
some brands of Christian theology, participation in the being of
Christ, what Paul Tillich called the “New Being” in Jesus as the
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Christ, can only be had by participation in Christ’s earthly, physical
body, which in the present day and age is, in essence, the Christian
community, the church.4
Consider a second possible problem exacerbated, if not
uniquely caused, by the adoption of the modification strategies we
have discussed: the erstwhile member of a church may choose to
abandon the form of spirituality found in that church in favor of the
New Age variety. After all, once one has come to the momentous
conclusion that Jesus Christ is just one way among many to unity
with the ultimate, it is but a small step to buy into the New Age’s
estimate of spiritual beliefs and practices as just so many techniques
and commodities. In that case, the question about possible
disconfirmation from the Other does not even arise (at least not
where other New Agers are concerned, though it may well face
contradiction from mainline religions, a paradoxical situation for
one who initially embraced the modification strategies precisely
because of the other world religions that seemed to contradict his or
her own). The disconfirmation threat fails even to arise mainly
because the mindset that focuses upon technique and
commodification is unlikely to raise the truth question about
spiritual and religious beliefs. At the very least, as we saw in Chapter
Five, New Age spirituality marginalizes the truth question. This is a
decidedly undesirable outcome if one assumes, as I have assumed
throughout our discussion, that truth claims are part and parcel of
spiritual pursuits and that those truth claims face various challenges,
including the disconfirming Other, that must be faced if one’s
spirituality is to maintain its integrity.
To put this problem a bit differently, the ideal type – in this
case a Christian ideal type – that I sketched out at the beginning of
this study and to which I have remained tied throughout the book
fits the orientation of the theologian and the philosopher of
religion. That is, we are focusing on those members of the Christian
community – and perhaps they are decidedly in the minority – who
put a good deal of emphasis upon the cognitive dimension of
religion, the dimension of explicit belief, and who recognize the
need to back up their truth claims with some sort of reasoning
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process. We have just considered the likelihood that some of these
folks may be directed to the New Age camp precisely by having first
confronted the modification strategies, a move that I would
denigrate as having started in a position that offers rational
justification for one’s beliefs but ending up in a position where that
intellectual rigor has been essentially abandoned. But we should
take the time here to consider the fact that things could be worse. It
may be that the influence of New Age spirituality and of various
other laudable factors that push Americans toward toleration of the
Other will bring many Christians into the New Age camp without
any particular process of rational deliberation at all: they will not be
induced to embrace the essentially non-rational aspects of New Age
spirituality as the paradoxical outcome of having worked through the
rational modification strategies at the heart of our deliberations.
Instead, they will simply bypass the deliberation that makes up the
modification strategies and, perhaps mainly due to the apparent
ubiquity and emotional appeal of New Age attitudes in
contemporary America, come up with what is essentially an
accidental concatenation of Christian and New Age belief. Note
that the persons we are imagining here are not the thoroughgoing
New Agers who give up any ties to mainline religions, if ever they
had such ties, or who disdain those religions. Rather, these are folks
who continue to think of themselves as part of the Christian
religion but who haphazardly add New Age convictions and
practices to their Christianity.
That this dynamic is in fact unfolding before our eyes in the
present historical moment is given empirical support by another of
the Pew Charitable Trust’s polls on religion (recall the polling data
they provided us in the Introduction in our discussion of potential
weak spots in American piety). In a poll released at the end of 2009,
the Pew researchers found that 29% of those in America who
identify themselves as Christian claimed to have been in touch with
the dead; 17% claimed to have seen or been in the presence of
ghosts; 14% consulted a psychic; 23% believed that there is spiritual
energy in natural entities such as trees; 23% believed in
reincarnation; and 17% believed that there is such a thing as the
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Evil Eye, in other words, that some persons can place curses upon
others.5 To wax editorial for a moment, to embrace belief in the Evil
Eye, and most of the other things the Pew poll lists, seems
predicated on the total abandonment of interest in rigorous
rationality, indeed the abandonment of the project dear to the heart
of our ideal type, namely, the enterprise of “faith seeking
understanding.”
Of course, if we are honestly and fairly to evaluate the role of
rationality in forming our spiritual convictions, we must admit a
potential weak spot where rationality is concerned in the
modification strategies too, whatever laudable degree of faith
seeking understanding they represent. A thoughtful analysis of the
modification strategies reveals that, while they can ward off the
disconfirming Other, those strategies provide no evidence at all of their
own truth. Thinking of the Christian God and of Jesus Christ in
terms such as those suggested by Nhat Hahn, Chopra, and Spong
may allow me to avoid anxiety about disconfirmation or about
moral insensitivity, but what leads me to suppose that my new
spiritual worldview accurately depicts the real ultimate and its actual
relation to human life?
It is understandable that I will be inclined to accept the truth
claims of a pluralist theology for the pragmatic reason that it takes
care of the aforementioned anxieties: this may well make the
pluralist perspective seem almost inevitably true. But while thinkers
such as Nhat Hahn, Chopra, and Spong may be able to put together
theological proposals that, if embraced, make the world religions
largely intellectually consistent with one another and accepting of
each other’s salvific power, none of these admittedly significant
boons of a pluralist theology provide direct evidence regarding the
truth question. Simply because a theological perspective is morally
sensitive and intellectually consistent does not imply that the sort of
God or ultimate that the perspective presents is real. This should
become all the clearer when one stops to think about the fact that
different sorts of modification strategies than the ones we have
investigated could no doubt also be crafted. That is, it seems
theoretically possible that we could attain moral sensitivity toward
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and intellectual consistency among the world religions through
strategies built not upon immanence, experience, and ineffability
but upon completely different elements, elements that might be
more salient in other cultural times and places. This would provide
us with a picture of the divine that might very well conflict in
various ways with the picture provided by our exploration of Nhat
Hahn, Chopra, and Spong. There is simply no guarantee of truth
provided by disarming the disconfirming power of the Other –
though this of course eliminates one reason for thinking that one’s
beliefs are untrue – or by committing oneself to a morally sensitive
theological position.
There is also another, formally different, possibility: suppose that
instead of religious thinkers coming up with proposals that clash with
those of Nhat Hahn, Chopra, and Spong but that still apparently
solve the pluralist challenge, we imagine a situation in which the
plausibility structure for my beliefs is propped up not by explicitly
harmonizing my beliefs with those of potentially disconfirming
Others but in a different fashion. I have argued elsewhere that it
might be possible to construct a distinct spiritual community held
together not by explicit agreement about the tenets of individual
members’ beliefs but by the commitment of the community or
church to support each seeker’s quest.6 There would be common
beliefs here too, but they would be on a different level; they would be
beliefs about the dignity of all human beings and of their various
spiritual quests. This approach too might be able to disarm the
disconfirming power of the Other and provide a robust plausibility
structure for each member’s beliefs, but it would be operating on the
level of attitudes of the community toward the general project of
belief rather than on the level of particular theological convictions. It
is an approach that seems well adapted to contemporary American
sensibilities, with their egalitarian yearning to let as many persons as
possible into the inner circle of spiritual life without sacrificing one’s
own most basic convictions. Yet, here too there is no necessary
correlation between this program’s ability to disarm the threatening
aspects of pluralism and the truth of any of the beliefs embraced in
any of the spiritual quests going on within the community.
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Of course none of this implies that it is impossible to come up
with arguments in addition to those we have been examining – we
have been focused here specifically upon the challenge of the
disconfirming Other – that would in fact provide evidence in favor
of the existence of the divine or ultimate as our modification
strategies perceive it. The point, however, is that this is a task that
we have not even begun to undertake and which, while we cannot
rule out its possible success, we have no way of knowing in advance
can be successful. It is advisable to remember that Christian thinkers
have for centuries attempted to come up with “proofs” for the
existence of God, or at least with arguments that suggest the
preponderance of evidence in theism’s favor, and that they have been
unable decisively to close that intellectually challenging deal. Of
course, it may be easier to meet the age-old challenge of coming up
with convincing evidence for the existence of the ultimate once the
modification strategies have at least prevented the apparently
different claims of the competing world religions from canceling
one another out.
What, then, should be our penultimate conclusion about
American religious and spiritual pluralism as a threat to belief? We
can express that penultimate conclusion in the form of five brief
propositions: First, pluralism does, without a doubt, raise the
specter of the disconfirming Other. Second, it is possible to craft
modification strategies that will render the religious Other friend
rather than foe so that the disconfirmation challenge is met, with
the moral bonus that one need no longer bear the guilt associated
with looking down on religious Others. Third, there is no way of
knowing, however, how many persons in American culture will be
interested in and willing to embrace such modifications to their
belief systems. An all-too-familiar American anti-intellectualism
suggests that only a small percentage of believers will be interested
in pursuing the project of faith seeking understanding with the sort
of rigor that analysis and adoption of the modification strategies
demand. Fourth, there are possible side-effects of taking up those
modifications that suggest that religious and spiritual pluralism will,
when all is said and done, still prove a threat to faith. Those side-
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effects include dislodging the believer from his or her erstwhile
religious community, which may, in addition, lead him or her to
view piety in terms of the New Age emphasis on technique and
commodification, which tends to push the truth question out of the
picture. Finally, if the modification strategies, whether or not they
point one toward technique and commodification in one’s spiritual
life, have no implications for the truth of one’s modified beliefs,
then the all-important truth question will stand in its own way as a
challenge to the modification strategies, as it has challenged more
traditional views of the divine throughout modernity.
There is one more topic left to consider: the five conclusions
just summarized are only penultimate because, in our investigation
thus far, we have left out any analysis of the challenges that natural
science poses to piety in the present day and age. This was no mere
oversight. In Chapter One we observed, just in passing, that some
commentators predict that the scientific worldview will eventually
lead to a thoroughgoing secularization of even a culture as
religiously and spiritually energetic as American culture. But our
interest throughout this study has lain elsewhere, namely, with how
spiritual and religious pluralism can threaten belief and with the
different approach believers can take to this challenge. But we ought
not wrap up our investigation without noting that, though it is
usually not understood in this fashion in the perennial debate
between science and religion, the scientific worldview can be viewed
as one more voice in the pluralism that is at issue for us, one more
instance of the potentially disconfirming Other.
At first blush, the notion of science as yet another form of the
disconfirming Other because it is an additional belief system seems
to result from a confusion. Suppose that we think of each of the
belief systems of each of the great world religions as a circle. If the
modification strategies can be trusted, then in terms of their specific
truth claims, and especially where the general category of topics
they address is concerned, these circles have large areas of overlap.
That is, while some of the specific content of the religions differs,
modification strategies or no, the aspects of life and the universe
that each attempts to explain – we are keeping intact our focus upon
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the cognitive dimension – are much the same. For instance, each
religion senses that human life is, as the Buddhists have put it, out
of joint, and each religion has its analysis as to just what causes that
problem. In addition, each of the religions supposes that the key to
dealing with the slings and arrows that finitude thrusts our way is to
move beyond the merely finite realm. Theists will see this goal in
terms of proper relation to God; others will look to an impersonal
infinite such as the Tao or an infinite state such as Nirvana.
Now natural science can hardly be one more circle massively
overlapping these religious belief systems, for science ordinarily
limits itself to empirical investigation of the physical world. An
investigative procedure that, at least methodologically speaking,
takes materialist reductionism as its vantage point upon reality can,
strictly speaking, neither investigate realities that lie beyond matterenergy nor offer judgments about their reality or unreality. The
mistake that has too often been made, however, when talking about
religion or spirituality and science is to suppose that if science is
indeed limited to the realm of matter-energy, it can have nothing to
say about religious beliefs. But in fact science and spirituality do
have points of contact. While there are large areas of the Christian
worldview, for instance, that speak of matters wholly outside the
purview of the scientific method, there are other portions of that
Christian worldview that cannot avoid making assumptions about
the universe of matter-energy that is science’s area of expertise. For
instance, if God is said to have miraculously cured someone of
cancer, practitioners of science, while methodologically unable to
view the divine cause, will of course be able to see the effect wrought
by that cause. What is more, if they had sufficiently intricate tools
to investigate that effect in perfect detail, they would notice a
violation of the law of conservation of matter and energy.7 God
would have to have smuggled energy from outside the closed system
of the physical universe into the inner workings of that universe.
This would be the case even if God were to operate within the
physical world by “pushing around” energy that already exists here:
that “pushing” would itself require the extra, scientifically
prohibited energy. In other words, a definite conflict arises here
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between spirituality and science; science and religion are not wholly
separate arenas of discourse.
We can easily adduce other examples of spirituality and science
both dealing with the physical universe in which we find ourselves,
examples which suggest that science and religion are sometimes
competing worldviews, each threatening the other with
disconfirmation. Consider the notion that human beings possess an
immaterial (and hence immortal) soul, a notion that most of the
great world religions affirm in one way or another (even if the
Buddha preached the doctrine of anatman, that is, “no self,” he
believed that there is something, if no more than a heap of qualities,
that passes via spiritual inertia from one life to another and
eventually into Nirvana). Those religions such as Christianity and
Hinduism and Islam that put particular emphasis on the notion of
a soul see it as distinguishable, if not wholly unconnected, from the
physical dimensions of our being. At the same time, the Abrahamic
religions most often think of the soul as the seat of our identities,
the deep center within which our personalities are formed and
which directly affects our behavior in the world, especially our
moral behavior. But the materialist worldview of the neuroscientist
suggests that the most distinguishing aspects of our personalities can
be changed by changing the physical organ that is the human brain.
Imbibing alcohol can turn a usually well-mannered man into the
proverbial “mean drunk” who goes home from the bar and beats his
wife and children. Or a stroke can take a person who had been
unfailingly gracious and kind into a cantankerous curmudgeon who
spends most of his or her time cursing and complaining. But surely
these instances show that an object of science, the purely physical
human brain, is the cause of who we are in a fashion that
spiritualities have traditionally asserted could only be a function of
an immaterial soul. Spirituality and science meet here, and that
meeting seems to be a contentious one.
It is a notorious fact that, even in the present day and age, there
are biblical literalists within the Christian community who hold
that to embrace the Darwinian notion of evolution through natural
selection would be to succumb to the disconfirmation of one’s
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religious convictions. Although they have attempted strategically to
appropriate different labels for the program that they want to
advance – for instance, “creationism,” “creation science,” and, most
recently, “intelligent design” theory – their goal is always the same,
namely, to defend their biblical literalism at whatever points that
literalism seems to be falsified by the natural sciences.
One response to the potential conflicts between spirituality and
science is simply to embrace a willful ignorance about the scientific
worldview and these potential conflicts with spirituality and
religion. At first blush, this sort of avoidance technique seems
formally similar to the sort of avoidance techniques we discussed in
Chapter One, techniques that were intended to protect one’s own
beliefs from the challenge of the disconfirming Others who are
devotees of other world religions. But upon closer inspection, we
find an important difference between the two instances of
avoidance: where the potentially disconfirming power of another
world religion is concerned, we can avoid facing the threat of
disconfirmation by trying to avoid thinking about the other
religious traditions. One reason for the possible “success” of this
avoidance maneuver is that, while there are persons of other faiths
all around me in the United States, I do not actually participate in
any of those other traditions. In our pluralistic society, I necessarily
rub up against Buddhism and Islam, for example, but I may be able
to put the implications of their existence out of my mind insofar as
I have not accepted any of their unique tenets.
But surely the majority of Americans are in a different situation
vis-à-vis the scientific worldview. While we may refuse to believe in
particular results of that worldview such as biological evolution, we
happily embrace other components of the scientific worldview,
whether we wish to or not, in a host of circumstances. For instance,
we are convinced that antibiotics can oftentimes eliminate
infections from which we suffer. And consider that most all of us
would be furious if, while suffering the symptoms of a heart attack,
we were rushed to a hospital where the staff responded by chanting,
dancing, and burning incense rather than with medical
interventions grounded in the scientific worldview.

162

THE MODIFICATION STRATEGIES

Thus it is that we find ourselves with a new version of the
problem of fragilization represented by pluralism. There is a plurality
of spiritual and religious worldviews, but in addition to all of these
there is another worldview that the vast majority of Americans at
least tacitly embrace, namely the scientific worldview – Sallie
McFague goes so far as to call scientific accounts of our origin the
“common creation story”8 – and it sometimes contradicts spiritual
convictions to a sufficient degree that it counts as another version of
the potentially disconfirming power of pluralism. Of course, unlike
the case of the disconfirming threats represented by world religions
confronting one another, the pluralism represented by a religious
worldview confronted with the scientific worldview is that this
pluralism and its concomitant conflict tends to exist within the
mind of a single individual.
What, then, are the implications of this science-centered
variation on the theme of the disconfirming Other? Perhaps some
fine-tuning of the modification strategies that we have explicated in
Chapters Three and Four might be able to equip them to deal with
this new, scientific player in our story about spirituality and
pluralism. But there is another possibility as well. In briefly treating
the modification strategies’ irrelevance to the truth question above,
we noted the very real possibility that one could construct
alternative modification strategies, strategies concentrating on
themes other than immanence, experience, and ineffability. Perhaps
the challenge of the scientific worldview to some forms of
spirituality and religion can best be met by making harmony with
science the guiding principle in constructing a modification
strategy, and only when that is achieved moving on to mold the
strategies so that they can avoid the mutual fragilization of spiritual
perspectives that has been our concern in this study. But that is, as
the saying goes, another story for another time.9
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be found in his The Christian Faith, trans. and ed. H.R. Mackintosh and
J.S. Stewart (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976).
21. Oddly enough, the one place where Chopra’s broad-minded
pluralist approach displays a dismaying lacuna is in his references to
Judaism. He takes for granted the old Christian portrayal of the Judaism
of Jesus’ day as an unimaginative, constrictive legalism and projects upon
that Judaism the distinctively Christian doctrine of original sin. See, for
example, The Third Jesus, p. 17. One wonders whether, in addition to a
simple lack of historical knowledge of Judaism, Chopra’s misapprehensions
are fueled by his special reliance on the notoriously anti-Jewish Gospel of
John for his interpretation of Jesus.
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22. Regarding Chopra’s apparently more quietest take thanks to his
notion of the everyday world as one of illusion, see, for example, The Third
Jesus: “physical life, even at its most cruel, can be transcended” (i.e., in
consciousness) (p. 111). In a similar fashion, he also says: “The rescue that
people need today won’t conquer Caesar [Jesus’ designation for the
political powers that be], but it will conquer duality. Jesus symbolized the
transcendent self that renders the ego irrelevant and transforms duality
into oneness with God” (p. 217).
23. John Shelby Spong, Jesus for the Non-Religious: Recovering the
Divine at the Heart of the Human (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco,
2007), p. 222. Further quotations from this book will be cited by page
number in the body of my essay.
24. If we juxtapose the material elements at the heart of this
modification strategy – the emphases on immanence, experience, and
ineffability – with the formal approach that our ideal type of Christian
(described in the Introduction) takes toward belief, an approach that
privileges the cognitive dimension of spirituality, it is tempting to see a
tension. If I am particularly invested in the cognitive dimensions of the
Christian life, and if it is precisely that focus on the cognitive that attunes
me to the disconfirming power of the Other and disposes me toward the
modification strategy exemplified by Nhat Hahn, Chopra, and Spong,
what are we to make of the fact that that modification strategy itself edges
away from cognition and toward experience and ineffability? The answer is
to be found in the distinction between the formal and material sides of the
equation made above: there is no tension or contradiction, for my
cognitive focus is what allows me to calculate and to understand that
movement toward a greater emphasis on experience and ineffability will
negate the Other’s ability to effect disconfirmation.
25. Quoted in Mark C. Taylor, After God (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2007), p. 5.
26. We have drawn upon Eliade at some length above. For Otto’s
central work, see The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational
Factor in the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, trans.
John W. Harvey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958).
27. Catechism of the Catholic Church (New Hope Kentucky: Urbi et
Orbi, 1994), pp. 115-16; emphasis in original.
28. Karl Menninger, Whatever Became of Sin? (New York: Hawthorn,
Press, 1973).
29. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo?, trans. Sidney Norton Deane (Chicago:
Open Court Press, 1903).
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Chapter Four
1. See, for example, Mircea Eliade, ed., Essential Sacred Writings from
Around the World (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1967), pp. 5-7.
2. Peter Berger explains Weber’s perspective in The Sacred Canopy:
Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday/Anchor Books, 1967), p. 111.
3. The forms of Protestantism that are least likely to disenchant the
world may well be those rooted in Pietism, for that tradition often views
the relationship of the individual believer with Jesus Christ not as
threatening and distant, but as personal and akin to the friendship between
two human beings. Some commentators go so far as to suggest an erotic
relationship in Pietism between Jesus and the believer.
4. Mark C. Taylor, After God, p. 297. Taylor’s observation here is more
applicable to the history of modern Protestant theology than to Roman
Catholic thought.
5. See, for example, David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New
Pluralism in Theology (New York: Seabury, 1975), and Sallie McFague,
Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1982).
6. See Mark C. Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern A/Theology (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1984).
7. See Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a
Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon, 1983).
8. Harold Bloom, The American Religion: The Emergence of the PostChristian Nation (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992).
9. Thich Nhat Hahan, Living Buddha, Living Christ, p. 194.
10. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp
Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965), p. 171.
11. One might object that the sort of experience generated with the help
of sensible intuition is already “internal experience,” given that it too –
indeed any sort of experience, qua experience – plays itself out in the mind
(and is powerfully molded by the mind, if one accepts the whole of Kant’s
philosophy). But it is evident, I think, that what we are designating
“internal experience” has a peculiar right to that designation insofar as it
plays itself out in the mind without being (directly) dependent upon
sensible intuition, which can be traced back to physical phenomena
external to the mind. Of course, the God believed to be given to
consciousness via this internal experience is claimed to be external to the
mind as well, but not in the manner of a physical object; God’s externality
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to the mind is not one of physical distance. What is more, as we have
emphasized, this God can be claimed to be immanent at the same time
that it is external or transcendent to the mind.
12. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 21.
13. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 31.
14. For a particularly perceptive account of Buddhism’s role in
contemporary America, see Chapter Twelve, “Western Dharmas,” in
Pankaj Mishra, An End to Suffering: The Buddha in the World (New York:
Picador Press, 2004).
15. The Holy Qur’an, text, translation, and commentary by A. Yusuf Ali
(Brentwood, Maryland: Amana Press, 1983).
16. See Hick, Philosophy of Religion, p. 115.
17. Of course, we have produced no arguments showing that the divine
or infinite actually is immanent within human consciousness, nor that the
divine can be and actually is experienced by some spiritually inclined
persons, nor that such experience and its object, if they exist, are necessarily
in some sense ineffable. All we have is the testimony of Nhat Hahn,
Chopra, and Spong. Thus, our investigation should in no way be confused
with a foundational or apologetic theology: the reality of the ultimate that
the believer wants to protect from disconfirmation by the Other may or
may not exist. Our concern, rather, has simply been to show how certain
modification strategies can render the Other’s beliefs consistent with the
believer’s own and thus no longer disconfirming. Whether the beliefs in
question are “true,” whether they accurately reflect reality, has not been
and will not be part of our topic.
Chapter Five
1. See above, p. 9.
2. See the “Coda” in Albanese, A Republic of Mind and Spirit.
3. At least they need not conflict when viewed simply as practices. If,
however, we insist that all such practices presuppose facts about the world
and the way in which it works, which indeed they do, then we may
reasonably look for contradictions also among the conceptual
underpinnings of diverse practices. It is simply that the majority of New
Age teachers – though not all, as we shall see below in our discussion of
those who attempt to enlist science on behalf of the New Age – have
effected an epistemic reordering such that the ontological claims about
how the universe is ultimately put together (claims that are on the top rung
of our ideal Christian’s spiritual concerns, claims that deal with the reality

NOTES

175

of God, after all) are now relegated to a lower rung of the ladder, with the
top rung now occupied with subjective perceptions of therapeutic efficacy.
4. See, for example, Michael Shermer, “Hope Springs Eternal: Science,
the Afterlife, and The Meaning of Life,” The Skeptic, 13, no. 4 (2010): 5255, and Michael Shermer, How We Believe: Science, Skepticism, and the
Search for God, 2nd ed. (New York: Henry Holt, 2003), pp. 48-58. Shermer
actually critiques John Edward and James Van Praagh in particular.
5. For a particularly thorough exercise in the scientific scrutiny of
alternative medicine, see R. Barker Bausell, Snake Oil Science: The Truth
about Complementary and Alternative Medicine (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007).
6. Susan Blackmore, “Where Are You, Sue?” in What Have You
Changed Your Mind About: Today’s Leading Minds Rethink Everything, ed.
John Brockman (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), p. 19.
7. Blackmore, “Where Are You, Sue?,” p. 20.
8. See, as but one example, Benedict Carey, “Long-Awaited Medical
Study Questions the Power of Prayer,” New York Times, March 31, 2006, p. 1.
9. Lynne McTaggart, The Field: The Quest for the Secret Force of the
Universe, updated ed. (New York: Harper, 2008), p. xxiii.
10. Phaedra and Isaac Bonewits, Real Energy: Systems, Spirits, and
Substances to Heal, Change, and Grow (Franklin Lakes, NJ: Career
Press, 2007).
11. See Victor J. Stenger, Quantum Gods: Creation, Chaos, and the
Search for Cosmic Consciousness (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2009).
12. See Rhonda Byrne, The Secret (New York: Atria, 2006), and the
film What the Bleep Do We Know? (2004), directed by Betsy Chasse et al.
13. See Michael Shermer, “Quantum Flapdoodle and Other
Flummery,” his Foreword to Victor Stenger’s Quantum Gods, p. 8. Some
readers, having seen the New Age’s traditional emphasis on technique, and
noting that even when New Agers give more weight than usual to the New
Age as a belief system it remains inconsistent with the scientific worldview,
might conclude that the New Age ought to be categorized not as “religion”
but as “magic.” The traditional divide between religion and magic suggests
that, for the religious person, any supernatural favors granted one are the
gracious gifts of a power beyond one’s control, while magic is all about
mastering techniques for controlling the world. Given that the religion
versus magic distinction is most often invoked by those in favor of religion,
it is not surprising that, despite the admiration, or even envy, that one
might feel for Harry Potter, magic is usually frowned upon as a self-deceived
quest for the essentially selfish ability to manipulate reality. However, given

176

NOTES

that our approach to the New Age sees it as a contemporary manifestation
of what Albanese calls metaphysical religion and that our particular concern
is with its highly pluralistic character, it would not, I think, prove
illuminating for us to pursue the magic versus religion distinction here.
Chapter Six
1. “Christians and Lions,” The Economist (December 31, 2011January 6, 2012): 9.
2. See Andrew Newberg, Eugene D’Aquili, and Vince Rause, Why
God Won’t Go Away: Brain Science and the Biology of Belief (New York:
Ballantine Books, 2001), and Andrew Newberg and Mark Robert
Waldman, Born to Believe: God, Science, and the Origin of Ordinary and
Extraordinary Beliefs (New York: Free Press, 2006).
3. This goes to show that the plausibility structure for my belief being
strengthened via the modifications has at least two different moments.
First, and most important, the plausibility of my beliefs will be reinforced
when I adopt the modifications. Second, the attractiveness and apparent
wisdom of that process of adoption will itself seem the more plausible the
larger the number of persons in my society who have already adopted the
modifications before me.
4. See Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of
Chicago, 1951-63) vol. 2.
5. “Pew Forum: Many Americans Mix Multiple Faiths,” at
http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=490, p. 2. Accessed December 14, 2009.
6. For my attempt to treat this hypothesis in detail, see To Re-Enchant
the World: A Philosophy of Unitarian Universalism (New York: Xlibris
Press, 2004).
7. The first law of thermodynamics states that matter and energy in a
closed system can never be either created or destroyed but can only change
their form.
8. See Sallie McFague, The Body of God: An Ecological Theology
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press, 1993).
9. For an analysis that focuses exclusively upon making spiritual
affirmations consistent with the scientific worldview, see my Beyond the
God Delusion: How Radical Theology Harmonizes Science and Religion
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008).
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